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I. Developments 
 
A. IRC § 170(h) and Treasury Regulations 
 
IRC § 170(h) (attached as Appendix A), which authorizes a federal charitable income tax 
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement meeting specific requirements, was 
enacted in 1980. Treasury Regulations interpreting § 170(h) (attached as Appendix B) were 
issued in 1986. The Treasury Regulations are based, in large part, on the detailed Senate 
Report describing § 170(h) (the legislative history).1 
 
B. Washington Post Articles 
 
In May 2003, the Washington Post published a series of articles questioning some of the 
practices of The Nature Conservancy.2 In December of that same year, the Washington 
Post published a follow-up article describing allegedly abusive conservation easement 
donation transactions involving “wildly exaggerated” easement appraisals and developers 
who received “shocking” tax deductions for donating conservation easements encumbering 
golf course fairways or otherwise undevelopable land.3 
 
In December 2004, the Washington Post published a second series of articles alleging 
abuses in the facade easement donation context.4 The articles described a surge in facade 
easement donations that coincided with the emergence of for-profit facilitators and 
nonprofit organizations that have “taken in millions of dollars for processing paperwork 
and monitoring the easements.” The articles also noted that facade easements often merely 
duplicate restrictions already imposed by local law and fail to decrease the value of the 
buildings they encumber, making tax deductions based on a 10% to 15% reduction in the 
value of the properties unwarranted. One promoter reportedly told property owners they 
would receive tax breaks for a drop in their property values, but stressed that there would 
be no actual decline; that "[i]t's a paper concept."5 
 
C. IRS Notice 2004-41 
 
In June 2004, the IRS issued Notice 2004-41,6 which states that the IRS is aware that 
taxpayers who transfer conservation easements to charitable organizations or make 
payments to charitable organizations in connection with a purchase of real property from 
the organization may be improperly claiming charitable deductions under § 170. The 
                                               
1 S. Rep. No. 96-1007 (1980), 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1980, 1980-2 C.B. 599, available at 1980 IRB LEXIS 2362 or 1980 
WL 12915. 
2 See David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at A1; Joe 
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Species Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 2003, at A1; Joe 
Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss; Buyers Gain Tax Breaks with Few 
Curbs on Land Use, WASH. POST, May 6, 2003, at A1. 
3 Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1. 
4 See Joe Stephens, For Owners of Upscale Homes, Loophole Pays; Pledging to Retain the Facade Affords a Charitable 
Deduction, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A1 [Loophole Pays]; Joe Stephens, Local Laws Already Bar Alterations; 
Intervention by Trusts Is Rare for Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A15; Joe Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into 
Big Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1. 
5 See Loophole Pays, supra note 4. 
6 Available at https://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-28_IRB#NOT-2004-41.  
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Notice warned that the IRS intends to disallow improper deductions and impose penalties 
and excise taxes on taxpayers, promoters, and appraisers involved in such transactions. 
 
D. 2005 JCT Report 
 
In January 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) issued a report to Congress 
recommending, among other things, that: 
1. the federal charitable contribution deduction offered to conservation easement 
donors be eliminated with respect to easements encumbering property on which the 
donor maintains a personal residence, 
2. the deduction be substantially reduced in all other cases, and 
3. new standards be imposed on appraisers and appraisals with regard to the 
valuation of easements.7 
 
E. Proposal to Penalize Charities that Fail to Enforce Restrictions 
 
In March 2005, the JCT published a Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the 
President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, one of which was to impose significant 
penalties on a charity that removes or fails to enforce conservation easement restrictions, 
or transfers an easement without ensuring that the conservation purposes will be protected 
in perpetuity.8  
 
F. 2005 SFC Report 
 
In June 2005, the Senate Finance Committee (SFC) held a hearing on the federal tax 
incentives available with respect to conservation easement donations. In connection with 
that hearing, the SFC issued a report in which it recommended numerous reforms, 
including: 
1. revocation of the tax-exempt status of conservation organizations that regularly 
and continuously fail to monitor the conservation easements they hold (or the 
suspension of the ability of such organizations to accept tax-deductible 
contributions), 
2. implementation of an accreditation program for conservation organizations 
acquiring easements, 
3. limiting charitable contribution deductions for certain small easement donations 
and providing the IRS with the authority to pre-approve deductions for such 
donations, and 
4. IRS issuance of guidance regarding how a conservation organization can 
establish that it is appropriately monitoring the easements it holds.9 
 
                                               
7 Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, JCS-
2-05, 281 (Jan. 27, 2005). 
8 Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Proposal, prepared by Joint 
Committee on Taxation, JCS-3-05, 239–41 (March 2005).  
9 Report of Staff Investigation of The Nature Conservancy (Volume I), U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Executive 
Summary 10-11 (June 2005), available under “Library,” then “Committee Prints” at http://finance.senate.gov/.  
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The Senate Finance Committee report also expresses concern regarding amendments to 
conservation easements. The report explains that “[m]odifications to an easement held by 
a conservation organization may diminish or negate the intended conservation benefits, and 
violate the present law requirements that a conservation restriction remain in perpetuity.”10 
The report notes that modifications made to correct ministerial or administrative errors are 
permitted under present federal tax law.11 But the report expresses concern with regard to 
“trade-off” amendments, which both negatively impact and further the conservation 
purpose of an easement, but on balance are arguably either neutral with respect to or 
enhance such purpose.12 The report provides, as an example, an amendment to an easement 
that would permit the owner of the encumbered land to construct a larger home in exchange 
for restrictions further limiting the use of the land for agricultural purposes.13 The report 
explains that trade-off amendments “may be difficult to measure from a conservation 
perspective,” and that the “weighing of increases and decreases [in conservation benefits] 
is difficult to perform by [the holder] and to assess by the IRS.”14 
 
G. 2005 IRS Testimony Before SFC 
 
In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in June 2005, then IRS 
Commissioner of the Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division discussed steps the 
IRS was taking to enforce the law in this area, including: 
1. modifications to IRS Forms 1023, 990, and 8283, 
2. the formation of a special cross-functional team to “attack all aspects of the 
problem of conservation easements,” and 
3. increased audits of easement donors.15 
 
H. Pension Protection Act of 2006 
 
To combat abuses, the Pension Protection Act of 2006,16 among other things: 
1. revised the rules in § 170(h) with respect to contributions of certain types of 
façade easements, 
2. provided statutory definitions of the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified 
appraisal” in IRC § 170(f)(11), and 
3. lowered the thresholds for accuracy-related penalties and made the gross 
valuation misstatement penalty with regard to charitable contributions a strict 
liability penalty. 
 
At the same time, the Pension Protection Act increased the tax benefits offered to 
conservation easement donors for donations made in 2006 and 2007 by making the 
percentage limitations and carry-forward periods applicable to resulting charitable 
                                               
10 Id., Executive Summary 9. 
11 Id., Executive Summary 9, n. 20. 
12 See id., at Pt. II 5. 
13 See id. 
14 Id. 
15  The testimony is available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=e821cece-d9eb-1c66-4b9e-
b4a6602a54f4.  
16 Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780. 
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deductions more favorable. 17  These enhanced incentives were repeatedly temporarily 
extended and then made permanent in 2015.18 
 
I. DOJ Suit Against Trust For Architectural Easements 
 
In June 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Trust for 
Architectural Easements (“TAE”).19 The lawsuit alleged, among other things, that TAE 
made false and fraudulent statements to prospective donors about the tax benefits available 
for donating façade easements, steered donors to appraisers who had been coached by it to 
go along with its questionable practices, helped donors to claim deductions before 
donations were final, and allowed donors to terminate easements they had already 
granted.20 In July 2011, a U.S. District Court Judge issued a permanent injunction against 
TAE settling the case.21 The injunction permanently prohibits TAE from engaging in what 
the federal government said were abusive and illegal practices. The injunction bars TAE 
from, among other things: 
1. representing to prospective donors and others that the IRS has established a “safe 
harbor” for the value of a donated façade easement equal to 10 to 15% of the subject 
building’s value, 
2. participating in the appraisal process for a conservation easement in any regard, 
including recommending or referring donors to an appraiser or TAE’s preferred list 
of appraisers, 
3. accepting easements that lack a conservation purpose or do not satisfy the 
“protected in perpetuity” requirement of § 170(h), and 
4. requesting fees or cash donations tied to a percentage of the estimated value of 
the easement or the deduction to be claimed with regard to the easement’s donation. 
 
TAE was also ordered to pay an independent monitor for two years to ensure that it 
complied with the injunction.22 
 
  
                                               
17 Before 2006, as a general rule, a property owner could claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the 
extent of 30% of the property owner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation and the following 
five years. Based on changes made in 2006, which were temporary and repeatedly extended temporarily, easement donors 
were permitted to claim the resulting deduction to the extent of 50% of the donor’s AGI in the year of the donation and 
the following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher donations, 100% of the donor’s AGI for the 16-year period.. 
See Technical Explanation Of H.R. 4, The "Pension Protection Act Of 2006," prepared by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, JCX-38-06 (August 3, 2006) [hereinafter JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006].  
18 For guidance on deductions by individuals for qualified conservation contributions, see IRS Notice 2007-50. 
19 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. June 14, 
2011). TAE was formerly known as the National Architectural Trust or “NAT.” 
20 Id. See also Janet Novack, Feds Sue Trust Over Historic Easement Tax Breaks, Taxing Matters, FORBES, June 16, 
2011. 
21 Stipulated Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C. July, 15, 2011) (TAE 
agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing). 
22 Id. See also D.C. Federal Court Bars Company from Promoting Alleged Tax Scheme Involving Improper Easements 
on Historic Buildings, Department of Justice Press Release (July 18, 2011); Joe Stephens, Judge bars D.C. charity from 
promoting ‘façade easement’ tax deductions, WASH. POST, July 19, 2011. 
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J. IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide 
 
The IRS issued a Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide in 2012 (last revised in 
Jan. 2018).23 The Guide is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the 
IRS, and it cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such. The Guide nonetheless provides 
a detailed summary of many of the requirements that must be met to be eligible for a 
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement under § 170(h) and includes 
numerous examples. The Guide also alerts readers to various issues that IRS Examiners 
will consider when reviewing a taxpayer’s tax return claiming a § 170(h) deduction.   
 
K. IRS Form 990 Disclosures 
 
IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations—as most land trusts are—must file an IRS Form 990 
(Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax) each year. Schedule D to IRS Form 
990 requires a charitable organization holding a conservation easement to provide certain 
information, including: 
 
1. the total number of conservation easements held at the end of the year;  
2. the total acreage restricted by such easements;  
3. the number of easements modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, by the 
organization during the taxable year; 
4. whether the organization has a written policy regarding the monitoring and 
enforcement of easements; 
5. the total number of hours devoted to monitoring, enforcing, and inspecting 
conservation easements during the tax year; and 
6. the expenses incurred during the tax year to monitor, inspect, and enforce 
easements. 
 
For each easement modified, transferred, released, or extinguished, in whole or in part, the 
organization must explain the changes in a Supplemental Statement to Schedule D. The 
Instructions for Schedule D explain: 
 
1. an easement is released, extinguished, or terminated when, among other things, 
all or part of the property subject to the easement is removed from the protection of 
the easement in exchange for cash or the protection of some other property; 
2. the use of synonyms does not avoid the application of the reporting requirement 
(e.g., calling an action a “swap” or a “boundary line adjustment” does not mean the 
action is not also a modification, transfer, or extinguishment); and 
3. “[t]ax exemption may be undermined by the modification, transfer, release, 
extinguishment, or termination of an easement.” 
 
  
                                               
23  The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide is available at https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/audit-techniques-guides-atgs.  
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L. Obama Administration Calls for Reform 
 
In its Revenue Proposals for fiscal year’s 2013 through 2017,24 the Obama Administration 
proposed a variety of reforms to curb abuses in the conservation easement deduction 
context, including: 
 
1. elimination of the charitable deduction for contributions of conservation 
easements on golf courses; 
2. disallowance of the deduction for the value of a façade easement associated with 
forgone upward development above a historic building; 
3.  requiring all conservation easements to further a clearly delineated Federal or 
authorized state or tribal governmental policy and yield a significant public benefit; 
4. requiring donors to provide detailed information about the conservation purposes 
and public benefit of contributed easements; 
5. requiring donees to meet minimum standards, attest to the accuracy of donor 
representations to the IRS, and electronically report information about donated 
easements, and 
6. subjecting donees to loss of “eligible donee” status and donees and their 
managers to penalties for overvalued easements or easements that do not further 
eligible conservation purposes. 
 
The Administration also proposed to pilot a new tax credit for conservation easement 
donations “as an alternative” to the § 170(h) deduction.  
 
M. IRS General Information Letter on Swaps 
 
In a March 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that conservation easements that are 
subject to swaps other than in the very limited situation of a swap that meets the 
extinguishment and proceeds requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6) are 
not deductible.25 A “swap” is defined as the removal of some or all of the originally 
protected property from the terms of the original deed of conservation easement in 
exchange for either the protection of some other property or the payment of cash. 
 
  
                                               
24 See General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 140 (February 
2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf; 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 161-162 (April 2013), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf; 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 193-196 (March 2014), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf; 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals, Treas. Dep’t 188-192 (Feb. 2015), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf; 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf. 
25 Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (March 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/12-0017.pdf. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
  7 
N. IRS General Information Letter on Extinguishment 
 
In a September 2012 Information Letter, the IRS advised that, while state law may provide 
a means for extinguishing a conservation easement for state law purposes, the requirements 
of § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations, including Treasury Regulation §1.170A-14(g)(6) 
(the judicial extinguishment and division of proceeds regulation), must nevertheless be 
satisfied for a contribution to be deductible for federal income tax purposes.26 
 
O. DOJ Suit Against Façade Easement Appraiser 
 
In January 2013, the United States filed a complaint in District Court against an appraiser 
and the company he owned with his wife.27 The complaint alleged, among other things, 
that the appraiser had appraised more than ninety conservation easements for purposes of 
the deduction under § 170(h) and had repeatedly and continually made material and 
substantive errors, distorted data, and provided misinformation and unsupported personal 
opinions in the appraisals to significantly inflate the value of the easements for federal 
deduction purposes. The complaint also alleged that the appraiser attempted to obstruct 
IRS enforcement efforts by claiming not to have any work files for his appraisal reports, 
which professional standards require that an appraiser maintain. “This sort of abuse of a 
high-dollar charitable contribution deduction,” stated the complaint, “inspires contempt for 
the system of honest, voluntary income tax reporting.” 
 
In February 2013, the District Court issued an Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction that, 
among other things, (i) barred the appraiser and the company from preparing any kind of 
appraisal report or otherwise participating in the appraisal process for any property relating 
to federal taxes and (ii) ordered the appraiser and the company to provide to counsel for 
the United States a list of clients for whom they prepared appraisal reports for tax purposes 
on or since November 1, 2009.28 
 
P. IRS CCA on Conservation Easement Valuation 
 
In August 2012, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel published helpful guidance on valuing 
conservation easements in accordance with some of the more technical requirements of 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).29 The Chief Counsel Advice (CCA) specifically 
addresses the “contiguous parcel” and “enhancement” rules, and provides twelve examples 
illustrating the application of those rules. 
 
  
                                               
26 Information Letter from Karin Goldsmith Gross, Senior Technician Reviewer, IRS (Sept. 18, 2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/1VMfimR.  
27 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, U.S. v. Ehrmann et al., Civ. No. 1:13-cv-214 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 
30, 2013). 
28 Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction, U.S. v. Ehrmann, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00214-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2013) (the 
appraiser and company agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing). See also Ohio Federal Court Bars 
Appraiser of Historic-Preservation Easements, Department of Justice Press Release (Feb. 13, 2013). 
29  IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/1334039.pdf. See also IRS on Conservation Easement Valuation, at 
 http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2014/09/irs-on-conservation-easement-appraisals.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
  8 
Q. IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Easements for Five Years 
 
In March 2014, the IRS announced that its Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
had entered into a settlement agreement with a group of appraisers from the same firm 
accused of aiding in the understatement of federal tax liabilities by overvaluing facade 
easements for charitable donation purposes.30 To value facade easements, the appraisers 
had simply multiplied the “before” value of the subject property by a fixed percentage, 
generally 15%. Under the settlement agreement, the appraisers admitted to violating 
relevant sections of Circular 230. According to the Director of OPR: 
 
Appraisers need to understand that they are subject to Circular 230, and must 
exercise due diligence in the preparation of documents relating to federal tax 
matters. Taxpayers expect advice rendered with competence and diligence that goes 
beyond the mere mechanical application of a rule of thumb based on conjecture and 
unsupported conclusions. 
 
The appraisers agreed to a five-year suspension of valuing facade easements and 
undertaking any appraisal services that could subject them to penalties under the Internal 
Revenue Code. The appraisers also agreed to abide by all applicable provisions of Circular 
230. 
 
 
R. Enhanced Incentives Made Permanent  
 
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Protecting Americans from 
Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (the PATH Act).31 Before the PATH Act, as a general rule, a 
property owner could claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the extent 
of 30% of the property owner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the 
donation and the following five years. Based on changes made in 2006, which were 
temporary and repeatedly extended temporarily, easement donors were permitted to claim 
the resulting deduction to the extent of 50% of the donor’s AGI in the year of the donation 
and the following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher donations, 100% of the 
donor’s AGI for the 16-year period. The PATH Act made these favorable rules for 
easement donations permanent. In addition, beginning in 2016, the Act allows an Alaska 
Native Corporation donating a conservation easement with respect to certain lands to claim 
the resulting deduction to the extent of 100% of taxable income in the year of the donation 
and the following 15 years. Accordingly, farmers, ranchers, and Alaska Native 
Corporations that make qualifying easement donations can potentially avoid paying any 
federal income tax for up to 16 years. The PATH Act made the enhanced incentives 
                                               
30 IRS, IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing Facade Easements for Federal Tax Purposes for Five Years, IR-2014-31 
(March 19, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Bars-Appraisers-from-Valuing-Facade-
Easements-for-Federal-Tax-Purposes-for-Five-Years.    
31 See Technical Explanation of the Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes Act of 2015, prepared by the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, JCX-144-15 (Dec. 17, 2015).  
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permanent without implementing any reforms proposed by the Treasury or others to curb 
abuses.32  
 
The incentives for conservation easement donations are complex. It is important to have a 
competent tax professional who has up to date software estimate the potential tax benefits. 
Neither the donor nor the donee should attempt to guess or estimate the potential benefits. 
 
S. Appraiser and CPA Summonses Enforced 
 
In April 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s 
petition to enforce a summons served on an appraiser.33 The summons requested, among 
other things, all documents reflecting the customers for whom the appraiser prepared or 
approved conservation or historic easement appraisals during the period beginning January 
1, 2010, through the present, and all appraisal work files for such appraisals. The judge 
found that the summons had a legitimate purpose (to determine whether the appraiser had 
improperly appraised conservation easements), the summons was not overbroad, and the 
IRS was not acting in bad faith. 
 
In June 2016, a U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia granted the IRS’s 
petition to enforce a summons served on a certified public accountant (CPA).34 Among 
other things, the IRS was seeking client files, tax returns, and supporting documentation 
for federal tax returns prepared by the CPA for tax years 2010-2012 that were either 
conservation easement partnership returns or federal income tax returns where the client 
claimed a charitable deduction arising from a conservation easement. Quoting the Eleventh 
Circuit, which was quoting the Supreme Court, the judge explained, in part, that:  
 
“[T]he Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential 
taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.... The purpose 
of ... [a summons] is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations 
unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-
reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable 
invasions of house, business, and records.” 
                                               
32 See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges, and Reform, 2013 UTAH 
LAW REVIEW 755; Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA. TAX REV. 229 (2014); 
Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (2011); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. 
TAX REV. 225 (2016); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements: 
Protecting the Federal Investment After Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012); Jeff Pidot, 
Reinventing Conservation Easements: A Critical Examination and Ideas for Reform (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
2005). See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements and the Essential Perpetuity 
Requirements, 37 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2017). 
33 U.S. v. Clower, 2016 WL 3144048 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in U.S. 
v. Clower, 2016 WL 3129451 (N.D. Ga. March 22, 2016), aff’d U.S. v. Clower, 666 Fed.Appx. 869 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(unpublished). See also U.S. v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that IRS summons seeking production of 
appraiser’s work file was issued in good faith and the file was not protected from disclosure by the work-product doctrine, 
but remand was required to determine whether some of the contents of file were protected by attorney-client privilege); 
Stern v. U.S., 2010 WL 7096092 (D. Idaho 2010). 
34 U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 3912060 (N.D. Ga. June 21, 2016), adopting Judge’s Report and Recommendation in 
U.S. v. Greenberger, 2016 WL 391206 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2016). See also Greenberger v. IRS, 283 F.Supp.3d 1354 (N.D. 
Ga. 2017), in which the court denied Greenberger’s FOIA request seeking the IRS’s investigation file concerning him. 
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T. Treasury’s 2016-2017 Priority Guidance Plan 
 
The Treasury’s 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan contained projects that were priorities 
for allocation of the resources of its offices from July 2016 through June 2017.35 One of 
the listed projects was “[g]uidance under §170 regarding charitable contributions of 
conservation easements.” 
 
U. Syndicated Conservation Easement Transactions 
 
In December 2016, the IRS issued Notice 2017-10, which identifies certain conservation 
easement donation transactions involving pass-through entities as “listed” (or tax 
avoidance) transactions and requires certain parties to such transactions to make 
disclosures to the IRS. The Notice identifies the following transactions and those 
substantially similar thereto as “listed” transactions: if an investor received oral or written 
promotional materials that offered prospective investors in a pass-through entity the 
possibility of a deduction that equals or exceeds two and one-half times the investor’s 
investment. Donees described in § 170(c) are not treated as parties to, participants in, or 
material advisors with respect to such transactions for purposes of the Notice.36  
 
In May 2017, an economist at the Brookings Institution published a report discussing 
problems and abuses in the conservation easement donation context, including grossly 
inflated easement appraisals and easements that do not fulfill bona fide conservation 
purposes.37 In December 2017, the economist published a follow-up piece on abuses that 
explains that the deduction program is costing billions of dollars annually in terms of lost 
revenue and now ranks among the largest federal environmental and land management 
programs in the U.S. budget.38 
  
In September 2018, the IRS announced Syndicated Conservation Easement Transactions 
as one of its compliance campaigns.39  
 
In December 2018, the DOJ filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia seeking an order to shut down certain promoters of syndicated donation 
                                               
35 Department of the Treasury, 2016–2017 Priority Guidance Plan, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2016-
2017_pgp_initial.pdf.  
36 See also Notice 2017-29; Notice 2017-58. 
37  Adam Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements, Brookings Institution 5 (May 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/looney_conservationeasements.pdf. 
38 Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Costs of a Surprising Tax Shelter: The Syndicated Conservation Easement, 
Brookings Institution (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/12/20/estimating-the-rising-cost-
of-a-surprising-tax-shelter-the-syndicated-conservation-easement/. For additional reporting on syndicated transactions, 
see, e.g., Peter Elkind, The Billion-Dollar Loophole, ProPublica (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/conservation-easements-the-billion-dollar-loophole; Richard Rubin, Thousands of 
Investors Got Big Tax Breaks for Land-Rights Donations, IRS Finds, Wall St. J. (Mar. 14, 2018). 
39 See IRS Announces the Identification and Selection of Five Large Business and International Compliance Campaigns 
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/irs-announces-the-identification-and-selection-of-five-large-business-
and-international-compliance-campaigns-0. This campaign is intended to encourage taxpayer compliance and ensure 
consistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers by ensuring the easement contributions meet the legal requirements 
for a deduction and the fair market values are accurate. 
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transactions operating out of Georgia and require them to disgorge all profits related to 
such transactions, plus interest.40  
 
In March 2019, the IRS announced that syndicated deals are on their annual “Dirty Dozen” 
list of Tax Scams to avoid.41 The Senate Finance Committee launched an investigation into 
the potential abuse of syndicated conservation easement transactions.42  In addition, a 
bipartisan bill was introduced into Congress that would limit deductions under § 170(h) for 
certain easement contributions made by partnerships.43 The bill is designed to curb abuses 
by promoters of syndicated deals, while still allowing partners in family or other legitimate 
conservation partnerships to benefit from the deduction. 
 
V. Case Law 
 
Since 2005, the courts have decided more than 70 cases involving challenges to deductions 
claimed with respect to easement donations. More than 100 opinions have been issued in 
these cases, some of which were appealed, had a motion for reconsideration filed, or 
resulted in opinions addressing different issues. Appendix C lists the cases and opinions as 
of April 2019. The cases and opinions are referred to in this outline by case name and 
numerical designation (e.g., Belk III, Carpenter I, Palmer Ranch II).  
                                               
40 See DOJ, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Sues to Shut Down Promoters of Conservation Easement Tax 
Scheme Operating out of Georgia (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-shut-down-
promoters-conservation-easement-tax-scheme-operating-out; Complaint, U.S. v. Zak et al., Case 1:18-cv-05774-AT 
(N.D. Ga., Dec. 18, 2018). See also Jay Adkisson, DOJ Sues to Shut Down Conservation Easement Tax Shelter 
Promoters, Forbes, Personal Finance (Dec. 20, 2018), https://goo.gl/FD5vSP.  
41 IRS, Abusive tax shelters, trusts, conservation easements make IRS’ 2019 "Dirty Dozen" list of tax scams to avoid, 
(March 19, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/abusive-tax-shelters-trusts-conservation-easements-make-irs-2019-
dirty-dozen-list-of-tax-scams-to-avoid.  
42 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Grassley, Wyden Launch Probe of Conservation Tax Benefit Abuse, March 27, 
2019, https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/grassley-wyden-launch-probe-of-conservation-tax-benefit-
abuse.  
43 U.S. Congressman Mike Thompson, Thompson and Kelly Introduce Legislation to Help Stop Abuse of Conservation 
Tax Incentive, March 28, 2019, https://mikethompson.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/thompson-and-kelly-
introduce-legislation-to-help-stop-abuse-of-conservation.  
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II. Filing a Tax Return Package to Minimize Risk of Audit 
 
• Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement Deed 
• IRS Form 8283 & Supplemental Statement 
• Qualified Appraisal 
• Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment 
• Correct and Timely Baseline Documentation 
• Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable) 
 
A. Correctly Drafted Conservation Easement Deed 
 
1. File Copy of Recorded Conservation Easement Deed. A copy of the correctly 
drafted and recorded conservation easement deed should be either (i) filed with IRS 
Form 8283, Section B (the appraisal summary) or (ii) if the easement is valued at 
more than $500,000, included in the qualified appraisal filed with IRS Form 8283.  
 
a. Best practice is to either (i) file the date stamped copy of the recorded 
easement deed with the Form 8283 or (ii) have the appraiser include the 
date stamped copy of the recorded easement deed in the appraisal.  
 
b. It is imperative that the appraiser values the easement as described in the 
final recorded easement deed rather than in an earlier draft.  
 
c. As noted in the discussion of IRS Form 8283 in Part II.B below, the IRS 
has informally suggested that a copy of the qualified appraisal be included 
in the package filed with the federal income tax return on which a deduction 
for the easement donation is first claimed even if the appraised value of the 
easement is $500,000 or less. 
 
Façade easements on buildings in registered historic districts are subject to special 
rules. The taxpayer must include with the taxpayer’s return for the year of the 
contribution, in addition to the Form 8283: (i) a qualified appraisal, (ii) photos of 
the entire exterior of the building, and (iii) a description of all restrictions on the 
development of the building.44 A date stamped copy of the recorded easement deed 
should be included with these items. If the deduction claimed is more than $10,000, 
it will be allowed only if the taxpayer also includes a $500 filing fee.45 
 
2. Include Extensive Recitals. The conservation easement deed should include 
extensive recitals clearly indicating the conservation or historic values of the 
property that are worthy of protection. 
 
3. “Exclusively for Conservation Purposes” Requirements. To be eligible for a 
deduction, the donation of a conservation easement must, among other things, be a 
contribution made “exclusively” for one of more of the four “conservation 
                                               
44 See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii). 
45 See IRC § 170(f)(13); IRS Form 8283-V. 
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purposes” enumerated in § 170(h).46 The contribution will not be treated as made 
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is “protected 
in perpetuity.” 47  Satisfying the “protected in perpetuity” requirement requires 
satisfying all of the following requirements:48 
 
a. the eligible donee requirement,49   
b. the restriction on transfer requirement,50    
c. the no inconsistent uses requirement, 51 
d. the general enforceable in perpetuity requirement, 52  
e. the mortgage subordination requirement,53 
f. the mineral extraction restrictions requirement,54  
g. the baseline documentation, donee notice, donee access, and donee 
enforcement requirements,55 and 
h. the extinguishment and proceeds requirements.56 
 
Analysis by the IRS and the courts of the “exclusively for conservation purposes” 
requirement generally has not been systematic, making the cases somewhat 
difficult to categorize. Areas of focus have included whether the purpose is 
“protected in perpetuity” despite reserved rights or inconsistent uses, satisfaction 
of the conservation purposes test generally, whether the extinguishment and 
division of proceeds requirements were satisfied, and whether the mortgage 
subordination requirement was satisfied. 
 
4. Extensive Reserved Rights. In Glass, Butler, and Pine Mountain II, the IRS 
argued unsuccessfully that, at full exercise of all reserved rights, the conservation 
purposes of the easements at issue would not be protected in perpetuity. For 
discussion of reserved development rights and the siting of building areas, see Part 
II.A.6, 7, and 8 below. 
 
                                               
46 IRC § 170(h)(1)(C), (h)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(a), - 14(d). The four conservation purposes are protection of 
habitat, protection of open space, historic preservation, and preservation of land for outdoor recreation by or education 
of the general public. 
47 IRC § 170(h)(1)(C), (5)(A).  
48 See IRC § 170(h)(5)(B) (addressing surface mining); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1) (“To meet the requirements of 
this section, a donation must be exclusively for conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and (g)(1) through (g)(6)(ii) 
of this section.”). In addition, in explaining the “protected in perpetuity” requirement, the Senate Finance Committee 
provided instructions that were incorporated into the regulations as the restriction on transfer and no inconsistent use 
requirements of Treasury Regulation §§ 1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(e)(2). See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B.  
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). 
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2), (3). 
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). 
53 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (applicable only if the property is subject to a mortgage at the time of the donation). 
54 IRC § 170(h)(5)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4). 
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) and (ii). These requirements are applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the 
exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property.” However, that will almost always 
be the case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that these requirements be satisfied with regard to every 
conservation easement donation because they help to ensure the holder will have the information as well as the notice, 
access, and enforcement rights needed to properly enforce the easement. 
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) and (ii). 
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a. Glass. In Glass, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that 
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre parcel 
located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the “exclusively” for 
habitat protection “conservation purposes” requirement. The IRS argued, 
among other things, that the easements failed to satisfy this requirement 
because (i) the protected properties were too small, (ii) the taxpayers 
reserved too many rights in the easements, and (iii) there were no limits on 
building on neighboring properties. The Sixth Circuit rejected those 
arguments, finding that (i) neither § 170(h) nor the Treasury Regulations 
require that the subject property be a minimum size,57 (ii) although the 
easements reserved various use rights to the taxpayers, both also contained 
an overarching restriction prohibiting “[a]ny activity on or use of the 
Property that is inconsistent with the purpose of this Conservation 
Easement,” and provided that the easement “shall be liberally construed in 
favor of the purpose of [the easement, the land trust holder, and the state 
conservation easement enabling statute],” and (iii) neither § 170(h) nor the 
Treasury Regulations require consideration of neighboring property 
owners’ building rights when assessing the deductibility of a conservation 
easement. The taxpayers in Glass also provided credible testimony at trial 
indicating that exercise of the reserved rights would not be inconsistent with 
the habitat protection purpose of the easements, while the IRS failed to 
provide any evidence to the contrary. For more on Glass, see Part II.A.5 
below. 
 
b. Butler. In Butler, the IRS asserted that the rights retained by the 
landowners in the conservation easement deeds meant that the habitat and 
open space protection conservation purposes of the easements were not 
“protected in perpetuity.” The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the habitat 
protection conservation purpose test would still be satisfied even if the 
properties were developed to the fullest extent permitted by the easement 
deeds.58 However, the holding in Butler should not be viewed as a green 
light for retaining extensive development and use rights in a conservation 
easement deed for a number of reasons.  
 
(i) The burden of proof regarding satisfaction of the conservation 
purposes test, which normally falls on the taxpayer, had shifted to 
the IRS.  
 
(ii) The parties disagreed about whether the conservation easement 
deeds restricted the location of the building sites. The donors argued 
that the deeds incorporated the baseline documentation by reference, 
and the baseline included a map stipulating the placement of the 
                                               
57 For a critique of the Sixth Circuit’s holding on this point, see Jonathan M. Burke, A Critical Analysis of Glass v. 
Commissioner: Why Size Should Matter for Conservation Easements, 61 TAX LAWYER 599 (2008). 
58 Because the court found that the easements satisfied the habitat protection conservation purposes test it did not address 
the open space conservation purposes test. 
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building sites in locations consistent with the preservation of the 
conservation purposes. The court found that, under Georgia law, 
reference in the recorded deeds to the baseline effectively made the 
baseline (including the map) part of the recorded deeds, and the 
restrictions on the location of the lots in the map were therefore 
binding. 
 
(iii) The donors offered some (albeit “sparse”) evidence in the form 
of testimony of environmental consultants to support their 
contention that the reserved rights were not inconsistent with the 
conservation purposes of the easements and, as in Glass, the IRS 
failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary.  
 
c. Additional Case Law. After Butler was decided, the IRS informally 
indicated that in future cases it intended to hire its own environmental 
experts to testify as to whether the conservation purpose of an easement 
would be protected in perpetuity upon full exercise of all reserved rights. 
As discussed in Part II.A.5 below, the IRS hired its own environmental 
experts in Atkinson, PBBM-Rose Hill, and Champions Retreat and was able 
to establish that the easements at issue did not satisfy habitat protection 
conservation purpose test due, in part, to the reserved rights in the deeds.59 
However, in Pine Mountain II, as discussed in Part II.A.6 below, the IRS 
again lost the argument that extensive reserved rights in an easement 
permitted the subject property to be used in ways inconsistent with the 
conservation purposes of the donation because the taxpayer provided expert 
testimony (in the form of the land trust’s biologist) that this was not the 
case, and the IRS failed to provide any evidence to the contrary.  
 
d. Overarching Restriction. To prevent uses inconsistent with the 
conservation purposes of the donation, a conservation easement should     
(1) specifically reserve to the grantor (and the grantor’s successors) only 
those rights that, even if fully exercised, would be consistent with the 
conservation purpose of the easement, (2) specifically prohibit activities 
that are inconsistent with the conservation purpose of the easement (such as 
subdivision, mining, and industrial uses), and (3) because it is impossible at 
the time of conveyance to specify in the deed every conceivable variation 
of use, activity, or practice that in the future might have an adverse impact 
on the conservation purpose of the easement, include an overarching 
restriction prohibiting any activities that are inconsistent with the 
conservation purpose of the easement or the perpetual protection of the 
property’s conservation values. The overarching restriction is necessary to 
prevent the present or a future landowner from claiming that she has the 
right to do anything not specifically prohibited by the easement even if it 
                                               
59 See also IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 18 (“The Tax Court’s reliance on the 
Service’s expert reports and testimony in Atkinson demonstrates the importance of expert evidence in these types of 
‘protecting natural habitat’ cases.”). 
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would be inconsistent with the purpose of the easement or continued 
protection of the property’s conservation values.60  
 
e. Liberal Construction Provision. A conservation easement should also 
include a provision stating that the parties to the easement (and their 
successors) affirmatively agree and intend that, notwithstanding any general 
rule of construction to the contrary, the easement shall be liberally construed 
in favor of permanently protecting the property’s conservation values and 
carrying out the conservation purposes of the easement.61 In the absence of 
such a provision, there is a danger that ambiguous terms in the easement 
will be construed in favor of free use of land and that the conservation 
purposes of the easement will not be deemed “protected in perpetuity” as 
required by § 170(h).62  
 
Some state conservation easement enabling statutes mandate that 
conservation easements be liberally construed in favor of effecting their 
conservation purposes.63 However, given that statutes are subject to change 
at any time, every conservation easement deed should nonetheless include 
a liberal construction provision. 
 
5. Conservation Purposes Test. Satisfaction of the conservation purposes test was 
an issue in Turner, Glass, RP Golf I, Atkinson, PBBM-Rose Hill I and II, Champions 
Retreat, Carroll, Herman I, Partita Partners I.64  
 
a. Turner. In Turner, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
deductions claimed with respect to the donation of a conservation easement 
because the donation did not satisfy either the open space or historic 
                                               
60 See Glass; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200836014. 
61 See, e.g., BYERS & PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 376, 466-67 (2d ed. 2005).  
62 See Wetlands America Trust v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016), in which the court held that 
the common law rule of construction requiring land use restrictions to be interpreted in favor of free use of land applied 
to the conservation easement at issue and the enabling statutes in Virginia do not abrogate that rule of construction. There 
was a strong dissent: 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the common law principle of strict construction in favor of free use of 
land no longer applies to conservation easements. The strict construction principle was applied under the 
common law because easements in gross, including negative easements in gross, were disfavored as a matter 
of public policy. Today, and for at least the last four decades, Virginia public policy strongly favors the 
conservation of land and open spaces…. The oft-stated policy of the Commonwealth in favor of conservation 
easements such as the type at issue here could not be a clearer rejection of the common law strict construction 
principle.  
See id. See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Interpreting Conservation Easements, 29 PROB. & PROP. 30 (2015) (explaining 
why conservation easements should be interpreted in favor of carrying out their public-benefiting conservation purposes 
rather than in favor of free use of land), available at http://bit.ly/1KSyi2U. 
63 See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5055(c)(2) (“Any general rule of construction to the contrary notwithstanding, conservation 
or preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein to effect the purposes of 
those easements and the policy and purpose of this act”); W. VA. CODE § 20-12-5(b) (“Notwithstanding provision of law 
to the contrary, conservation and preservation easements shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained 
therein to effect the purposes of those easements and the policy and purpose of this article”). 
64 See also Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) (while contribution of a taxpayer’s house to a volunteer fire department 
for destruction by burning during training exercises serves to further the protection of property by providing valuable 
training experience for volunteer firefighters, it does not satisfy the conservation purpose test of § 170(h)). 
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preservation conservation purposes tests. Turner involved a purported 
donation to Fairfax County, Virginia, of a conservation easement 
encumbering a 29.3-acre parcel located in a historic overlay district.65 The 
subject property is in the general vicinity of Mount Vernon, President 
George Washington’s 500-acre residential estate; adjacent to President 
Washington's Grist Mill; and in close proximity to the Woodlawn 
Plantation, which was built in 1805 on land owned by President 
Washington. In obtaining an appraisal of the easement, the donor (an 
attorney whose practice concentrated on real estate transactions) 
represented that 60 residences could be built on the 29.3-acre parcel and 
that the easement reduced the number of permitted residences to 30. In 
reality, however, zoning regulations already limited development to 30 
residences because slightly more than half of the parcel (15.04 acres) was 
situated within a designated 100-year floodplain.66  
 
The Tax Court held that the easement did not satisfy the open space 
conservation purpose test because it did not limit the size of the residences 
that could be built on the 15 acres (either in square footage or height) and 
did not contain any provisions to protect the views from the nearby historic 
sites. The easement also did not satisfy the historic preservation 
conservation purpose test because it did not preserve a historic structure or 
historically important land area. The court explained:  
 
Here there has been no preservation of open space. Nor [has the 
donor] preserved anything that is historically unique about the 
property or the surrounding historical areas. [The donor] simply 
developed the property to its maximum yield within the property's 
zoning classification.67  
 
b. Glass. In Glass, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that 
two conservation easements protecting small portions of a ten-acre parcel 
located along the shoreline of Lake Michigan satisfied the habitat protection 
conservation purposes test. The IRS argued that the easements failed to 
satisfy this test because, among other things, threatened species had not 
actually been sighted living on the properties. The Sixth Circuit rejected that 
argument, finding that (i) the habitat protection conservation purposes test 
can be satisfied if the easement protects property that is potential habitat for 
rare, threatened, or endangered species, and (ii) one of the taxpayers and the 
executive director of the donee land trust credibly testified that the property 
                                               
65 The donation is referred to as “purported” because Fairfax County did not sign or acknowledge the conservation 
easement deed or sign the Form 8283. 
66 Although the donor could have attempted to obtain approval to rezone the parcel, the court noted that obtaining such 
approval would have been time-consuming and costly, and success was not guaranteed. 
67 See also Joe Stephens, IRS Gets ‘First Big Win’ in Push to Stem Abuse of Conservation Tool, WASH. POST A01 (June 
4, 2006) (describing the transaction as a $3.1 million donation that promised not to overdevelop scenic land once owned 
by George Washington and located down the road from Mount Vernon, but developers clear-cut acres of trees on the 
property and erected 29 sprawling homes that preservationists today deride as ‘McMansions.’”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
  18 
was a “famous roosting spot” for bald eagles and that there were threatened 
plant species on the properties. As explained in Part II.A.4 above, the Sixth 
Circuit also rejected the IRS’s arguments that the easements failed to satisfy 
the habitat protection conservation purposes text because (i) the protected 
properties were too small, (ii) the taxpayers reserved too many rights in the 
easements, and (iii) there were no limits on building on neighboring 
properties. 
 
c. RP Golf I. In RP Golf I, the IRS asserted that the conservation easement 
donation at issue was not made “exclusively for conservation purposes,” in 
part because the Missouri conservation policy the taxpayer referenced in the 
easement deed was limited to certain areas of the state and there was no 
evidence that the subject property was located in such an area on the date of 
the donation. The taxpayer was forced to concede that the easement was not 
made pursuant to a “clearly delineated governmental conservation 
policy.”68 
 
d. Atkinson. In Atkinson, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
$7.88 million of deductions claimed with regard to the conveyance of 
conservation easements encumbering land on and adjacent to golf courses 
located in a gated and guarded residential community in North Carolina. 
The court determined that the easements, which were conveyed to the North 
American Land Trust, did not satisfy either the habitat or open space 
protection conservation purposes tests. The properties subject to the 
easements consisted of noncontiguous tracts (i.e., fairways, greens, teeing 
grounds, ranges, roughs, ponds, and wetland areas); residential lots 
bordered most of the tracts; and a concrete golf cart path winded its way 
through the tracts. The taxpayers argued that each of the subject properties 
had independent conservation significance and contributed to the ecological 
viability of surrounding conservation areas. The IRS focused on the 
operation of the golf courses and argued that the rights retained in the 
easements negated any purported conservation purpose.  
 
Unlike in Glass and Butler, in Atkinson both the taxpayers and the IRS 
presented expert environmental testimony to establish their respective 
positions regarding the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In 
holding that the conservation easements did not satisfy this test, the Tax 
Court noted, among other things, that the most significant ecological 
features on the subject properties—the longleaf pine “remnants”—were not 
maintained in a relatively natural state worthy of conservation and were not 
protected in any event because the easements permitted cutting and removal 
of the trees; very few of the ponds had a natural edge and the few edges that 
                                               
68 The court found that material facts regarding the easement’s preservation of a natural habitat continued to be in dispute. 
The court ultimately did not rule on that issue because it sustained the IRS’s disallowance of the deduction on the ground 
that the taxpayer failed to obtain mortgage subordination agreements at the time of the easement’s donation. See Part 
II.F.2 below. 
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existed were regularly sprayed with pesticides; there were no natural fruits 
and seeds for foraging on the properties; the properties provided no cover 
for animals; and animal migration was deterred by the residential 
development surrounding each of the noncontiguous tracts, the level of 
human activity, and the frequent watering. In addition, the only birds the 
IRS’s environmental expert observed on one of the properties were geese, 
which the community attempted to “control” (i.e., drive away) using a 
border collie. The court also found that the use of pesticides and other 
chemicals in the operation of the golf course injured the ecosystems on the 
subject properties and, thus, violated the “no inconsistent use” requirement 
of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2). The court concluded that 
wildlife and plants were not “most likely” to be found and did not “normally 
live” on the properties subject to the easements, but declined to decide 
whether operating a golf course is inherently inconsistent with the 
conservation purpose of protecting relatively natural habitat. 
 
With regard to the open space conservation purposes test, the Tax Court 
noted that the taxpayers did not mention or provide any analysis of 
governmental conservation policies in their briefs, and the court deemed 
that argument abandoned. The taxpayers also failed to establish that 
preservation of the subject properties was for the scenic enjoyment of the 
general public. Since the golf courses were in a gated and guarded 
community and ringed by houses, the court found that the general public 
did not have visual access to the properties. The taxpayers argued that the 
general public had visual access because most of the population of the Town 
of St. James lived within the gated community. The court, however, did not 
deem the population of one town to constitute “the general public.”69  
 
e. PBBM-Rose Hill. In PBBM-Rose Hill I, the Tax Court, in a Bench 
Opinion, sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $15.16 million deduction 
claimed by the PBBM-Rose Hill partnership for the conveyance of a 
conservation easement encumbering a 27-hole golf course interspersed 
among houses in a gated and guarded residential community in South 
Carolina. Among other things, the court determined that the easement, 
which was conveyed to the North American Land Trust, did not satisfy the 
habitat protection, open space protection, or outdoor recreation for the 
general public conservation purposes tests. 
 
Unlike in Glass and Butler, both the taxpayer and the IRS presented expert 
environmental testimony to establish their respective positions regarding 
the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In determining that the 
easement failed that test, the Tax Court explained that the IRS’s expert 
testified credibly that, among other things, most of the encumbered property 
consisted of the golf course, which was dominated by non-native grasses, 
                                               
69 For media coverage, see Richard Rubin, IRS Tees Off on Golf Courses’ Green Tax Claims, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2016). 
Atkinson is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit. 
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required continued application of fungicides and pesticides, and was not 
conducive to wildlife; the quality of the ponds on the property was similar 
to that of waterways in urban areas; and many of the trees on the property 
were in isolated patches or thin strips. 
 
In finding that the easement failed the open space conservation purposes 
test, the Tax Court explained that the easement (i) did not preserve the 
property for the scenic enjoyment of the general public because it mainly 
benefited the homeowners in the gated and guarded residential community 
and (ii) did not preserve the property pursuant to a clearly delineated 
governmental conservation policy because the relevant policies addressed 
ecological preservation and the IRS’s expert testified that the ecological 
value of the easement was low.  
 
In finding that the easement failed to preserve the property for the outdoor 
recreation of the general public, the Tax Court noted that (i) there were 
conflicting provisions in the easement regarding public access and (ii) the 
owner of the property (the homeowners association) had converted a 
significant portion of the property into a private park.  
 
The case was appealed, and in PBBM-Rose Hill II, while affirming the 
denial of the deduction,70 the Fifth Circuit held that the easement satisfied 
the outdoor recreation for the general public conservation purposes test71 
because (i) the provision in the easement requiring that the property remain 
open for substantial and regular outdoor-recreation use by the general public 
was deemed to be “specific” and thus given greater weight than the 
conflicting provision that stated that nothing in the deed shall be construed 
to create any right of public access to the property, which was deemed to be 
“general,” and (ii) in determining whether the public-access requirement is 
satisfied, the focus should generally be on the terms of the deed and not on 
the actual use of the land after the easement’s donation. As the Fifth Circuit 
noted, however: “The public does not have access to the park; a sign on the 
road to the park states ‘[p]roperty owners, residents & guests only beyond 
this point.’” Accordingly, the IRS and the South Carolina Attorney General 
could seek to sanction the North American Land Trust for failing to enforce 
the “specific” public access provision of the easement given that such 
failure benefits the homeowners in the gated and guarded community (i.e., 
provides a private benefit). It also would be helpful for the IRS to provide 
guidance regarding what is meant by “substantial and regular use by the 
general public” to help ensure that only easements that actually provide a 
significant benefits to the general public are subsidized through the § 170(h) 
deduction. 
                                               
70 As discussed in Part II.A.12, the Fifth Circuit determined that the clause included in the easement deed providing for 
the payment of a share of the proceeds to the holder following extinguishment did not comply with the proceeds 
requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) and, thus, the partnership was not entitled to a deduction. The 
Fifth Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that the easement had a value of only $100,000. 
71 This was the only conservation purposes test at issue on appeal. 
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f. Champions Retreat. In Champions Retreat, the Tax Court sustained the 
IRS’s disallowance of a $10.427 million deduction claimed by the 
Champions Retreat LLC for the conveyance of a conservation easement 
encumbering most of a 27-hole golf course interspersed among houses in a 
gated and guarded residential community in Evans, Georgia. The court 
determined that the easement, which was conveyed to the North American 
Land Trust, did not satisfy the habitat or open space protection conservation 
purposes tests. 
 
Unlike in Glass and Butler, both the taxpayer and the IRS presented expert 
environmental testimony to establish their respective positions regarding 
the habitat protection conservation purposes test. In determining that the 
easement failed that test, the Tax Court noted, among other things, that:      
(i) the golf course property had very little plant species diversity and the 
wetland, forested, and open pond areas that had survived the golf course 
development accounted for only a little over 16% of the property,                 
(ii) environmentally hazardous fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides were 
applied to the property, the staff members applying these chemicals were 
required to wear protective gear including gloves and respirators, and some 
of the holes were specifically designed to drain into the creeks, ponds, and 
remaining wetland and forested areas on the property, (iii) the streams on 
the property exhibited little variety of aquatic life and one emitted a 
sulfurous odor and had an oily sheen, and (iv) while the LLC argued that 
the property provided a habitat for several species of conservation concern, 
including the southern fox squirrel and the denseflower knotweed, the 
squirrel was still legally hunted in Georgia (hunters could kill up to 12 per 
day during the six-month hunting season), and the bottomland forest areas 
that could provide habitat for the denseflower knotweed constituted less 
than 17% of the property and were used as drainage for the holes, thus 
subjecting those areas to the chemicals used on the course.  
 
In finding that the easement failed the open space conservation purposes 
test, the Tax Court explained that the easement did not preserve the property 
for the scenic enjoyment of the general public because the property was 
physically accessible only to members and their guests through a gate 
manned 24 hours a day, visual access to the property was very limited, and 
the annual charity events held at the golf club did not provide sufficient 
physical access to public. In addition, the court determined that the 
easement did not preserve the property pursuant to a clearly delineated 
governmental conservation policy because the policies cited by the LLC did 
not satisfy the Treasury Regulation requirements and one of the policies was 
focused on development rather than conservation.   
 
g. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation because 
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the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause.72 However, the 
court also held that the easement satisfied the open space conservation 
purpose test under § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(II), which requires that preservation 
of the property be “pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local 
governmental conservation policy” and “yield a significant public benefit.” 
The easement, which encumbers a 21-acre property located in a historic 
district in Maryland, was granted to the Maryland Environmental Trust 
(MET) and the Land Preservation Trust (LPT), as joint holders. MET is a 
quasi-public entity that the Maryland legislature established in 1967 to 
conserve the environment; it is both a unit of the Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources and governed by a board of trustees. LPT is a charitable 
conservation organization.  
 
In interpreting the governmental conservation policy requirement, Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(B) provides that: 
 
Acceptance of an easement by an agency of the Federal Government 
or by an agency of a state or local government (or by a commission, 
authority, or similar body duly constituted by the state or local 
government and acting on behalf of the state or local government) 
tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental 
policy, although such acceptance, without more, is not sufficient. 
The more rigorous the review process by the governmental agency, 
the more the acceptance of the easement tends to establish the 
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. For example, in a 
state where the legislature has established an Environmental Trust 
to accept gifts to the state which meet certain conservation purposes 
and to submit the gifts to a review that requires the approval of the 
state’s highest officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust tends to 
establish the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy. 
However, if the Trust merely accepts such gifts without a review 
process, the requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is not 
established. 
 
In finding that the easement in Carroll satisfied the open space conservation 
purpose test, the Tax Court explained that the thoroughness of MET’s 
easement-review process, combined with the fact that Maryland’s highest 
officials (the Governor, the Comptroller, and the Treasurer of Maryland) 
approved the easement, established that the easement preserves open space 
pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental conservation policy. The Tax 
Court also determined that preservation of the 21-acre property yielded a 
significant public benefit because (i) the property was in a highly desirable 
area under development pressure, (ii) the property was subject to a 
restrictive type of zoning established to foster and protect agricultural lands 
in certain areas, (iii) the valley in which the property was located was 
                                               
72 See Part II.A.12 below. 
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specifically designated in the county’s Master Plan as an agricultural 
preservation area, and (iv) four properties adjacent to the property were 
encumbered by conservation easements held by MET or a state agency. 
 
h. Herman I. In Herman I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance 
of a $21.8 million deduction for the conveyance in 2003 of a facade 
easement to the National Architectural Trust. The easement encumbered 
10,000 unspecified square feet of the approximately 22,000 square feet of 
unused development rights (UDRs) above a certified historic structure (or 
45 percent of the UDRs). 73  The easement did not, however, prevent 
alteration or demolition of the structure or prohibit the building of six stories 
over any half (front, back, or side) of the structure. Accordingly, the court 
found that the easement did not protect either the structure or the historic 
significance of the underlying land and, thus, did not satisfy the historic 
preservation conservation purposes test. In 2006, § 170(h) was amended to 
expressly require that, to be deductible, a façade easement with respect to a 
building in a registered historic district must preserve the entire exterior of 
the building (including the front, sides, rear, and height of the building).74 
 
i. Partita Partners I. In Partita Partners I, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $4.186 
million deduction for the conveyance in 2008 of a façade easement to the 
Trust for Architectural Easements (formerly the National Architectural 
Trust). The easement did not preserve the entire exterior of the building as 
required by § 170(h). Partita Partners LLC argued that, because any 
construction would require the approval of the Trust for Architectural 
Easements, alteration of the exterior of the building was unlikely. The court 
rejected that argument, explaining that § 170(h) requires a restriction that 
preserves the entire exterior of the building, not a conditional restriction that 
delegates to the grantee future decisions regarding development of the 
exterior. 
 
6. Extinguishments (Including Swaps) Require a Judicial Proceeding; 
Building Areas; Amendment Clauses. The conservation easement deed should 
include provisions satisfying the restriction on transfer and extinguishment 
requirements of Treasury Regulation §§ 1.170A-14(c)(2) and -14(g)(6), which are 
related.75 Sample “Restriction on Transfer” and “Extinguishment” Provisions are 
included in Part II.A.11 below. 
 
a. Carpenter I. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that conservation 
easements extinguishable by mutual agreement of the parties, even if 
                                               
73 The certified historic structure was an eleven-story apartment building located on Fifth Avenue in New York City that 
had been designed by the late Henry Otis Chapman in 1923 in the neo-Italianate Renaissance style of architecture. 
74 See IRC § 170(h)(4)(B)(i). See also JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 17, at 294-95. 
75 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). In the last sentence of this regulation, the cross-reference to (b)(3) should be to 
(b)(2), and the cross-reference to (g)(5)(ii) should be to (g)(6); the Treasury failed to update the cross-references when it 
finalized the proposed regulations in 1986. 
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subject to a standard such as “impossibility,” fail as a matter of law to satisfy 
the judicial extinguishment requirements in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A– 
14(g)(6)(i). 
 
(i) In support of its holding, the Tax Court explained: 
 
Extinguishment by mutual consent of the parties does not 
guarantee that the conservation purpose of the donated 
property will continue to be protected in perpetuity. As at 
least one commentator has noted, the “restrictions [in a deed] 
are supposed to be perpetual in the first place, and the 
decision to terminate them should not be [made] solely by 
interested parties. With the decision-making process pushed 
into a court of law, the legal tension created by such judicial 
review will generally tend to create a fair result.” Small, 
Federal Tax Law of Conservation Easements 16–4 (1986). 
 
The court referenced this passage again in reaffirming and 
supplementing its opinion in Carpenter II. 
 
(ii) With regard to federal and state law interaction, the court in 
Carpenter I explained: 
 
To determine whether the conservation easement deeds 
comply with requirements for the…deduction under Federal 
tax law, we must look to State law to determine the effect of 
the deeds. State law determines the nature of the property 
rights, and Federal law determines the appropriate tax 
treatment of those rights.76 
 
(iii) The court in Carpenter I also held that the “so-remote-as-to-be- 
negligible” standard of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3) does 
not modify the extinguishment requirements of Treasury Regulation 
§ 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Accordingly, failure to comply with the 
extinguishment requirements cannot be cured by a showing that the 
possibility of extinguishment is so remote as to be negligible. 
 
b. Carpenter II. In Carpenter II, the Tax Court confirmed that 
“extinguishment by judicial proceedings is mandatory.” 77  The court 
                                               
76 See also Patel v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 395 (2012) (State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. . . . 
Once property rights are determined under State law, as announced by the highest court of the State, the tax consequences 
are decided under Federal law). 
77 See also IRS General Information Letter on extinguishment, supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Land Trust 
Alliance’s 2007 amendment report instructs: 
If the conservation easement was the subject of a federal income tax deduction, then Internal Revenue Code 
Section 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations Section 1.170A-14 apply…. The easement must be transferable 
only to another government entity or qualified charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the 
easement. The easement can only be extinguished by the holder through a judicial proceeding, upon a finding 
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specifically rejected the taxpayers’ arguments that the Treasury Regulations 
contemplate alternatives to judicial extinguishment and that the judicial 
proceeding requirement is “merely a safe harbor.”  
 
The court also rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the First Circuit’s 
decision in Kaufman III was an intervening change in the law that required 
the court to reconsider its holding in Carpenter I. The court explained that, 
not only is Kaufman III not binding in the Tenth Circuit (to which Carpenter 
would have been appealed), Kaufman III addressed legal issues different 
from those present in Carpenter.78 The court also noted that it does not read 
Kaufman III as sanctioning “putting into the hands of the parties to a 
conservation agreement the authority to determine when to extinguish the 
conservation easement so long as the donee organization gets its shares of 
the proceeds of a subsequent sale.” 
 
c. Mitchell II. In Mitchell II, the Tax Court similarly rejected the argument 
that Kaufman III was an intervening change in the law requiring it to 
reconsider its holding in Mitchell I.79 The court explained that, not only is 
Kaufman III not binding in the Tenth Circuit (to which Mitchell was 
appealed and affirmed), Kaufman III addressed legal issues different from 
those present in Mitchell.80 The court reiterated that Treasury Regulation 
1.170A-14(g)(6) is not “merely...a safe harbor,” and the specific provisions 
of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) through (g)(6) “are mandatory 
and may not be ignored.” The court further rejected the taxpayer’s argument 
that the court should “draw a general rule” with respect to the in-perpetuity 
requirement of § 170(h)(5)(A) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g) 
from the analysis in Kaufman III. The taxpayer had asserted: “The 
regulation emphasizes perpetuating an easement’s purpose as opposed to 
the conservation easement itself. The proceeds are protected which is the 
goal of the law.” The Tax Court disagreed, stating: “Nowhere in Kaufman 
III did the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit state a general rule that 
protecting the proceeds from an extinguishment of a conservation easement 
would satisfy the in-perpetuity requirements of section § 1.170A-14(g)... 
generally.” In other words, the court held that § 170(h) requires perpetuation 
of the conservation easement itself, not conservation purposes generally. 
                                               
that continued use of the encumbered land for conservation purposes has become “impossible or impractical,” 
and with the payment to the holder of a share of proceeds from a subsequent sale or development of the land 
to be used for similar conservation purposes. To the extent an amendment amounts to an extinguishment, the 
land trust must satisfy these requirements. 
Land Tr. Alliance, Amending Conservation Easements: Evolving Practices and Legal Principles 24 (2007). 
78 Kaufman III involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (the “general enforceable in perpetuity” 
requirement) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the “proceeds” requirement). Carpenter, on the other hand, 
involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i) (the “extinguishment” requirement)). 
79 In Mitchell I the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a deduction for an easement donation because the 
taxpayer failed to obtain a mortgage subordination agreement at the time of the gift. See Part II.F.2. 
80  Mitchell involved interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination” 
requirement). 
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Mitchell was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court 
(see Part II.F.2 below). 
 
d. Belk. In Belk III, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in holding 
that a conservation easement that authorizes the parties to agree to 
“substitutions” or “swaps” (i.e., to remove some or all of the original 
protected land from the easement, or unencumber that land, in exchange for 
the protection of similar contiguous land upon the approval of the donee 
land trust) is not eligible for a deduction. The Fourth Circuit explained that 
such an easement is not “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use 
which may be made of the real property” as required under § 170(h)(2)(C). 
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that, to be eligible for a 
deduction under § 170(h), a donor must grant an easement with regard to a 
“single, immutable” or “defined and static” parcel. 
 
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Belk encumbers a 184-
acre semi-private golf course located in a high-end residential 
development near Charlotte, North Carolina. The Belks donated the 
easement to the Smoky Mountain National Land Trust and claimed 
a $10.5 million deduction. 81  The easement deed authorizes the 
landowner to remove land from the easement in exchange for adding 
an equal or greater amount of contiguous land, provided that, in the 
opinion of the grantee: 
• the substitute property is of the same or better ecological 
stability, 
• the substitution will have no adverse effect on the 
conservation purposes of the easement, and 
• the fair market value of the “easement interest” placed on the 
substitute land will be at least equal to or greater than the fair 
market value of the “easement interest” extinguished with 
regard to the land removed from the easement. 
 
(ii) Single Narrow Exception to Perpetuity. In affirming the Tax 
Court’s holding that the Belks were not eligible for a deduction, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that the “Treasury Regulations offer a 
single—and exceedingly narrow—exception to the requirement that 
a conservation easement impose a perpetual use restriction”: 
 
[if a] subsequent unexpected change in the conditions 
surrounding the property…make[s] impossible or impractical 
the continued use of the property for conservation purposes, the 
conservation purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in 
perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial 
proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds…from a subsequent 
sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee 
                                               
81 The Smoky Mountain National Land Trust has since changed its name to Southwest Regional Land Conservancy. 
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organization in a manner consistent with the conservation 
purposes of the original contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(g)(6)(i) (emphasis added by the court). 
 
“[A]bsent these ‘unexpected’ and extraordinary circumstances,” 
explained the Fourth Circuit, “real property placed under easement 
must remain there in perpetuity in order for the donor of the 
easement to claim a charitable deduction.” 
 
(iii) Critical Requirements. The Fourth Circuit explained that 
permitting a deduction for the donation of the Belk easement would 
enable taxpayers to bypass several requirements critical to the 
statutory and regulatory schemes governing deductions for 
charitable contributions. 
 
• For example, permitting the Belks to change the boundaries 
of the easement would render “meaningless” the 
requirement that an easement donor obtain a qualified 
appraisal because the appraisal would no longer be an 
accurate reflection of the value of the easement, parts of 
which could be clawed back. “It matters not,” said the court, 
“that the Easement requires that the removed property be 
replaced with property of ‘equal or greater value,’ because 
the purpose of the appraisal requirement is to enable the 
Commissioner, not the donee or donor, to verify the value of 
a donation. The Easement’s substitution provision places the 
Belks beyond the reach of the Commissioner in this regard.” 
 
• Similarly, the baseline documentation requirement “would 
also be skirted if the borders of an easement could shift.” 
“Not only does this regulation confirm that a conservation 
easement must govern a defined and static parcel,” explained 
the court, “it also makes clear that holding otherwise would 
deprive donees of the ability to ensure protection of 
conservation interests by, for instance, examination of maps 
and photographs of ‘the protected property.’” 
 
(iv) Kaufman and Simmons Distinguishable. The Belks argued that 
Kaufman III and Simmons II support the notion that § 170(h) does 
not require that easement restrictions attach to a single, defined 
parcel. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that 
those “out-of-circuit” cases: 
plausibly stand only for the proposition that a donation will not 
be rendered ineligible simply because the donee reserves its 
right not to enforce the easement. They do not support the Belks’ 
view that the grant of a conservation easement qualifies for a 
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charitable deduction even if the easement may be relocated. 
Indeed, as we have explained, such a holding would violate the 
plain meaning of § 170(h)(2)(C).82 
 
(v) Federal Law Controls. The Belks argued that, because North 
Carolina law permits parties to amend or swap easements, like a 
right-of-way easement between neighbors, not permitting swaps 
would render all conservation easements in North Carolina 
ineligible for a deduction under § 170(h). The Fourth Circuit found 
this argument “unpersuasive,” explaining: 
 
whether state property and contract law permits a substitution in 
an easement is irrelevant to the question of whether federal tax 
law permits a charitable deduction for the donation of such an 
easement…§ 170(h)(2)(C) requires that the gift of a 
conservation easement on a specific parcel of land be granted in 
perpetuity to qualify for a federal charitable deduction, 
notwithstanding the fact that state law may permit an easement 
to govern for some shorter period of time. Thus, an easement 
that, like the one at hand, grants a restriction for less than a 
perpetual term, may be a valid conveyance under state law, but 
is still ineligible for a charitable deduction under federal law. 
 
With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of 
any easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the 
parties to a conservation easement can include provisions in the deed 
to comply with the federal tax law perpetuity requirements and, 
provided the easement is drafted appropriately, those provisions will 
be legally binding on both the landowner and the holder even though 
they impose conditions on the transfer or extinguishment of the 
easement that may be different or more restrictive than those 
imposed by state law (see Parts II.A. 9, 10, and 11 below, discussing 
the interaction between state and federal law). 
 
(vi) Savings Clause Did Not Save Deduction. The substitution 
provision in the Belk conservation easement provided that 
substitutions become final when they are reflected in a formal 
recorded “amendment.” The amendment provision in the easement 
provided that the land trust could not agree to any amendment that 
would result in the easement failing to qualify as a qualified 
                                               
82 In Simmons II, the D.C. Circuit implicitly rejected the argument of the amici curiae (the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation et al.) that land trusts should be permitted to agree with developers to extinguish perpetual easements on 
some properties to allow development of those properties in exchange for the receipt of easements on other properties. 
The D.C. Circuit held, in part, that an “eligible donee” must have a “commitment to protect the conservation purposes of 
the donation” and “the resources to enforce the restrictions” and that a tax-exempt organization would fail to enforce a 
conservation easement “at its peril.” The D.C. Circuit also concluded that the donated easements at issue in Simmons II 
“will prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.” 
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conservation contribution under § 170(h) or the applicable 
regulations. The Belks referred to this latter provision as a “savings 
clause.” They argued that, if the Fourth Circuit found that the 
substitution provision violated the requirements of § 170(h), the 
savings clause would render the substitution provision inoperable, 
thus making the easement eligible for the deduction. In other words, 
the Belks argued that the savings clause would operate to negate a 
right clearly articulated in the easement (the right to substitute 
property), but only if triggered by an adverse determination by the 
court.  
 
The Fourth Circuit dismissed this argument, noting that the Belks 
were asking the court to employ the savings clause to rewrite the 
easement in response to the court’s holding, which the court was 
unwilling to do. The court refused to condone such “trifling with the 
judicial process.” The court also explained that holding for the Belks 
“would dramatically hamper the Commissioner’s enforcement 
power. If every taxpayer could rely on a savings clause to void, after 
the fact, a disqualifying deduction…enforcement of the Internal 
Revenue Code would grind to a halt.” 
 
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the Belks’ “last-ditch” argument—
that the savings clause was designed “to accommodate 
evolving…interpretation of Section 170(h)”—explaining 
the statutory language of § 170(h)(2)(C) has not “evolved” since 
the provision was enacted in 1980…. The simple truth is this: 
the Easement was never consistent with § 170(h), a fact that 
brings with it adverse tax consequences. The Belks cannot now 
simply reform the Easement because they do not wish to suffer 
those consequences. 
 
e. Balsam Mountain. In Balsam Mountain, the Tax Court held that a 
conservation easement that authorized the parties, for a period of up to five 
years, to remove up to 5% of the land from the easement in exchange for 
protecting a similar amount of contiguous land was not eligible for a 
deduction under § 170(h).  
 
(i) The Easement. The easement at issue in Balsam Mountain, which 
was granted to the North American Land Trust (NALT) on 22 acres 
in North Carolina, allowed the landowner to, for five years 
following the donation, make alterations to the boundaries of the 
area protected by the easement, subject to the following conditions: 
• the total amount of land protected by the easement could not 
be reduced, 
• land added to the easement had to be contiguous to the 
originally protected land, 
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• land added to the easement had to, in NALT’s reasonable 
judgment, make an equal or greater contribution to the 
easement’s conservation purpose, 
• the “location and reconfiguration of a boundary” could not, 
in NALT’s judgment, result in any material adverse effect 
on the easement’s conservation purposes, and 
• no more than 5% of the originally protected land could be 
removed from the easement as a result of such alterations. 
 
(ii) Belk Not Distinguishable. Based on Belk, the Tax Court held 
that the Balsam Mountain easement was not “a restriction (granted 
in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property” 
as required by § 170(h)(2)(C) and, thus, was not eligible for a 
deduction. The donor argued that Belk was distinguishable because 
the Belk easement allowed for the substitution of all of the land 
originally protected by the easement, while the Balsam Mountain 
easement allowed for the substitution of only 5% of the originally 
protected land. The Tax Court was not persuaded. While the court 
agreed that the Belk and Balsam Mountain easements were different, 
it said “the difference does not matter.” For five years following the 
donation, the donor, with the approval of NALT, could change the 
boundaries of the area protected by the easement (i.e., extinguish the 
original easement in part without satisfying the judicial 
extinguishment, impossibility or impracticality, or proceeds 
requirements). Accordingly, the easement was not an interest in an 
identifiable, specific piece of real property and, thus, was not 
deductible.  
 
(iii) The holdings in Belk and Balsam Mountain prohibiting swaps 
are consistent with Carpenter I and II, in which the Tax Court held 
that extinguishment of a tax-deductible easement requires a judicial 
proceeding. Removing land from a conservation easement, whether 
in connection with a swap or otherwise, constitutes an 
extinguishment of the easement with regard to the removed land. It 
allows the removed land to be used for previously prohibited 
purposes, such as development, thus permitting the conservation 
values of the removed land, which had previously been protected in 
perpetuity, to be destroyed. The holdings in Belk and Balsam 
Mountain are also consistent with Congress’s admonition in the 
legislative history “that provisions allowing deductions for 
conservation easements should be directed at the preservation of 
unique or otherwise significant land areas or structures,” as well as 
the detailed threshold conservation purpose and other qualification 
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and valuation requirements that must be met to be eligible for a 
deduction under § 170(h).83 
 
f. Bosque Canyon Ranch. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Fifth Circuit 
majority vacated the Tax Court’s holding that two conservation easements 
that permitted 47 unencumbered 5-acre homesites to be moved around the 
properties subject to the easements with the approval of the holder (North 
American Land Trust, or NALT) violated § 170(h)(2)(C)’s “granted in 
perpetuity” requirement. The Tax Court determined that, as in Belk, the 
easements permitted property that was originally protected by the 
easements to lose that protection. The Fifth Circuit majority held that Belk 
was distinguishable for the following reasons.  
 
• The easements allowed only the homesite parcels’ boundaries to be 
changed and then only (1) within the tracts that are subject to the 
easements and (2) without increasing the acreage of the homesite 
parcel in question. The easements did not allow any change in the 
exterior boundaries of the easements or in their acreages. Thus, 
neither the exterior boundaries nor the total acreage of the easements 
would ever change: only the lot lines of one or more the five-acre 
homesite parcels were potentially subject to change and then only 
(1) within the easements and (2) with NALT’s consent. 
 
• The IRS’s expert reportedly confirmed that the unencumbered 
homesite parcels had roughly the same per-acre value as the rest of 
the ranch that was encumbered by the easements. Thus, changing 
the boundaries of some of the homesite parcels would not return any 
value to the easement donors. 
 
• The development plan for the ranch at the time of the trial indicated 
that (1) the vast majority of the homesites would be tightly clustered, 
largely contiguous, and located in the northernmost tip of the ranch; 
(2) together, the homesites closely resembled a typical suburban 
subdivision; (3) almost every homesite shared one or two common 
side line boundaries with one or more other homesites; and (4) most 
homesites were located on or in close proximity to the only road 
inside the easements, which road provided the sole access to the 
nearest public roads. Given this subdivision-like layout and the 
homesites’ contiguity or close proximity to each other and to the 
only interior road providing ingress and egress to and from the 
public roads, “the plan visually eschewed any realistic likelihood of 
significant future changes in homesite location—at most, only 
theoretical or hypothetical changes.”  
 
                                               
83 S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B. 599, at 603. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text, discussing IRS General 
Information Letter regarding swaps 
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The majority also determined that any homesite parcel adjustments would 
be “de minimis” and “common-sense reasoning” indicated “that an 
easement may be modified to promote the underlying conservation 
interests.” Finally, the majority held that “the usual strict construction of 
intentionally adopted tax loopholes is not applicable to grants of 
conservation easements made pursuant to § 170(h)” and, instead, “the 
ordinary standard of statutory construction” should apply.  
 
Fifth Circuit Judge Dennis issued a strong dissent in Bosque. He pointed out 
that the statutory requirement of a qualified appraisal would be rendered 
meaningless if a donor were permitted to change the boundaries of a 
conservation easement after the deduction was claimed. He disagreed that 
homesite parcel adjustments would constitute de minimis changes, 
explaining that there is no time limit within which the homesite 
modifications must occur and there is no limit upon the distance or the 
number of times a homesite can be relocated within the outer boundaries of 
the tract.  
 
Judge Dennis argued that the Bosque easement is not distinguishable from 
the Belk easement because the forty-seven homesites were not a part of the 
land protected by the conservation easement. By permitting changes to the 
location of the homesite parcels, the easement authorized the removal of 
previously-protected conservation habitat from the easement and 
conversion of that habitat into residential development. In other words, the 
substitutions would change “the real property” that is subject to the 
easement.  
 
Judge Dennis also rejected reliance on the existing development plan for the 
ranch, focusing instead on what could be done over the perpetual life of the 
conservation easement. He noted:  
 
there is nothing in the modification provision that would stop the 
limited partners from later deciding that they would rather not be 
organized as a stereotypical subdivision and spread the sites across 
the tract...there is nothing to prevent a limited partner from seeking 
modification of his or her homesite even after a ranch home has been 
constructed...  
 
Judge Dennis further pointed out that there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that the movable-homesite provision was designed to promote 
conservation interests. Rather, it appeared that the provision would more 
likely be used to  benefit the partnerships and homeowners rather than 
conservation goals. He explained that, because most of the homesites are 
grouped together as a typical residential subdivision in the plan, they are not 
as valuable for wildlife conservation purposes as land within the heart of 
the 3,744-acre tract, and, thus, the swap of a homesite for a five-acre tract 
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of initially-protected land would in most instances be detrimental to 
conservation. 
 
As for the fact that NALT had to approve movement of the homesites, Judge 
Dennis explained: 
 
Congress did not intend for possibly enormous tax deductions to be 
based on the likelihood of continued agreement between the donor-
taxpayer and the non-profit donee as to the land designated as 
subject to the conservation easement; rather, it specifically and 
unequivocally required that a qualified conservation easement be 
perpetual. 
 
And, citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, Judge Dennis noted the well-established rule that tax 
deductions are a matter of legislative grace and are therefore “strictly 
construed and allowed only as there is a clear provision therefor.”84 He 
explained that, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this rule applies and has 
been applied in other circuits to a deduction for the donation of a 
conservation easement.85 
 
The impact of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in Bosque is likely to be 
limited given that (i) it is contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Belk, 
(ii) it was based on very specific and unusual facts, (iii) the rule of 
construction applied by the majority differed from that applied in other 
circuits to § 170(h) and to charitable deductions generally, (iv) there was a 
strong dissent, and (v) in Pine Mountain II, discussed immediately below, 
the Tax Court expressly declined to follow Bosque in cases not appealable 
to the Fifth Circuit. 
 
g. Pine Mountain II. In Pine Mountain II, the Tax Court held that two 
conservation easements that allowed residential “building areas” to be 
moved or identified following the easements’ donation, subject to the 
holder’s approval, did not qualify for a deduction because neither easement 
was a “restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of 
the real property” as required by § 170(h)(2)(C). The Tax Court held that 
the two easements were analogous to the easements in Belk, Balsam 
Mountain, and Bosque, and the court expressly declined to follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s majority opinion in Bosque, instead relying on its own analysis in 
                                               
84 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). 
85 See Minnick v. Commissioner, 796 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir.2015); Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221, 225 (4th 
Cir.2014); Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2014); Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, 744 F.3d 648, 
653 (10th Cir.2014). The strict-construction rule of INDOPCO has also been applied to charitable deductions generally. 
See, e.g., Zavaldi v. Commissioner, 793 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.2015) (charitable income-tax deduction); Galloway v. United 
States, 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.2007) (charitable estate tax deduction); Hewitt v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.1998) 
(charitable income-tax deduction; “‘the taxpayer seeking the benefit of a deduction must show that every condition which 
Congress has seen fit to impose has been fully satisfied’”). 
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Bosque and Fifth Circuit Judge Dennis’s dissent in Bosque. The Tax Court 
explained that appeal of its decision in Pine Mountain would be to the 
Eleventh Circuit, and the Tax Court is not bound to follow a Fifth Circuit 
holding in cases appealable in other circuits.86  
 
The Tax Court further held that neither the reserved rights nor the 
amendment clause included in a third easement meant that the conservation 
purpose of that easement was not protected in perpetuity, and allowed a 
deduction for the donation of that easement.  
 
Tax Court Judge Morrison published a strong dissent taking issue with 
various of the Tax Court majority’s arguments. Given the dissent and the 
loss of sizable deductions by the taxpayer,87 it is likely that this case will be 
appealed and, thus, the Tax Court’s holdings should not be viewed as the 
final word on these issues. 
 
(i) Background. Pine Mountain involved a developer’s donation of three 
conservation easements to the North American Land Trust (NALT). The 
easements, donated in 2005, 2006, and 2007, encumbered relatively small 
portions (collectively approximately 20%) of a large tract of land slated for 
development near Birmingham, Alabama (6,224 acres).  
 
• The 2005 easement encumbered approximately 47% of one parcel and 
consisted of approximately 560 mostly contiguous acres. Among other 
significant rights, the 2005 easement reserved to the developer (and the 
developer’s successors) the right to construct a single family residence 
and associated structures within each of ten building areas, each as large 
as one acre.88 While Exhibit C of the easement situated the building 
areas around a man-made lake, the 2005 easement permitted the 
building areas to be relocated anywhere on the encumbered land, 
provided the relocation “shall not, in NALT’s ‘reasonable judgment,’ 
adversely affect conservation purposes.”  
 
• The 2006 easement encumbered approximately 500 acres consisting of 
seven noncontiguous plots within three parcels, and the encumbered 
area constituted 17.6% of the total acreage of the parcels. Among other 
                                               
86 This is based on the “Golsen rule,” established by  Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), aff’d, 445 
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).  
87 At trial, the taxpayer claimed that it was entitled to a collective deduction of $88.26 million for the donation of the 
2005 and 2006 easements. This was considerably in excess of the $29.276 million the taxpayer had claimed on its tax 
return with respect to those easements. 
88 Other rights reserved to the developer include the right to construct ten 5,000-square foot barns each of which could 
include a dwelling, another barn, a riding stable, and indoor riding ring, two scenic overlooks that could involve tree-
clearing, fourteen piers and boat launches, five ponds, access roads and driveways, raised walkways, hunting stands and 
blinds, and wells. 
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significant rights,89 the 2006 easement reserved to the developer (and 
the developer’s successors) the right to construct a single family 
residence and associated structures within each of six building areas, 
each as large as one acre. The 2006 easement did not specify the location 
of the building areas and placed no limitation on where they could be 
located, except to state that NALT had to approve the locations and 
could withhold its approval if it believed a proposed location would 
result “in any material adverse effect on the Conservation Values or 
Conservation Purposes.”  
 
• The 2007 easement encumbered approximately 240 acres consisting of 
seven noncontiguous plots within three parcels, and the encumbered 
area represented 7.5% of the total acreage of the parcels. The developer 
did not reserve any residential development rights in the 2007 easement, 
but did reserve certain other rights (e.g., the right to construct a water 
tower and underground pipelines that could service other properties; the 
right to construct fences, raised walkways, service vehicle trials, and 
utility installations; and the right to hunt, trap, and otherwise harvest 
fish and wildlife on the property).  
 
(ii) Movable Building Areas. In holding that the 2005 and 2006 easements 
were analogous to the easements in Belk, Balsam Mountain, and Bosque, 
and thus not eligible for a deduction, the Tax Court noted that its thinking 
was well captured by the “Swiss cheese” metaphor used by Fifth Circuit 
Judge Dennis in his dissent in Bosque. The Tax Court explained that one 
must imagine the area encumbered by an easement as a large slice of 
Emmenthaler cheese. The cheese represents the real property initially 
restricted by the easement; the holes represent the zones reserved for 
commercial or residential development; and § 170(h)(2)(C), which requires 
that an easement attach to a “defined parcel of real property” or a “single, 
immutable parcel,” bars the putting of any new holes in the cheese. 
  
The court explained that a developer could consider two techniques for 
reserving the right to put new holes in the cheese.  
 
• First, the developer could put new holes in the cheese and make up 
for it by adding an equal amount of previously unprotected land to 
the conservation area. That was the pattern in Belk. 
• Alternatively, the developer could put new holes in the cheese and 
make up for it by plugging the same number of holes elsewhere in 
the conservation area. That was the pattern in Bosque and in Pine 
Mountain.  
 
                                               
89 These rights were to some extent similar to those reserved in the 2005 easement (see supra note 88) and further included 
the right to construct a water tower and underground pipelines that could service residential and commercial development 
on portions of the larger property not protected by a conservation easement. 
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The court explained that, in each instance, the acreage subject to the 
easement remains exactly the same. But in each instance, the developer has 
achieved the impermissible objective of putting new holes in the cheese, 
i.e., subjecting to commercial or residential development land that was 
supposed to be protected in perpetuity from such development.90 The court 
explained that reserved development rights in Belk, Bosque, and Pine 
Mountain were all paths to the same bottom line—the developer retaining 
the right to develop a portion of the originally-protected conservation area 
by substituting other property. Compare Butler, discussed in Part II.A.4. 
above, in which the location of the building sites was fixed by the 
conservation easement deed because a map stipulating the placement of 
building sites in locations that were consistent with preservation of the 
conservation purposes was found to be incorporated into the deed and 
binding under Georgia law.  
 
The Tax Court determined that the 2007 easement, which did not reserve to 
the developer any residential development rights, did not suffer from the 
same fatal flaw as the 2005 and 2006 easements because it did not permit 
the developer to place any new holes in the cheese.  
 
Tax Court Judge Morrison, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the 2005 
and 2006 easements were distinguishable from the easements in Bosque 
because the homesite parcels in Bosque were completely free of the 
easements while the building areas in Pine Mountain allowed residential 
development but were otherwise subject to the easements’ restrictions (that 
is, he argued that the easements attached to “defined parcels”). Judge 
Morrison argued that the relative weakness of the easement deeds’ 
restrictions in the building areas was relevant only to whether the easements 
protected conservation purposes in perpetuity as required by § 
170(h)(5)(A).  
 
The Tax Court majority said that the fact that the building areas in Pine 
Mountain were technically encumbered by the easements, while the 
homesites in Bosque were not, was a distinction without a difference. The 
majority explained that, by permitting the building areas to be relocated to 
other sections of the conservation area, the easements allowed the developer 
to subject to residential development land that was supposed to be protected 
in perpetuity from any form of development. The court also explained that, 
although the building areas were not literally exempt from the easements, 
                                               
90 The court also explained that, because the 2005 easement permits Pine Mountain to construct a variety of other 
buildings (at least eleven of which may include additional living quarters) anywhere within the conservation area, Pine 
Mountain had reserved the right, not only to put new holes in the cheese for the ten residences, but to put twenty acres of 
extra holes in the cheese for structures appurtenant to those residences. With regard to the 2006 easement, where the 
location of the six building areas was not identified in the easement at the time of the donation, the court explained that 
it was impossible to identify, when the  easement was granted, the “real property” that would actually be restricted from 
development because the residential lots could literally be placed anywhere on the property. As a result, the perpetual 
use restriction did not attach at the outset “to a defined parcel of real property” or to “a single, immutable parcel.” 
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they were not subject to the easements in any meaningful sense because 
they permitted uses that were antithetical to the habitat and open space 
protection conservation purposes of the easements. The court concluded 
that it made no difference to anyone--the land trust, the developer, or the 
homeowners--whether the building areas were encumbered (or not) by the 
easements; either way the developer had the right to construct residential 
development in those areas and that development was exempt, for all 
practical purposes, from the restrictions imposed by the easements.  
 
(iii) Extensive Reserved Rights. The IRS argued that the conservation 
purposes of the Pine Mountain easements were not “protected in perpetuity” 
because the extensive rights reserved to the developer (and the developer’s 
successors) permitted the properties to be used in ways inconsistent with 
those conservation purposes. Because the Tax Court majority determined 
that the 2005 and 2006 easements did not qualify for a deduction due to the 
movable building areas, this argument was relevant only to the 2007 
easement and the majority held for the taxpayer on this issue. A NALT 
biologist presented testimony that none of the reserved rights  in the 2007 
easement would impair the conservation purposes and, as in Glass and 
Butler (discussed in Part II.A.4), the IRS failed to provide any evidence to 
the contrary. The Tax Court held that since there was no conflicting 
testimony as to whether the conservation purposes of the 2007 easement 
were protected in perpetuity, it found that those purposes were so protected. 
This holding and the holdings in Glass and Butler signal that, regardless of 
the conservation purposes at issue, to succeed with this argument, the IRS 
must hire its own experts to testify as to why, upon full exercise of all 
reserved rights, the conservation purposes of an easement will not be 
protected in perpetuity. 
 
Because Judge Morrison in his dissent determined that the 2005 and 2006 
easements were not rendered nondeductible as a result of the movable 
building areas, and the 2007 easement was not rendered nondeductible by 
the amendment clause (as discussed below), he viewed the “too many 
reserved rights” argument as relevant to all of the Pine Mountain easements. 
He held that the 2005 and 2007 easements did not permit uses inconsistent 
with conservation purposes, but the 2006 easement did. With regard to the 
2005 easement, Judge Morrison relied on the testimony of NALT’s 
biologist that the man-made lake, the ten building areas around it, and the 
other  extensive reserved rights would not affect the conservation value of 
the easement. He also noted that the “dense clustering” of the ten houses 
around the lake would not appreciably affect the scenic value of the 
protected land.  
 
With regard to the 2006 easement, where the location of the building areas 
was not specified in an exhibit to the easement, Judge Morrison felt 
differently. He found that the right to build six houses was inconsistent with 
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the habitat and scenic enjoyment conservation purposes because he did not 
know where the building areas for the six houses would be. He noted that, 
for the 2005 easement, the IRS had the opportunity to present evidence that 
the initial locations of the building areas were inconsistent with 
conservation purposes. He said there was no such opportunity regarding the 
2006 easement. Rather “[t]here is only a vague hope that NALT will 
exercise its veto over boundary areas that would undermine the 
conservation purposes.” This hope, he said, was not enough to convince him 
that the right to build in the yet-to-be-specified building areas is consistent 
with the conservation purposes. He did not explain, however, why 
developer’s ability to relocate the ten building areas in the 2005 easement, 
which was also subject to only the “vague hope” that NALT would exercise 
its veto power to prevent the undermining of conservation purposes, did not 
similarly disqualify that easement.  
 
(iv) Amendment Clause. The IRS argued that the amendment clause 
included in the 2007 easement, which authorized the parties to agree to 
amendments that are “not inconsistent with the Conservation Purposes,” 
enabled the parties to amend the easement in ways that would clearly violate 
the statutory perpetuity requirements, such as by reducing the size or 
otherwise modifying the boundary of the protected area or by permitting 
residential construction within the protected area. The Tax Court majority 
rejected this argument on three grounds.  
 
• First, the Tax Court noted that it was hard to imagine how NALT 
could conscientiously find such amendments to be “consistent with 
the Conservation Purposes” set forth in the easement, and that an 
easement’s restrictions should not be deemed “nonperpetual” 
because of the risk that the qualified organization might be 
unfaithful to the charitable purposes on which its exemption rests. 
Citing to Simmons, the court noted that “[a]ny donee might fail to 
enforce a conservation easement, with or without a clause stating 
that it may consent or abandon its rights, and a tax-exempt 
organization would do so at its peril.” 
• Second, the Tax Court’s noted that a conservation easement 
involves a conveyance, which is a form of contract and, generally 
speaking, the parties to a contract are free to amend it, whether or 
not they explicitly reserve the right to do so. According to the court, 
the amendment clause could thus reasonably be regarded as a 
limiting provision, confining the permissible subset of amendments 
to those that would not be “inconsistent with the Conservation 
Purposes” of the easement. 
• Third, the Tax Court noted that the IRS’s argument would 
apparently prevent the donor of any easement from qualifying for a 
deduction under § 170(h) if the easement permitted amendments, 
and the court said it found no support for that argument in the statute, 
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the regulations, the decided cases, or the legislative policy 
underlying the statute.  
 
Dissenting Tax Court Judge Morrison disagreed with the Tax Court 
majority on this issue as well. He noted that the amendment clause included 
in the 2007 easement states that the developer and NALT “recognize that 
circumstances could arise which would justify the modification of certain 
of the restrictions contained in this Conservation Easement,” and “[t]o this 
end,” NALT and the owner of the land in the conservation area have the 
right to agree to amendments that are not inconsistent with the conservation 
purposes. Judge Morrison argued that because the amendment clause 
authorizes only modification of “the restrictions,” it limits the parties to 
modifying the specific restrictions in the deed and, thus, would not permit 
the parties to modify the exterior boundary of the easement. 
 
Judge Morrison also noted that the Tax Court majority made unfounded 
assumptions about NALT’s behavior. He explained that, while it is true that 
the amendment clause provides that no amendment can be agreed to by 
NALT unless the amendment is not inconsistent with the conservation 
purposes, this does not require NALT to review proposed amendments to 
see whether the amendments comply with § 170(h)(2)(C), which does not 
refer to conservation purposes and requires only that an easement to be “a 
restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real 
property.” Judge Morrison argued that the Tax Court majority mixed up the 
“granted in perpetuity” and “protected in perpetuity” tests and made the 
unsupported assumption that NALT would refuse to consent to amendments 
that would bar a deduction for the donation of the easement under  section 
170(h)(2)(C) (i.e., amendments that would change the boundary of the 
easement), and this “unrealistically supposes that NALT will essentially act 
as a tax compliance officer.”  
 
Judge Morrison further argued that the Tax Court majority made “radical 
claims” about the consequences of the IRS’s interpretation of the 
amendment clause. The majority asserted that the clause in the 2007 
easement was similar to the amendment provisions in many other 
conservation easement deeds and supported this assertion by citing an 
amicus brief filed by the Land Trust Alliance in different case. Judge 
Morrison pointed out that the amendment clause in the easement involved 
in that other case was different from the amendment clause in the Pine 
Mountain easements and, thus, that amicus brief was irrelevant to the Pine 
Mountain Case. Judge Morrison also explained that the Land Trust Alliance 
amicus briefs (he had refused to accept the one filed in Pine Mountain) made 
unsubstantiated claims about particular amendment clauses being “widely 
used” and, thus, were unreliable and should not affect the court’s analysis 
of the amendment clause. 
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Finally, Judge Morrison argued that, in wrapping up its discussion of the 
amendment clause, the Tax Court majority misleadingly summarized the 
IRS’s argument by stating that the IRS’s argument “would apparently 
prevent the donor of any easement from qualifying for a charitable 
contribution deduction under  section 170(h) if the easement permitted 
amendments.” Judge Morrison noted that, actually, the IRS had argued only 
that the particular amendment clause in the Pine Mountain easement deeds 
prevented the donor of those easements from qualifying for a deduction. 
The IRS did not attack all amendment clauses in all easement deeds. Judge 
Morrison noted that amendment clauses can and do differ, and that the 
courts must interpret each clause to see whether it satisfies § 170(h)’s  
requirements. 
 
Although not mentioned by Judge Morrison in his dissent, the argument that 
the 2007 easement involved a conveyance, which is a form of contract, and 
generally speaking the parties to a contract are free to amend it, whether or 
not they explicitly reserve the right to do so, makes no sense in the tax-
deductible conservation easement context. First, that argument ignores the 
fact that tax-deductible conservation easements are by definition charitable 
gifts (they have to be in order to be eligible for a deduction), and under state 
law charitable organizations are generally not free to alter the terms of a 
charitable gift made for a specific purpose except to the extent that the 
organization is granted the power to do so in the terms of the gift. 91 
Accordingly, an amendment clause is not a limiting provision; it does not 
constrain an otherwise unlimited power to amend. Rather, it is in 
empowering provision—granting the donee certain rights to alter the terms 
of the gift that the donee otherwise would not have. Moreover, if an 
easement were simply a contract that could be amended by the current 
landowner and donee at any time, the amendment provision itself could be 
amended, and thus would not be a limiting provision. It also would be 
impossible to comply with the various requirements in 170(h) – e.g., the 
restriction on transfer, judicial extinguishment, and payment of a minimum 
proportionate share of proceeds to the holder upon extinguishment 
requirements – because the clauses included in a deed to satisfy those 
requirements could be amended at any time. 
 
7. Reserved Development Rights: Regulations and Examples.  
 
a. Treasury Regulations. The following Treasury Regulations, among 
others, limit reserved development rights. 
 
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v) contains a 
limitation on the reservation of rights in an open space 
easement—a deduction will not be allowed “if the terms of the 
                                               
91 See Part II.A.10 below, discussing the interaction between federal and state law.  
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easement permit a degree of intrusion or future development that 
would interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or 
the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the 
donation.” 
 
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2) provides that “a 
deduction will not be allowed if the contribution would 
accomplish one of the enumerated conservation purposes but 
would permit destruction of other significant conservation 
interests” (the “no inconsistent use” requirement).92  
 
(iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) provides that “any 
interest in the property retained by the donor...must be subject to 
legally enforceable restrictions...that will prevent uses of the 
retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of 
the donation” (the “general enforceable in perpetuity” 
requirement). 
 
b. Examples 3 and 4. The Treasury Regulations provide two examples 
addressing “future development” in an open space easement.93 
 
(i) Example 3 involves Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of 
woodland, rolling pasture, and orchards on the crest of a 
mountain, all of which is clearly visible from a nearby national 
park. The highest and best use of Greenacre is as a subdivision 
of 40-acre tracts (potentially twenty-two residential lots). The 
landowner wishes to donate a scenic easement on Greenacre and 
“would like to reserve the right to subdivide Greenacre into 90-
acre parcels with no more than one single-family home 
allowable on each parcel.” Example 3 concludes that “[r]andom 
building on the property, even as little as one home for each 90 
acres [a total of only ten homes], would destroy the scenic 
character of the view. Accordingly, no deduction would be 
allowable.” 
 
(ii) Example 4 assumes the same facts as Example 3, except: 
• “not all of Greenacre is visible from the park” 
• “the deed of easement allows for limited cluster 
development of no more than five nine-acre clusters 
(with four houses on each cluster) located in areas 
                                               
92 The regulations provide, as an example, that the preservation of farmland will not qualify for a deduction if, under the 
terms of the easement, a significant naturally occurring ecosystem could be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides 
in the operation of the farm. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2). A use that is destructive of conservation interests is permitted 
only if the use is necessary for the protection of the conservation interests that are the subject of the contribution, such as 
allowing site excavation that may impair scenic values on property preserved as an archaeological site. Treas. Reg. § 
1.170A-14(e)(3). 
93 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(f), Examples 3 and 4. 
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generally not visible from the national park and subject 
to site and building plan approval by the donee 
organization in order to preserve the scenic view from 
the park,”  
• “[t]he donor and the donee have already identified sites 
where limited cluster development would not be visible 
from the park or would not impair the view,” and 
• “[o]wners of homes in the clusters will not have any 
rights with respect to the surrounding Greenacre 
property that are not also available to the general public.” 
Example 4 concludes that the donation qualifies for a deduction.  
 
Example 3 involves rights to build that could be exercised by the landowner 
anywhere on the property. The donation is not eligible for a deduction, 
despite the easement reducing the number of potential residential lots from 
twenty-two to ten, because such rights could (i) interfere with the essential 
scenic quality of the land or the governmental conservation policy being 
furthered by the donation, 94  (ii) permit destruction of other significant 
conservation interests, 95  and (iii) permit uses of the retained interest 
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.96  
 
Example 4 indicates that, even if the number of permitted homes is 
increased (from ten to twenty), if the conditions specified in the Example 
are met, the donation will be eligible for a deduction. Given that Example 4 
provides that the “donor and the donee have already [i.e., at the time of the 
donation] identified sites where limited cluster development would not be 
visible from the park or would not impair the view,” the Example does not 
appear to give the donee the discretion to determine the location of such 
sites at some later date. Rather, to give each of the specified conditions in 
Example 4 meaning, the Example could be interpreted to (i) give the donee 
the discretion to later approve the site and building plans of the four 
homesites within each cluster (rather than the sites of the clusters 
themselves) or (ii) give the donor and donee the right to identify, at the time 
of the donation, more than five possible sites “where limited cluster 
development would not be visible from the park or would not impair the 
view,” thus giving the donor and the donee some flexibility to later choose 
the five cluster sites from the more than five possible sites identified on the 
date of the donation.97  
 
Identification of the possible sites of cluster development at the time of the 
donation is also consistent with the Treasury Regulation requirements noted 
                                               
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(v).  
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2). 
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). 
97 This is not an uncommon technique that is used to give donors some flexibility, while ensuring that the extent of the 
reserved rights can be assessed by the IRS and the courts at the time of the donation. 
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above because it would allow the IRS (and, if litigated, a court) to assess 
whether—at the time of the donation—the reserved development rights 
would (i) interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land or the 
governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation, (ii) 
permit destruction of other significant conservation interests, or (iii) permit 
uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes of 
the donation. Alternatively, interpreting Example 4 to permit the donee to 
determine the sites of the five cluster developments at some point after the 
donation is made would render those threshold requirements meaningless 
because the IRS and the courts would have no way to assess, at the time of 
the donation, whether the easement satisfied those requirements. Similar to 
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Belk (discussed in Part II.A.6 above), the 
purpose of these threshold requirements is to enable the Commissioner, not 
the donee or donor, to verify that the reserved rights in a conservation 
easement will not (i) interfere with the essential scenic quality of the land 
or the governmental conservation policy being furthered by the donation, 
(ii) permit destruction of other significant conservation interests, or (iii) 
permit uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation 
purposes of the donation. Allowing the holder to identify or relocate 
building areas at some point following the donation places taxpayers 
beyond the reach of the Commissioner in this regard.98  Had Congress 
intended to grant holders the discretion to approve the location of building 
areas and other intensive use of protected lands after the donation of an 
easement, § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations would be much shorter 
and simpler.99  
 
8. Addressing Reserved Development Rights. Reserved development rights 
could be addressed in a number of ways: 
 
a. The parties could identify the building areas in the conservation easement 
deed. 
 
b. The parties could identify more building areas in the conservation 
easement deed than are permitted to be used. For example, the easement 
might reserve to the grantor the right to build two additional single-family 
residences on the subject property, each in a one-acre building area, but four 
possible sites for the building areas may be identified in the deed. The deed 
would also provide that the unused sites will be retired once the reserved 
rights have been exercised.100 
                                               
98 Allowing the holder to identify or relocate building areas at some point following the donation would also further 
complicate an already challenging appraisal process, as the appraiser, who is not an attorney or an employee of the donee, 
would be required to try and determine where on the subject property the holder might (and might not) permit the building 
areas to be located. 
99 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that the Treasury Regulations are based, in large part, on the 
detailed Senate Report describing § 170(h)). 
100 The deed might provide that the unused sites will remain extant even after the reserved rights have been exercised, to 
be used if a future property owner decides to relocate a residence. However, given the difficulties associated with 
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c. The parties could designate all conservation sensitive areas as “no-build” 
areas,” and the remaining portions of the subject property as “build areas.” 
However, the no-build areas would have to be more than just token 
setbacks; they would have to be extensive enough to protect the property’s 
conservation values.  
 
d. The parties could exclude the building areas from the legal description of 
the property encumbered by the conservation easement. A significant 
drawback to this approach is that the holder would not be able to limit 
intensive uses of the excluded areas, and those uses could negatively impact 
the protection of conservation values on the encumbered land. Excluding 
the building areas from the easement also might reduce the donor’s donation 
as a result of the “entire contiguous parcel” valuation rule, which is designed 
to reduce an easement donor’s deduction to the extent that the donation 
increases the value of contiguous property owned by the donor or a member 
of the donor’s family.101 
 
In addition, the conservation easement and the baseline documentation should 
explain why the location of each identified building site or build area will not 
adversely impact the property’s conservation values or the conservation purposes 
of the easement.  
 
9. State Law Can Render Conservation Easements Nondeductible. In Wachter, 
the Tax Court held that North Dakota law, which limits the duration of easements 
created after July 1, 1977, to a maximum of 99 years, precludes conservation 
easement donors in the state from qualifying for a deduction under § 170(h) because 
easements in North Dakota cannot be granted “in perpetuity.” 
 
a. Federal Law Controls. The Tax Court in Wachter reiterated the 
fundamental principle that, while state law determines the nature of 
property rights, it is federal law that determines the federal tax treatment of 
those rights. Wachter confirmed that state law can render all conservation 
easement donations in a state ineligible for the federal deduction if state law 
prevents conservation easements from complying with federal 
requirements.  
 
Some states have considered making changes to their state codes that could 
render conservation easements in the state ineligible for federal tax 
                                               
restoration of developed sites to their natural condition, the possible negative impacts on conservation values might be 
too extensive to warrant a deduction for the donation.  
101 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). The donor might also consider donating two easements, one nondeductible 
easement encumbering the designated building areas, and a second deductible easement encumbering the remaining 
property that satisfies all federal tax law requirements. While this could address the concern about intensive uses of the 
unencumbered areas, the conveyance of two easements would increase the expense and complexity of the transaction. 
For more on this and the option of excluding building areas from easement protections altogether, see the discussion of 
PBBM-Rose Hill in Part II.A.12 below. 
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incentives.102 Potential easement donors and their advisors should be aware 
of this issue. 
 
b. Wachter: Termination in 99 Years Not So Remote as to be Negligible. 
The taxpayers in Wachter argued that North Dakota’s 99-year limitation 
should be considered the equivalent of a remote future event that does not 
prevent an easement from being considered perpetual. They cited Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(3), which provides, in part, that: 
 
[a] deduction shall not be disallowed ... merely because the interest 
which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization may be 
defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some 
event, if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such 
act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible. 
 
The Tax Court in Wachter noted that the courts have construed the so-
remote- as-to-be-negligible standard to mean: 
 
‘a chance which persons generally would disregard as so highly 
improbable that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in 
undertaking a serious business transaction’ or ‘a chance which every 
dictate of reason would justify an intelligent person in disregarding 
as so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and 
substance.’ 
 
The Tax Court explained that the term “remote” refers to the likelihood of 
the event that could defeat the donee’s interest in the gift. It then explained 
that the likelihood of the event in Wachter that could defeat the donee’s 
interest in the charitable gifts of the conservation easements—expiration of 
the easements after 99 years—was not “remote.” On the date of the donation 
of the easements, the court explained, it was not only possible, it was 
inevitable that the donee would be divested of its interests in the easements 
by operation of North Dakota law. Accordingly, the easements were not 
restrictions granted “in perpetuity” and, thus, were not deductible under        
§ 170(h). 
 
10. Interaction Between Federal and State Law. Numerous courts have 
addressed the interaction between federal and state law in the conservation 
easement context. As noted in the discussions of Carpenter I103 and Wachter104 
above, while state law determines the nature of the property rights in an easement, 
it is federal law that determines the tax treatment of those rights. Thus, in 
determining whether an easement complies with federal tax law requirements, one 
                                               
102 See, e.g., Keeping the Perpetual in Perpetual Conservation Easements, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/2015/12/keeping-the-perpetual-in-perpetual-conservation-easements.html.  
103 See Part II.A.6 above. 
104 See Part II.A.9 above. 
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must look to the terms of the deed and applicable state law to determine how a 
particular easement may, for example, be transferred, extinguished, or amended, 
and then ask whether the easement, so configured, satisfies federal tax law 
requirements. 
 
a. In Belk III, the Fourth Circuit held that § 170(h) “requires that the gift of 
a conservation easement on a specific parcel of land be granted in perpetuity 
to qualify for a federal charitable deduction, notwithstanding the fact that 
state law may permit an easement to govern for some shorter period of 
time.” Thus, while an easement that grants restrictions for less than a 
perpetual term, like the easement at issue in Belk, may be a valid 
conveyance under state law, it will be ineligible for a deduction under 
federal law.  
 
b. With the exception of North Dakota, which limits the duration of any 
easement created in the State to 99 years, it appears that the parties to a 
conservation easement can include provisions in the deed to comply with 
the federal tax law perpetuity requirements and, provided the easement is 
drafted appropriately, those provisions will be enforceable under state law 
even though they impose conditions on the transfer or extinguishment of the 
easement that are different from or more restrictive than those imposed by 
state law. As the Tax Court noted in Wachter, “[b]oth parties allege that the 
State law at issue here is unique because [North Dakota] is the only State 
that has a law that provides for a maximum duration that may not be 
overcome by agreement.”  
 
c. The drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, which has been 
adopted in just over half the states and the District of Columbia, 105 
specifically intended that the Act would allow parties to draft a conservation 
easement that would comply with federal tax law requirements. The drafters 
explained: 
 
The Act enables the structuring of transactions so as to achieve tax 
benefits which may be available under the Internal Revenue Code, 
but parties intending to attain them must be mindful of the specific 
provisions of the income, estate and gift tax laws which are 
applicable.106  
 
The Act enables parties to create a conservation easement of 
unlimited duration subject to the power of a court to modify or 
terminate the easement in accordance with the principles of law and 
equity.… Allowing the parties to create such easements also enables 
                                               
105 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT STUDY COMMITTEE BACKGROUND REPORT 
(prepared for the Uniform Law Commission, June 11, 2017), available at 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=dde6ced5-c42e-
f02a-ff3b-95ce0f53d3d6&forceDialog=0.   
106 Unif. Conservation Easement Act, Prefatory Note, at 3 (2008). 
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them to fit within federal tax law requirements that the interest be 
“in perpetuity” if certain tax benefits are to be derived. 107 
 
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act drafters also contemplated that 
the terms of a conservation easement could be enforced by the relevant state 
attorney general on behalf of the public if the holder failed to enforce the 
easement or agreed to an improper amendment or extinguishment: 
 
the Act also recognizes that the state's other applicable law may 
create standing [to bring an action] in other persons. For example, 
independently of the Act, the Attorney General could have standing 
in his capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts, either by statute or 
at common law.108  
 
d. In 1980, at the congressional hearings on proposed § 170(h), in response 
to the Treasury’s concern that charitable conservation organizations might 
not properly enforce conservation easements, nineteen land trusts submitted 
an Appendix to their testimony in which they acknowledged the status of 
tax-deductible conservation easements as “charitable grants,” and noted the 
power and duty of courts of competent jurisdiction and state attorneys 
general to enforce such grants.109  
 
e. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the conservation easements at 
issue were restricted charitable gifts, or “contributions conditioned on the 
use of the gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and 
limitations.” Restricted gift status means that both the donor and the donee 
(and their successors) are bound by the terms of the easement deed under 
state law, including the provisions included in the deed to satisfy federal tax 
law requirements. Thus, if an easement deed is drafted appropriately, the 
provisions included in the deed governing transfer, amendment, and 
extinguishment should be binding on both parties (owner and holder) and 
enforceable by the state attorney general, even though the state enabling 
statute may contain different or less restrictive provisions addressing those 
actions. For example, if a conservation easement enabling statute provides 
that a conservation easement can be extinguished with the approval of a 
public official, that state law requirement must be satisfied in addition to the 
judicial extinguishment and division of proceeds requirements set forth in 
the easement deed to satisfy § 1.170A-14(g)(6). 
 
                                               
107 Unif. Conservation Easement Act, § 2, Comment (2008). 
108 Unif. Conservation Easement Act, § 3, Comment (2008). See also Part II.A.13 below, discussing the Tax Court Order 
in Hoffman Properties, which provides, in part, “it is undisputed that Ohio law empowers the AG to initiate a suit to 
enforce the terms of an easement if the holder neglects to do so....” 
109 See Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 96th Cong. 238, 242 (1980) (Appendix to Testimony of French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the 
Brandywine Conservancy, and other Conservation Organizations in re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980). 
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11. Sample Restriction on Transfer and Extinguishment Provisions. A conservation 
easement deed should include transfer and extinguishment provisions that comply with 
Treasury Regulation requirements. The following are sample provisions.110 
 
Article X. Transfer and Extinguishment 
 
a. Restriction on Transfer.111  
 
(1) Grantee is prohibited from assigning or otherwise transferring this 
Easement, whether or not for consideration, unless: 
(i) the transferee is, at the time of the transfer, a “qualified 
organization” and an “eligible donee,” as those terms are 
defined in § 170(h) of the Code and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder, and  
 
(ii) Grantee, as a condition of the transfer, requires that the 
transferee agree in writing that the conservation purpose(s) 
that the contribution of this Easement was originally intended 
to advance will continue to be carried out. 
Any subsequent transfer of this Easement shall also be subject to this 
paragraph. 
 
(2) If Grantee shall cease to exist, or cease to be a “qualified 
organization” or an “eligible donee,” as those terms are defined in § 
170(h) of the Code and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and 
a prior transfer is not made in accordance with the requirements of 
this paragraph, then Grantee’s rights and obligations under this 
Easement shall vest in such entity as a court of competent jurisdiction 
shall direct pursuant to the applicable laws of [State in which Property 
is located] governing charitable gifts, provided that the requirements 
of subparagraphs (1)(i) and (ii) of this paragraph shall be satisfied.  
 
b. Extinguishment; Proceeds.112  
 
(1) Grantor and Grantee agree that the donation of this Easement 
creates a property right that immediately vests in Grantee. Grantor 
and Grantee further agree that this property right has a fair market 
value that is at least equal to the proportionate value that this 
Easement, at the time of the gift, bore to the value of the Property as 
a whole (unencumbered by this Easement) at that time, and such 
                                               
110 These sample provisions are drafted to comply with § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation requirements. However, neither 
the IRS nor the courts have blessed these sample provisions. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice from their 
own legal counsel. 
111  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2). In the last sentence of this regulation, the cross-reference to (b)(3) should be to 
(b)(2), and the cross-reference to (g)(5)(ii) should be to (g)(6); the Treasury failed to update the cross-references when it 
finalized the proposed regulations in 1986. 
112 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6). 
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minimum proportionate value of Grantee’s property right, expressed 
as a percentage (the “Minimum Percentage”), shall remain constant. 
 
(2) This Easement can be extinguished in whole or in part (whether 
through release, termination, eminent domain, abandonment, swap, 
exchange, reconfiguration, or otherwise) only: 
 
(i) in a judicial proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction,  
 
(ii) upon a finding by the court that a subsequent unexpected 
change in the conditions surrounding the Property has made 
impossible or impractical the continued use of the Property 
(or the portion thereof to be removed from this Easement) for 
conservation purposes, and  
 
(iii) with a payment of proceeds to Grantee, calculated as 
provided in subparagraph (3) below, and all such proceeds 
shall be used by Grantee in a manner consistent with the 
conservation purposes of this gift.  
 
(3) In the event of an extinguishment, Grantee shall be entitled to a 
share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, exchange, lease, or 
involuntary conversion of the property removed from this Easement 
equal to the greater of:  
 
(i) the Minimum Percentage of such proceeds or  
 
(ii) the appraised value of this Easement (or portion of this 
Easement encumbering the property to be removed) 
immediately before and ignoring the extinguishment, 
calculated using before and after valuation methodology 
similar to that provided in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
14(h)(3)). 
 
If Grantee, in Grantee’s sole discretion, determines that the cost to 
Grantee of obtaining an appraisal of this Easement (or relevant 
portion thereof) at the time of extinguishment is likely to exceed any 
benefit to Grantee from obtaining such appraisal, or that the benefit 
of having such an appraisal prepared is so small as to be insignificant, 
Grantee may elect to receive the amount determined pursuant to (i) 
of this subparagraph (the “Minimum Percentage of such 
proceeds”).113  
                                               
113 The “greater of” proceeds formula complies with federal tax law requirements because the Grantee will always receive 
at least the minimum proportionate (or floor) share of proceeds required by Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). 
The “greater of” formula also helps to (i) ensure that the Grantee will receive the appreciation (if any) in the value of 
easement to be used “in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution” (i.e., to replace 
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(4) If all or any part of the Property is taken under the power of 
eminent domain, Grantor and Grantee shall participate in appropriate 
proceedings at the time of such taking to recover the full value of their 
respective interests subject to the taking and all incidental or direct 
damages resulting from the taking. Grantee shall be entitled to 
compensation from the recovered proceeds pursuant to 
subparagraph (3) above. The respective rights of Grantor and Grantee 
set forth in this subparagraph shall be in addition to, and not in 
limitation of, any rights they may have at common law. 
 
(5) For purposes of this Easement, any removal of any land from this 
Easement, however characterized, constitutes an extinguishment. 
 
(6) All provisions of this Article shall survive any extinguishment of this 
Easement in whole or in part. Any attempted extinguishment of all or 
a portion of the Easement contrary to this paragraph shall be invalid. 
 
c. Interaction With State Law. Grantor and Grantee are prohibited from 
exercising any power or discretion granted under state law regarding the 
transfer or extinguishment of this Easement that would be inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Easement, including the provisions in this Article, or the 
continued protection in perpetuity of the conservation values of the Property 
and the conservation purposes of this Easement. 
 
12. Noncompliant Proceeds Clause. The courts have denied deductions for failure 
to meet the proceeds requirement of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) in 
two cases: Carroll and PBBM-Rose Hill.  
 
a. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
approximately $650,000 of carryover deductions claimed with regard to a 
conservation easement donation because the easement contained a 
noncompliant proceeds clause. The court explained that the minimum 
proportionate share of proceeds that must be payable to the holder of an 
easement following extinguishment is equal to the percentage determined 
by (i) the fair market value of the easement on the date of the gift, which is 
the numerator, over (ii) the fair market value of the property as a whole on 
the date of the gift, which is the denominator. For example, if the fair market 
value of an easement on the date of the gift was $300,000, and the fair 
market value of the property as a whole on the date of the gift was 
$1,000,000, the easement represented 30% of the value of the property on 
the date of the gift, and the holder must be entitled to at least 30% of the 
proceeds following the easement’s extinguishment.  
 
                                               
lost conservation or historic values) and (ii) eliminate the property owner’s perverse incentive to seek extinguishment to 
benefit from any appreciation in the value of the easement following its donation, which may be significant. 
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In Carroll, the conservation easement deed limited the numerator of the 
formula noted above to “the deduction for federal income tax purposes 
allowable” by reason of the donation. The court explained that, if the IRS 
were to disallow the deduction for reasons other than valuation and the 
easement were later extinguished in a judicial proceeding, the numerator 
would be zero and the holder of the easement would not receive the 
minimum proportionate share of proceeds as is required. The court also 
noted that deductions are denied for many reasons unrelated to valuation, 
and, in fact, the IRS made numerous arguments for disallowance of the 
taxpayers’ claimed deductions in Carroll that were not based on valuation.  
 
Although not mentioned by the court, mandating that the holder receive at 
least a minimum proportionate share of proceeds following extinguishment 
even if the donor’s deduction is disallowed for other than valuation reasons 
is appropriate from a policy perspective. Donors of other types of charitable 
gifts are not entitled to a return of those gifts or the value attributable thereto 
if their deductions are denied for such things as failure to obtain a 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment or qualified appraisal. 
Moreover, regardless of whether a donor’s deduction is denied, holders 
have an ongoing obligation to monitor and enforce the easements on behalf 
of the public and they must invest time and resources fulfilling that 
obligation. The value attributable to a conservation easement is a charitable 
asset held for the benefit of the public and it should not be permitted to 
revert to the donors (or the donors’ successors in interest) upon 
extinguishment. Rather, such value should remain in the charitable sector 
and be used to replace lost conservation values, as Treasury Regulation § 
1.170A-14(g)(6) requires.  
 
The Tax Court distinguished its holding in Carroll from the First Circuit’s 
holding in Kaufman III. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit held that the donors 
of a facade easement had satisfied the proceeds requirement because the 
easement deed correctly stated the proceeds formula and the donee 
organization had an absolute right as against the donors for its share of 
proceeds upon extinguishment. 114  In Carroll, in contrast, the donee 
organizations would not be entitled to any proceeds in certain circumstances 
based on the formula included in the easement deed. Consistent with the 
First Circuit’s reasoning in Kaufman III, failing to guarantee that the donees 
would be entitled to at least the required minimum proportionate share of 
proceeds upon extinguishment, and providing a potential windfall to the 
donor or the donor’s successors as a result, was fatal to the deduction. 
 
The Tax Court also dismissed the taxpayers’ argument that noncompliance 
with the proceeds requirement should be forgiven because the probability 
of extinguishment of the easement was “so remote as to be negligible.” 
Citing Kaufman III, the Tax Court explained that easement donors cannot 
                                               
114 The Tax Court has declined to follow this holding in Palmolive I, as discussed in Part II.F.1 below. 
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satisfy the requirements of the extinguishment regulation by merely 
establishing that the possibility of a change in conditions triggering judicial 
extinguishment is unexpected. To accept such an argument, explained the 
Tax Court, would nullify the requirements because the extinguishment 
regulation, by its terms, applies only to “unexpected” conditions.115 
 
Finally, the Tax Court explained that the taxpayers in Carroll “could have 
avoided this adverse outcome by strictly following the proportionality 
formula set forth in the regulation.” In addition, in finding that the taxpayers 
were liable for accuracy-related penalties, the court noted: 
 
[The taxpayers] offered no evidence which would explain why the 
terms of the conservation easement varied from the requirements of 
[Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)], nor do they clarify why 
[they] failed to seek competent advice from a tax attorney or other 
adviser to ensure the conservation easement’s compliance with 
pertinent regulations. In the light of [the taxpayers’] high level of 
sophistication and experience with conservation easements, we 
conclude that [the taxpayers] have not demonstrated that they acted 
with reasonable cause and in good faith in not seeking competent 
tax advice regarding the conservation easement. 
 
There are a number of takeaways from Carroll. First, conservation 
easement donations generally involve high-dollar deductions and the 
requirements of § 170(h) and the regulations are numerous. Accordingly, 
prospective easement donors should hire experienced tax counsel to assist 
them with their donations. If they do not, they run the risk of not only having 
their deductions denied, but also being subject to penalties. Too often 
easement donors are either unrepresented by legal counsel, or represented 
by legal counsel with little or no relevant tax expertise.  
 
Second, donors of conservation easements should not rely on a donee 
organization, or donee’s template, or any other template or model easement 
(many of which are out-of-date) to satisfy the requirements for the 
deduction. The risks of noncompliance (audit, litigation, denial of 
                                               
115 The Tax Court further found that the donors’ deductions were not saved by the last sentence in Treasury Regulation 
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), which provides an exception to the requirement that the holder must receive at least a minimum 
proportionate share of proceeds upon extinguishment if “state law provides that the donor is entitled to the full proceeds 
from the conversion without regard to the terms of the [easement].” Maryland has an unusual provision in its state code. 
Pursuant to this provision, if land subject to an easement held by Maryland Environmental Trust (MET) is condemned, 
damages must be awarded “to the fee owner...and shall be the fair market value of the land or interest in it, computed as 
though the easement...did not exist.” This presumably means the holder would receive nothing unless the parties agreed 
that the fee owner would give a portion of the proceeds to the holder. The Carroll easement had been granted to MET 
and a local land trust as co-holders. The Tax Court held that the state code provision above did not save the deduction 
because (i) the provision applies only to easements held by MET and, thus, the proceeds formula in the deed still violated 
the proceeds requirement with regard to the local land trust, and (ii) the provision applies only to condemnations and, 
thus, the proceeds formula in the deed still violated the proceeds requirement with regard to judicial extinguishments not 
based on condemnation. 
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deductions, and interest and penalties) fall on the shoulders of the donor, 
and it is the responsibility of the donor and the donor’s tax counsel to ensure 
that all requirements are satisfied. Most donees are careful to instruct donors 
that they cannot and do not provide legal advice, and donors need to take 
that warning to heart. 
 
b. PBBM-Rose Hill. In PBBM-Rose Hill II, the Fifth Circuit similarly 
sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $15,160,000 deduction claimed with 
regard to a conservation easement donation because the easement contained 
a noncompliant proceeds clause. The proceeds clause included in the 
PBBM-Rose Hill easement provided that, following extinguishment, the 
holder was entitled to a share of the proceeds from a subsequent sale, 
exchange, or involuntary conversion of the property equal to the greater of 
(i) the fair market value of the easement around the date of the gift or (ii) a 
“defined share” of the amount of such proceeds remaining after both the 
expenses of the sale and the amount attributable to any improvements 
constructed upon the property pursuant to reserved rights was deducted. 
The defined share was the percentage determined by (i) the fair market 
value of the easement around the date of the gift over (ii) the fair market 
value of the property as a whole around the date of the gift (e.g., the 30% in 
the example provided in the discussion of Carroll above). 
 
The Fifth Circuit held that this formula did not satisfy the proceeds 
requirement because the plain language of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
14(g)(6)(ii) does not permit the value of improvements to be subtracted 
from the proceeds prior to the holder taking its share. The court also held 
that an IRS Private Letter Ruling sanctioning a proceeds clause that 
provided for such subtraction was not relevant because (i) the Regulation is 
not ambiguous and (ii) even if the Regulation were ambiguous, the court 
would not defer to an IRS interpretation in a Private Letter Ruling because 
such a ruling is binding only with respect to the parties at issue and cannot 
be cited as precedent.116 
 
It seems likely that, in crafting the proceeds requirement of Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), the Treasury specifically chose to create 
a simple, bright-line rule that relies on the qualified appraisal of a 
conservation easement obtained at the time of its donation. The Treasury 
was aware of the issue of reserved rights, which are addressed elsewhere in 
the Treasury Regulations, and it presumably also was aware that a 
conservation easement might appreciate in value relative to the property it 
encumbers over time (development pressures were increasing in the 1980s 
when the Regulations were drafted). Yet the Treasury did not address those 
                                               
116 A Private Letter Ruling (PLR) is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the 
taxpayer’s specific set of facts. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are 
generally made public after all information has been removed that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued. See 
IRS, Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-
A-Brief-Primer. 
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issues in § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The Treasury may have considered that any 
variation from the simple, bright-line rule to take into account the value of 
post-donation improvements or possible appreciation in the value of an 
easement would require that an additional appraisal be obtained at a later 
date, and a host of difficult issues would be raised by such a future appraisal. 
In addition to the property owner and holder having opposing interests with 
regard to such a future appraisal, a number of questions would arise: Would 
it have to be a “qualified appraisal”? Who would choose the appraiser? Who 
would define the scope of the assignment? What valuation methods should 
be employed (e.g., should improvements be valued using the before and 
after or replacement cost method)? Who would pay for the appraisal? What 
would be done if the owner and holder did not agree on the appraised value? 
The Treasury may have determined that the Regulation’s simple, bright-line 
rule is, on balance, the better approach because it is based on the qualified 
appraisal already required to be obtained at the time of donation and avoids 
difficult future valuation issues. 
 
In response to PBBM-Rose Hill, an easement donor that plans to construct 
valuable improvements on the encumbered property might be prompted to 
consider either (i) leaving designated building areas out of the conservation 
easement and therefore unrestricted or (ii) conveying two easements, one 
nondeductible easement encumbering the designated building areas, and a 
second deductible easement encumbering the remaining property that 
satisfies all federal tax law requirements. However, neither of these options 
is ideal. The first—leaving building areas entirely unrestricted—could have 
a detrimental effect on the protection of the conservation values of the 
encumbered land and reduce the donor’s deduction as a result of the “entire 
contiguous parcel” valuation rule. 117  The second—conveyance of two 
easements—would increase the expense and complexity of the donation 
transaction. The costs associated with these options also may be 
disproportionate to the potential benefits obtained for a number of reasons.  
• First, the Treasury Regulation’s formula, which requires the 
payment of only a fixed minimum percentage of proceeds to the 
holder following extinguishment, will benefit the property owner if 
the value of the easement relative to the value of the land increases 
following the date of the donation, which may often be the case. 
• Second, extinguishments, which require a judicial proceeding and a 
finding of impossibility or impracticality, should be extremely rare, 
occurring only in “extraordinary circumstances” (see Belk III, 
Carpenter). 
• Third, the likelihood of an extinguishment during the donor’s 
limited ownership period is even more remote. 
• And fourth, while condemnation is a possibility, condemnations are 
also relatively rare, and condemning authorities generally go out of 
                                               
117 See Part II.A.8 above, discussing options for addressing reserved development rights. 
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their way to avoid condemning structures, particularly personal 
residences.  
Thus, while for some donors the costs associated with the two options noted 
above may be worth the potential benefits, for many donors, given that 
extinguishment of a perpetual easement is extremely unlikely, encumbering 
the entire property (including the building areas) with a single easement and 
including a compliant proceeds clause that does not subtract the value of 
improvements will be the best option.   
 
13. Noncompliant Deemed Approval Clause. In a July 12, 2017, pre-trail Order 
issued in Hoffman Properties II, LP v. Comm’r (Docket No. 14130-15),118 the Tax 
Court determined that the Hoffman partnership was not entitled to a $15 million 
deduction for the donation of a façade easement on a building because the easement 
contained an “automatic approval” clause. Specifically, the easement reserved to 
Hoffman the right to modify, alter, or expand the building and its exterior in any 
manner desired, provided that Hoffman obtained prior approval from the holder. 
The easement further provided that if the holder failed to expressly reject a request 
for approval within 45 days of receiving it, the request was automatically approved 
and Hoffman could proceed with the proposed activity—even if the activity were 
inconsistent with the historic character of the exterior and the conservation purposes 
of the easement. The court explained that the automatic approval clause stripped 
the holder of any right to object to or remedy alterations or modifications that might 
be inconsistent with the historic character of the exterior or otherwise jeopardize 
the easement’s conservation purpose. As a result, the conservation purpose of the 
easement was not protected in perpetuity and the easement failed to qualify for a 
deduction under § 170(h). 
 
In a March 14, 2018, Order, the court denied Hoffman’s motion to reconsider its 
holdings in its July 2017 Order and affirmed those holdings. The court also 
addressed Hoffman’s argument that the shortcomings in the easement were 
irrelevant because the general public or the Ohio Attorney General (AG) had the 
right to prevent Hoffman from altering or modifying the building’s façade in a 
manner inconsistent with the building’s historic character. In support of this 
argument, Hoffman cited to Ohio statutory and case law empowering the AG to 
enforce, oversee, and administer charitable interests and nonprofit corporations. In 
rejecting this argument, the court explained that, while it is undisputed that Ohio 
law empowers the AG to initiate a suit to enforce the terms of an easement if the 
holder neglects to do so, the AG does not possess any greater rights than those 
granted to the holder under the easement. Thus, neither the holder nor the AG could 
object to an activity undertaken by Hoffman that had been automatically approved 
under the automatic approval clause.  
 
Finally, in a second  March 14, 2018, Order, in which the court came to similar 
conclusions regarding the portion of the easement relating the air space above the 
building, Hoffman argued that the possibility that the holder would fail to deny a 
                                               
118 Tax Court Orders are available on the Tax Court website: https://www.ustaxcourt.gov.   
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request to do something inconsistent with the purpose of the easement within the 
45-day period was “so remote as to be negligible.” In rejecting this argument, the 
court explained that inclusion of the automatic approval clause in the easement 
indicated that the parties did not consider that possibility to be improbable (i.e., so 
remote as to be negligible). 
 
Although not mentioned by the court, denying a deduction for a conservation 
easement containing an automatic approval clause is also appropriate from a policy 
perspective. A tax-deductible conservation easement should not be rendered 
unenforceable as a result of the holder’s inaction. A holder may fail to respond to a 
request from the landowner for a variety of reasons, such as other pressing 
obligations, misplaced mail, email oversight, turnover in staff, or gross negligence, 
none of which should result in the forfeiture of the public’s rights and investment 
in an easement.119 
 
Although Tax Court Orders are of limited precedential value, 120  the Hoffman 
Orders signal the position of the Tax Court and the IRS with regard to automatic 
approval clauses. Sometimes attorneys representing property owners treat 
conservation easement donations as if they are commercial transactions rather than 
charitable contributions, and these attorneys negotiate to include clauses in the 
easement deed that they think will benefit the property owner, such as an automatic 
approval clause. These attorneys fail to recognize that they are dealing with a 
charitable contribution intended to provide perpetual benefits to the public and, to 
be eligible for a deduction, the conservation purpose of the easement must be 
protected in perpetuity. The Hoffman Orders should make clear that such clauses 
are not appropriate in the tax-deductible conservation easement context. 
 
Rather than automatic approval, a holder’s failure to respond should be deemed a 
constructive denial. Below is a sample “constructive denial” clause. 121 
  
For activities or uses that are expressly permitted by the terms of this 
Easement only with Holder’s approval, Owner’s request for approval shall 
be in writing and shall describe the nature, scope, design, location, 
timetable, and any other material aspect of the proposed activity or use in 
sufficient detail to permit Holder to make an informed determination 
regarding approval or denial of the request. Such a request shall be delivered 
to Holder at least sixty (60) days prior to the anticipated start date of such 
activity or use. Holder agrees to use reasonable diligence to respond to the 
request within sixty (60) days of delivery. Holder’s failure to respond to 
                                               
119 For cases in which the court held that the public’s rights with respect to a conservation easement were not forfeited as 
a result of the actions or inactions of the holder, see, e.g., Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission, 148 Cal. App. 4th 
1346 (2007); Weston Forest and Trail Assoc. v. Fishman, 849 N.E. 2d 916 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
120 U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 50(f) (“Orders shall not be treated as precedent, except as may 
be relevant for purposes of establishing the law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or other similar doctrine.”). 
121 This sample provision is drafted to comply with § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation requirements. However, neither 
the IRS nor the courts have blessed this sample provision. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice from their 
own legal counsel. 
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such a request within the sixty (60) day period shall be deemed a 
constructive denial. Because a constructive denial is not a decision by 
Holder based on the merits of Owner’s request, it is not final or binding on 
Holder, and Owner can resubmit the same or a similar request for approval. 
 
This clause protects the public because the easement will not be rendered 
unenforceable due to the holder’s failure to respond within the specified time 
period. This clause also protects the property owner from an unreasonable or 
negligent holder because the property owner can seek redress in the courts if the 
holder fails to use “reasonable diligence” to respond within the designated time 
period. 
  
14. Releasing Land With Transfer to “Comparable” Easement. In Salt Point 
Timber, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a $2.1 million deduction 
claimed by an LLC for the donation of a conservation easement on a 1,032-acre 
parcel in South Carolina. The conservation easement contained a “boundary line 
adjustment” provision that required the holder to release land from the original 
easement (an extinguishment of the original easement with regard to the released 
land) if (i) the released land was transferred to the owner of adjacent property 
encumbered by a “comparable” conservation easement and (ii) the owner of the 
adjacent property and the holder of the comparable easement agreed to modify the 
comparable easement to add the released land.  
 
The Tax Court denied the deduction because the boundary line adjustment 
provision did not require the holder of the “replacement” (comparable) easement to 
be a “qualified organization” within the meaning of § 170(h). The court explained 
that, had the parties intended the replacement easement to be held by a qualified 
organization, they could have easily written such a restriction into the boundary 
line adjustment provision, which they did not do. In addition, the expectation that 
the word “comparable,” which was not defined in the easement, incorporated such 
a specific requirement was not objectively reasonable. 
 
The Tax Court also determined that the possibility that acreage would be released 
from the original easement and encumbered by a replacement easement was not “so 
remote as to be negligible.” There was an expectation that the donation of the 
original easement would “encourage neighboring landowners to commit their 
properties to conservation in a domino-effect fashion,” state and local entities were 
encouraging and subsidizing the donation of conservation easements in the area, 
and, significantly, the parties had “bothered to put” the boundary line adjustment 
provision in the easement.  
 
Because the Tax Court denied the deduction on the grounds noted above, it did not 
address the IRS’s argument that the boundary line adjustment provision permitted 
the restrictions of the original easement to be extinguished with regard to the 
released land without satisfaction of the Treasury Regulations’ judicial 
extinguishment requirements. 
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15. Reimbursement of Funders on Extinguishment. Irby analyzed Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) (the division of proceeds portion of the 
extinguishment regulation) as applied to conservation easements conveyed in 
bargain sale transactions. The conservation easements in Irby had been conveyed 
to a land trust, but three government entities had supplied funding to pay 
approximately 75% of the value of the easements to the landowners, and the 
landowners made charitable gifts of the remaining 25%. To be eligible for a 
deduction for the donation component of a bargain sale transaction, the donation 
must meet all of the statutory and regulatory requirements for the deduction.122  
 
The easement deeds in Irby provide that the grantee (the land trust) is entitled to 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s mandated minimum proportionate 
share of proceeds following extinguishment, but must pay 75% of those proceeds 
to the government entities to reimburse them for their contributions to the purchase 
price of the easements, which would leave the grantee with only 25% of the 
proceeds. 
 
a. The IRS argued that the reimbursement obligation meant that the grantee 
was not actually entitled to the mandated minimum proportionate share of 
proceeds following extinguishment—i.e., that its entitlement was merely 
“superficial.” The Tax Court disagreed. The court explained that, unlike the 
situation where a lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the property is 
given priority to proceeds upon extinguishment (which furthers the 
taxpayer’s interests because the proceeds will be used to pay down the 
taxpayer’s debt), there was no risk that the taxpayers in Irby could reap a 
similar windfall upon extinguishment because the proceeds payable by the 
grantee to the governmental entities, each of which has a conservation 
mission, would be used by such entities “in a manner consistent with the 
original conservation purposes of the contribution” (as explained in the next 
paragraph). Thus, the court found that the easement deeds met the 
requirements of division of proceeds regulation. 
 
b. The Tax Court noted that the IRS’s concerns in Irby more properly 
seemed to address the question of whether all of the extinguishment 
proceeds would be used by the grantee “in a manner consistent with the 
conservation purposes of the original contribution” as required by Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i). The court determined that they would. It 
explained that all three government entities “were established to assist the 
conservation of open land” and are “legally obligated to fulfill their 
conservation purpose.” In addition, the court stated that it appeared that the 
reimbursements would enhance the ability of the government entities “to 
conserve and protect more land, since the reimbursed funds would be used 
to do just that.” Accordingly, the court found that the reimbursement 
                                               
122 See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 39 and 40. 
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provision in Irby did not violate the requirements of either the 
extinguishment or division of proceeds regulations.123 
 
c. The Tax Court issued stipulated decisions in Irby in December 2013 
ordering the taxpayers to pay agreed upon deficiencies in income tax for 
taxable years 2003 and 2004, but no penalties were imposed. 
 
16. Safe Harbor Provisions and Amnesty Period. The amount of litigation in this 
context could be significantly reduced if the IRS developed safe harbor or “sample” 
conservation easement provisions to satisfy the key perpetuity requirements of § 
170(h). While many provisions of an easement must be tailored to the specific 
property and situation, many of the perpetuity requirements, including those 
addressing restriction on transfer, judicial extinguishment, and division of proceeds 
upon extinguishment, could be satisfied with provisions that generally should not 
vary from easement to easement. Safe harbor provisions would facilitate both donor 
compliance and IRS review, and would help to ensure that the public investment in 
easements and their conservation purposes is actually “protected in perpetuity” as 
Congress intended. Moreover, developing safe harbor provisions would not be a 
novel approach to facilitating compliance and curbing abuse. The Treasury 
developed safe harbor trust provisions with annotations in the charitable remainder 
trust and charitable lead trust contexts and those provisions, which are widely used, 
have greatly facilitated compliance and reduced abuses. 
 
The IRS and Treasury also could consider providing a temporary amnesty period 
upon issuance of safe harbor provisions. That is, give taxpayers a period of time 
(e.g., 6 months) to amend already recorded easement deeds to bring noncompliant 
clauses into compliance and, if they do, the fact that the deeds contained those 
noncompliant clauses at the time of their donation would not result in a denial of 
the deduction. But if taxpayers do not amend their deeds to come into compliance 
during the amnesty period, the donations could be challenged on those grounds. 
 
B. IRS Form 8283 (Appraisal Summary)  
 
1. History. 
 
a. In 1984, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA),124 
Congress required taxpayers claiming deductions for noncash charitable 
contributions in excess of $5,000 to obtain a qualified appraisal prepared by 
a qualified appraiser and attach an appraisal summary to the return on which 
                                               
123 Some have argued that the court reached the correct result in Irby, but for the wrong reason. Treasury Regulation  § 
1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) could be viewed as applying only to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the contribution 
component of a bargain sale transaction, and not to the portion of the proceeds attributable to the sales component of the 
transaction. Allowing the funders to be reimbursed for the funds they contributed to the purchase price should thus not 
run afoul of the proceeds requirement, although the priority of the payments might be an issue. 
124 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 691 (1984). 
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the deduction is first claimed for the property contributed.125 DEFRA also 
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations implementing 
the statutory requirements. Pursuant to this legislative mandate, the IRS and 
the Treasury Department promulgated Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c), 
which provides that no deduction shall be allowed for a noncash 
contribution in excess of $5,000 unless the taxpayer: 
 
(i) obtains a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified appraiser, 
and 
 
(ii) attaches a fully completed appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283) 
to the tax return on which the taxpayer first claims a deduction for 
the contribution. 
 
b. In 2004, Congress added § 170(f)(11) to the Internal Revenue Code 
effective for contributions made after June 3, 2004.126 Section 170(f)(11) 
provides, among other things, that: 
 
(i) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction of 
more than $5,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must obtain a qualified 
appraisal and attach to the return for the taxable year in which such 
contribution is made such information regarding such property and 
such appraisal as the Secretary may require,127 and 
 
(ii) in the case of contributions of property for which a deduction of 
more than $500,000 is claimed, the taxpayer must attach the full 
qualified appraisal to the return (i.e., the entire qualified appraisal 
must be filed with the Form 8283).128 
 
c. In 2006, Congress amended § 170(f)(11) to add statutory definitions of 
the terms “qualified appraiser” and “qualified appraisal” (§ 170(f)(11), as 
amended, is attached as Appendix D).129 
 
d. Later in 2006, the IRS issued Notice 2006-96, which, among other things, 
provided transitional guidance regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s definitions of 
qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser. 
 
                                               
125 DEFRA § 155(a). Congress defined the term “qualified appraisal” to mean an appraisal prepared by a qualified 
appraiser that includes, among other information: (1) a description of the property appraised, (2) the fair market value of 
the property on the contribution date and the specific basis for valuation, (3) a statement that the appraisal was prepared 
for income tax purposes, (4) the qualifications of the appraiser, and (5) any additional information the Secretary may 
prescribe by regulation. DEFRA § 155(a)(4). 
126 See § 883 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
127 IRC § 170(f)(11)(C). 
128 IRC § 170(f)(11)(D). 
129 IRC § 170(f)(11)(E). See § 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780. For an 
explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changes, see JCT Explanation of Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
supra note 17. 
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e. In 2008, the Treasury Department issued proposed regulations 
implementing the substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable 
contribution deductions. 130  Until these regulations were finalized and 
effective, the transitional guidance in IRS Notice 2006-96 applied. 
 
f. In July 2018, the Treasury Department issued final regulations 
implementing substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable 
contribution deductions (attached as Appendix E).131 
 
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-16 sets forth the substantiation 
and reporting requirements for noncash charitable contributions 
made after July 30, 2018, although taxpayers may rely on the rules 
of this regulation for contributions made after June 3, 2004, or 
appraisals prepared for returns or submissions filed after August 17, 
2006.132 Pursuant to this regulation: 
 
(1) No deduction is allowed for a noncash charitable 
contribution of more than $5,000 unless the donor: 
• substantiates the contribution with a 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the 
donee,  
• obtains a qualified appraisal prepared by a qualified 
appraiser, and  
• completes Form 8283 (Section B) and files it with the 
return on which the deduction is claimed.133  
 
(2) For a noncash charitable contributions of more than 
$500,000, the donor must also attach a copy of the qualified 
appraisal to the return on which the deduction is claimed.134 
 
(3) These requirements also apply to a return filed for any 
carryover year. 135 
 
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 sets forth the requirements for 
“qualified appraisals” and “qualified appraisers” for contributions 
made on or after January 1, 2019, although taxpayers may rely on 
the rules of this regulation for appraisals prepared for returns or 
submissions filed after August 17, 2006.136 
                                               
130 See Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable Contribution Deductions, 73 Federal 
Register 45908 (proposed August 7, 2008). 
131  TD 9836, Final Regulations, Substantiation and Reporting Requirements for Cash and Noncash Charitable 
Contribution Deductions (July 30. 2018) [hereinafter Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations] (attached at 
Appendix E).  
132 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(g). 
133 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(1). 
134 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(e)(1). 
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(f)(3). 
136 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(c). 
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(iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.6050L-1(d)(2) provides that a donee 
must retain the Form 8283 “for so long as it may be relevant in the 
administration of any internal revenue law.” 
 
g. As the foregoing indicates, the qualified appraisal, qualified appraiser, 
and appraisal summary requirements are both statutory and regulatory 
requirements. 
 
2. IRS Form 8283, Section B. Donors should correctly and completely fill out 
Section B of IRS Form 8283 and attach a Supplemental Statement as described 
below. Donors should not rely on substantial compliance. 
 
a. DEFRA specifically requires taxpayers to include on the return on which 
a deduction is first claimed such information as may be prescribed by 
Treasury Regulations, including the cost basis and acquisition date of the 
donated property.137 The Treasury Regulations implement this requirement 
by providing that the appraisal summary (Form 8283) must include, among 
other things: (i) the fair market value of the property on the “valuation 
effective date”; (ii) the manner and approximate date of acquisition of the 
property by the donor; (ii) the cost or other basis of the property; and (iv) a 
statement explaining whether the contribution was made by means of a 
bargain sale and, if so, the amount of any consideration received.138  
 
b. The donee and the individual appraiser or appraisers (if more than one) 
must all sign the Form 8283.139 
 
c. The Instructions for Form 8283 state, with regard to Section B, Part I, 
Line 5, Columns (d)—(f) (addressing date acquired, how acquired, and 
basis): “If you have reasonable cause for not providing the information in 
columns (d), (e), or (f), attach an explanation so your deduction will not 
automatically be disallowed” (emphasis added). The Instructions also 
provide: “For a qualified conservation contribution, indicate whether you 
are providing information about the underlying property or about the 
easement.” 
 
d. The case law in this context is unpredictable. For example, in Kaufman 
III, the First Circuit held that the taxpayers’ failure to include the date, 
manner of acquisition, and cost or other basis relating to a façade easement 
on the Form 8283 was not fatal to the deduction.140 However, in Belair, the 
Tax Court held that the taxpayer, who on the advice of a consultant had 
declined to include the cost basis relating to a conservation easement on the 
Form 8283, neither strictly nor substantially complied with the Treasury 
                                               
137 DEFRA § 155(a)(1)(C). 
138 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(3).  
139 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16(d)(3), (4), (5), (7). 
140 See also Scheidelman III.   
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Regulation requirements. The taxpayer in Belair claimed a deduction for 
the donation that presupposed that the encumbered land had increased in 
value by 1,380% in the 2½ years since its purchase, amid the worst real 
estate crisis since the Great Depression. The court explained: 
 
When a taxpayer claims a charitable contribution deduction for 
recently purchased property, a wide gap between cost basis and 
claimed value raises a red flag suggesting that the return merits 
examination. Unless the taxpayer complies with the regulatory 
requirement that he disclose his cost basis and the date and manner 
of acquiring the property, the Commissioner will be deprived of an 
essential tool that Congress intended him to have. 
 
In response to the taxpayer’s claim that it effectively disclosed its cost basis 
elsewhere on its tax return, the court noted: 
 
The IRS reviews millions of returns each year for audit potential, 
and the disclosure of cost basis on the Form 8283 itself is necessary 
to make this process manageable. Revenue agents cannot be 
required to sift through dozens or hundreds of pages of complex 
returns looking for clues about what the taxpayer’s cost basis might 
be…. If cost basis is not explicitly disclosed where it is required to 
be disclosed, the Commissioner will be handicapped in identifying 
suspicious charitable deductions and deterring taxpayers from 
“continu[ing] to play the ‘audit lottery.’ 
 
Moreover, Belair was not a case were the taxpayer had omitted the 
information through inadvertence. Rather, the taxpayer made a conscious 
election not to supply the required information. However, the Tax Court 
determined that it did not have sufficient facts to resolve the issue of 
whether the taxpayer could qualify for the reasonable cause defense.141    
 
e. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide provides the 
following list of common errors in Section B of Form 8283: 
• Inadequate description of the property 
• Missing information 
• Missing signatures 
• Inconsistent dates142 
 
3. Supplemental Statement. The Instructions for Form 8283 require the donor to 
attach a supplemental statement to the form. 
 
a. The supplemental statement must: 
 
                                               
141 See § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II).  
142 See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 27. 
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(i) identify the conservation purposes furthered by the donation, 
 
(ii) show, if before and after valuation is used, the fair market value 
of the underlying property before and after the gift, 
 
(iii) state whether the donation was made in order to get a permit or 
other approval from a local or other governing authority and whether 
the donation was required by a contract (i.e., was there a quid pro 
quo), and 
 
(iv) if the donor or a related person has any interest in other property 
nearby, describe that interest. 
 
b. The Supplemental Statement should be comprehensive and detailed 
(numerous pages long). An example of a supplemental statement is attached 
as Appendix F. 
 
4. Special Rules for Façade Easement Donations. For the donation of a façade 
easement on a building in a registered historic district, in addition to the Form 8283 
and Supplemental Statement, the taxpayer must include with the taxpayer’s return 
for the year of the contribution: (a) a qualified appraisal, (b) photos of the entire 
exterior of the building, (c) a description of all restrictions on the development of 
the building, and (d) if the deduction claimed is more than $10,000, a $500 filing 
fee.143  
 
In Gemperle, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of deductions claimed 
with regard to the donation of a façade easement because the taxpayers, a married 
couple who represented themselves in Tax Court, failed to include a qualified 
appraisal of the easement with the return they filed for the year of the contribution. 
The court also found the Gemperles liable for 20% penalties for “disregard of rules 
or regulations” under IRC § 6662(a) and (b)(1). The court explained that the 
requirement that the full qualified appraisal be included with the tax return filed for 
the year of the contribution is stated not only in the Internal Revenue Code but also 
in the instructions for the Form 8283, and the taxpayers “were at least careless, if 
not reckless, in ignoring the warning that an appraisal was required.” The court 
further found that the Gemperles were alternatively liable for 40% strict liability 
penalties under IRC § 6662(h) for making gross valuation misstatements on their 
2007 and 2008 returns with regard to the easement. 
 
C. Qualified Appraisal Requirements 
 
1. General Requirements. The current “qualified appraisal” requirements are 
found in IRC § 170(f)(11) (attached as Appendix D) and Treasury Regulation § 
1.170A-17 (attached as Appendix E). Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 applies to 
contributions made on or after January 1, 2019, although taxpayers may rely on the 
                                               
143 See IRC §§ 170(h)(4)(B)(iii) and 170(f)(13). See also IRS Form 8283-V.  
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rules of this regulation for appraisals prepared for returns or submissions filed after 
August 17, 2006.144  
 
For the “qualified appraisal” regulations in effect before Treasury Regulation § 
1.170A-17, see Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13. For transitional guidance 
regarding § 170(f)(11)(E)’s definitions of “qualified appraisal” and “qualified 
appraiser,” see IRS Notice 2006-96. Taxpayers may rely on Notice 2006-96 prior 
to the effective date of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17, noted above.145 For a 
history of these requirements, see Part II.B.1 above. 
 
Because Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-17 incorporates or only slightly modifies 
many of the qualified appraisal and qualified appraiser requirements in place before 
its effective date, the cases below, which were decided based on the former 
requirements, remain relevant. 
 
a. Donors Should Strictly Comply. Donors should strictly comply with all 
statutory and regulatory qualified appraisal requirements. While in some 
cases the courts have been willing to forgive failures to strictly comply with 
some of the requirements, 146  in the following cases failures to strictly 
comply led to a complete disallowance of the claimed deductions. 
 
(i) Lord. In Lord, the Tax Court sustained the disallowance of a 
deduction for the donation of a conservation easement because the 
taxpayer’s appraisal (which did not include the easement 
contribution date, the date the appraisal was performed, or the 
appraised fair market value of the easement on the contribution date) 
was not a qualified appraisal. The doctrine of substantial compliance 
was not applicable because significant information was omitted. 
 
(ii) Costello. In Costello, landowners conveyed a conservation 
easement permanently prohibiting development of their 73-acre 
farm to Howard County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to sell 
16 development rights to a developer for $2.5 million. The 
developer was able to use those rights to increase density on parcels 
located in a “receiving area” of the county (i.e., the exchange was 
pursuant to the county’s transfer of development rights program). 
Seven months later, the landowners hired an appraiser to appraise 
                                               
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-17(c). 
145 See Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations, supra note 131, at 36418. 
146 In Zarlengo, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer complied or substantially complied with the various qualified 
appraisal requirements even though, among other things, the appraisal was “premature” (i.e., prepared more than sixty 
days prior to the date of the contribution). In Irby, the Tax Court held that an appraisal report’s discussion of the purpose 
of the appraisal (i.e., to value an easement for purposes of § 170(h)) was sufficient to satisfy Treasury Regulation § 
1.170A–13(c)(3)(ii)(G)’s requirement that the appraisal contain “[a] statement that the appraisal was prepared for income 
tax purposes.” In Simmons II, Scheidelman II, and Friedberg II, the courts held that the appraisals obtained to substantiate 
façade easement donations sufficiently detailed the method used and basis of valuation for purposes of Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(J) and (K). Provision of the basis of valuation is also required by DEFRA 
§155(a)(4)(B). 
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their property before and after a “hypothetical” sale of development 
rights. The appraiser was unaware of the existing conservation 
easement and assumed the property could be developed into a 25-
lot subdivision. He estimated the value of the hypothetical 
development rights to be $5.5 million and the taxpayers filed a tax 
return claiming a charitable income tax deduction of that amount. 
Howard county refused to sign an IRS Form 8283 as the “donee” 
because it questioned whether the conveyance of the easement 
constituted a charitable donation. 
 
The IRS disallowed the claimed deduction on a number of grounds, 
including that the taxpayers failed to obtain a “qualified appraisal.” 
The Tax Court sustained the disallowance, finding, among other 
things, that the taxpayer’s appraisal failed to include the following 
three elements required for a qualified appraisal: (a) the appraisal 
did not contain an accurate description of the contributed property 
(the appraiser didn’t describe or purport to value the conservation 
easement because the appraiser was unaware of its existence), (b) 
the appraisal did not contain the date of the contribution 
(unsurprising given that the appraiser was unaware of the easement 
conveyance), and (c) the appraisal did not contain the salient terms 
of any of the agreements relating to the contributed property (again, 
unsurprising given that the appraiser was unaware that the 
landowners had agreed to grant the easement to the county in 
exchange for the right to sell development rights for $2.5 million). 
 
After filing their initial income tax return and claiming a $5.5 
million deduction, the landowners apparently had second thoughts. 
They had their appraiser prepare an addendum to his appraisal that 
took into account their sale of development rights to the developer 
for $2.5 million, and they filed an amended income tax return 
claiming a deduction of only $3 million. However, the appraiser’s 
addendum was not prepared within the required time period for the 
qualified appraisal (i.e., no more than 60 days before the date of the 
gift and no later than the due date (including extensions) of the 
return on which the deduction was first claimed).147 The Tax Court 
held that the untimely addendum did not convert the original 
appraisal into a qualified appraisal. The court also held that the 
appraisal did not “substantially comply” with the reporting 
requirements because it omitted numerous categories of important 
information and appraised the wrong asset.  
 
The Tax Court further explained that, pursuant to IRC                                    
§ 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) (see Appendix D), “[e]ven absent strict or 
substantial compliance with the ‘qualified appraisal’ and reporting 
                                               
147 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A). 
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requirements, a deduction will not be denied if the failure to meet 
those requirements is due to ‘reasonable cause and not to willful 
neglect.’” The burden of proving reasonable cause is on the 
taxpayer, however, and the court held that, given the magnitude of 
the omissions from the appraisal and the Form 8283, particularly the 
failure to disclose the prior sale of development rights for $2.5 
million, the taxpayers could not show that their failures were due to 
reasonable cause. 
 
(iii) Mecox. In Mecox, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of 
a deduction claimed with regard to the donation of a façade 
easement because (i) the easement was found not to have been 
contributed until the year it was recorded, which was the year 
following the year in which the taxpayer claimed the deduction and 
(ii) the appraisal was untimely (i.e., the appraisal was made more 
than 60 days prior to the date of the contribution148). For a more 
detailed discussion of Mecox, see Part III.C.2 below. 
 
b. Collective Defects. After the Second Circuit’s holding in Scheidelman II 
(discussed below), the Tax Court in Rothman II reconsidered its earlier 
opinion and concluded that the Rothman appraisal met the method used and 
basis of valuation requirements of the Treasury Regulations. However, the 
court noted that Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13 imposed fifteen distinct 
requirements and the appraisal in Rothman failed to satisfy eight of the 
fifteen requirements. Because of the “collective defects,” the court 
reconfirmed its holding that the appraisal was not qualified. The court 
further noted that, because the qualified appraisal regulation was 
promulgated under an express delegation of congressional authority and has 
been found to be valid, the U.S. Supreme Court instructs that courts respect 
the lines the Secretary of the Treasury has drawn therein as a valid exercise 
of rulemaking authority. Whether the donor in Rothman qualified for the 
“reasonable cause” exception for not having a qualified appraisal under § 
170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) was an issue that remained to be tried, but the case 
settled. 
 
c. Qualified Appraisals That Are Not Credible. In a number of façade 
easement cases the courts held that the appraisals met the minimal 
requirements of a qualified appraisal but did not provide credible evidence 
of value.  
 
(i) Scheidelman. In Scheidelman II, the Second Circuit explained: 
 
[f]or the purpose of gauging compliance with the reporting 
requirement, it is irrelevant that the IRS believes the method 
                                               
148 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A). 
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employed [a mechanical application of a percentage 
diminution] was sloppy or inaccurate, or haphazardly 
applied—it remains a method, and [the appraiser] described 
it. The regulation requires only that the appraiser identify the 
valuation method “used”; it does not require that the method 
adopted be reliable. 
 
However, the Second Circuit went on to explain that its conclusion 
that the appraisal met the minimal requirements of a qualified 
appraisal mandated neither that the Tax Court find the appraisal 
persuasive nor that Scheidelman be entitled to any deduction for the 
donated façade easement, and it remanded to the Tax Court.  
 
In Scheidelman III, the Tax Court held that, although the taxpayers’ 
appraisal was a qualified appraisal: (a) the taxpayers did not provide 
sufficient credible evidence to meet their burden of establishing 
entitlement to the claimed deduction and (b) the preponderance of 
the evidence supported the IRS's position that the façade easement 
had no value.  
 
In Scheidelman IV the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s 
holding that the easement had no value. 149 In support of its holding, 
the Second Circuit quoted the IRS’s valuation expert, who explained 
that “in highly desirable, sophisticated home markets like historic 
brownstone Brooklyn, the imposition of an easement, such as the 
one granted...does not materially affect the value of the subject 
property.” The Second Circuit also found persuasive the fact that the 
donee had assured one of Scheidelman's mortgagors that: 
 
[a]s a practical matter, the easement does not add any new 
restrictions on the use of the property because the historic 
preservation laws of the City of New York already require a 
specific historic review of any proposed changes to the 
exterior of this property. 
 
                                               
149 In Evans, Dunlap, Foster, Scheidelman, Kaufman, Chandler, and Reisner, façade easements on residential properties 
were found to have no value (in Reisner the parties so stipulated). However, in some cases courts have determined that 
façade easements reduced the value of the properties they encumbered, albeit by less than the taxpayers’ claimed. In 
Simmons I, Zarlengo, and Gorra, the Tax Court held that façade easements reduced the value of the subject residential 
properties by 5%, 3.5%, and 2%, respectively. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, the IRS argued that a façade 
easement had no effect on the value of a historic shrine because of already existing local historic preservation restrictions. 
The Tax Court disagreed, holding that the easement was more protective of the shrine than local law. In Whitehouse 
Hotel, after two appeals, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that a façade easement encumbering the 
historic Maison Blanche building (which is located in the French Quarter in New Orleans and is now used as a Ritz 
Carlton hotel) reduced the value of the building by 14.9%. For a comprehensive discussion of the valuation case law 
through 2015, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 
225 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.  
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(ii) Kaufman. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit vacated the Tax 
Court’s opinions in Kaufman I and Kaufman II in part and remanded 
to the Tax Court on the issue of valuation.150 The First Circuit noted 
that the Kaufmans had expressed concern to the donee, the National 
Architectural Trust (NAT), about the high appraised value of the 
façade easement they were donating because it implied a substantial 
reduction in the resale value of their home, which was located in 
Boston’s South End Historic District. “In an effort to reassure them, 
a [NAT] representative told the Kaufmans that experience showed 
that such easements did not reduce resale value.” “This,” said the 
First Circuit, “could easily be the IRS's opening argument in a 
valuation trial.”151 And so it apparently was.  
 
In Kaufman IV, on remand from the First Circuit, the Tax Court 
sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of the deductions 
claimed with regard to the façade easement donation on the ground 
that the easement had no value. Although the Tax Court assumed 
the Kaufman’s appraisal was a “qualified appraisal,” the court gave 
no weight to the appraisal’s estimate of value because it found the 
appraiser’s method (application of a standard diminution percentage 
to the value of the property before the easement's donation) to be 
unreliable and his analysis unpersuasive. The Tax Court found the 
IRS’s valuation expert, who determined that the value of the 
easement was zero, to be more persuasive. The IRS’s expert opined, 
among other things, that the typical buyer would find the restrictions 
in the façade easement no more burdensome than local historic 
preservation restrictions and, even if the façade easement were more 
restrictive, it would not necessarily reduce the value of the property 
because homeowners in historic districts place a premium value on 
the assurance that the neighborhood surrounding their homes will 
remain unchanged over time. In Kaufman IV the Tax Court also 
sustained the IRS imposition of accuracy-related penalties.  
 
The indefatigable Kaufmans appealed the holding imposing 
penalties to the First Circuit. In Kaufman V (discussed in Part III.B.2 
below), the First Circuit affirmed, noting that the Tax Court did not 
clearly err when it found that the Kaufmans were liable for penalties 
for claiming a deduction for the donation of “a worthless historic 
preservation easement on their home.” 
 
(iii) Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s 
complete disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two 
façade easement donations. As in Kaufman, the properties were 
                                               
150 For discussion of other issues in Kaufman, see Part II.B.2 above and Part II.F.1 and Part III.B below. 
151 The First Circuit also noted “Section 170(h) does not allow taxpayers to obtain six-figure deductions for gifts of lesser 
or no value.” 
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located in Boston’s South End Historic District and the easements 
were donated to NAT. Relying on its analysis in Kaufman IV, the 
court explained that, although there were minor differences (in 
scope, monitoring, and enforcement) between the easement 
restrictions and the restrictions already imposed by local law, those 
differences do not affect property values because a typical buyer 
would perceive no difference between the two sets of restrictions. 
The court did not find the taxpayer’s appraisal, which asserted a 
16% diminution in the value of the properties, to be credible. The 
appraiser who prepared the appraisal has been barred from preparing 
any kind of appraisal report or otherwise participating in the 
appraisal process for any property relating to federal taxes.152 
 
d. Importance of Compliant Appraisals. Donors should not rely on 
appraisals that do not strictly comply with the qualified appraisal 
requirements or use questionable valuation methods or bases. 153  While 
failures to strictly comply with the rules have been forgiven in some cases, 
in other cases they have resulted in complete disallowance of the claimed 
deductions. Moreover, even though an appraisal might be found to be a 
qualified appraisal, if it is poorly written, employs questionable methods or 
bases, or is otherwise unconvincing, it may nonetheless trigger an audit and, 
if litigated, the donor may be found to have failed to provide sufficient 
credible evidence of value. In situations where a donation has already been 
made and satisfaction of the qualified appraisal requirements is an issue on 
audit or in litigation, however, the decisions in Simmons II, Scheidelman II, 
Friedberg II, Irby, and Zarlengo may be helpful. 
 
2. Conservation Easement-Specific Valuation Rules. Donors should strictly 
comply with the conservation easement-specific valuation rules in Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3), including the “entire contiguous parcel” and 
“enhancement” rules.  
 
a. Pursuant to the entire contiguous parcel rule, 154  the amount of the 
deduction in the case of a conservation easement covering a portion of 
contiguous property owned by the donor and the donor's “family” is the 
difference between the fair market value of the entire contiguous parcel 
before and after the granting of the easement. 
 
b. Pursuant to the enhancement rule,155 if the granting of a conservation 
easement has the effect of increasing the value of any other property owned 
by the donor or a “related person,” the amount of the deduction must be 
                                               
152 See Part I.O above. 
153 For the IRS’s view of appraisals, see Nonprofit Law Professors Blog, IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, at 
http://bit.ly/1UqHbTl.  
154 The entire contiguous parcel rule is found in the fourth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
155 The enhancement rule is found in the fifth sentence of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
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reduced by the amount of the increase in the value of the other property, 
whether or not such property is contiguous. 
 
c. IRS Office of Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (CCA) provides helpful 
guidance on the application of the entire contiguous parcel and 
enhancement rules.156 
 
(i) The CCA discusses the meaning of the term “family” for 
purposes of the entire contiguous parcel rule, the meaning of the 
term “related person” for purposes of the enhancement rule, and 
rules relating to constructive ownership and entity classification and 
their impact on both the entire contiguous parcel and enhancement 
rules. The CCA provides twelve examples of the application of these 
rules to various situations involving property owned by individuals 
and entities (LLCs, partnerships, and corporations). 
 
(ii) The CCA also explains in a footnote that, for purposes of the 
entire contiguous parcel rule, whether the entire contiguous parcel 
is valued as one large property or as separate properties depends on 
the highest and best use of the entire contiguous parcel.157 
 
3. File Qualified Appraisal with Income Tax Return. The IRS has informally 
suggested that a copy of the qualified appraisal be included in the package filed 
with the income tax return on which a deduction for the easement donation is first 
claimed even if the appraised value of the easement is $500,000 or less. If possible, 
the qualified appraisal should include a copy of the recorded (date stamped) 
conservation easement deed. In all cases, the appraiser should have valued the 
restrictions as they appear in the final recorded easement deed rather than in an 
earlier draft. 
 
D. Contemporaneous Written Acknowledgment 
 
1. IRC § 170(f)(8) Requirements. No deduction is allowed for a charitable 
contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution with 
a contemporaneous written acknowledgment (CWA) obtained from the donee.158 
 
a. A CWA must include the following information:  
 
(i) the amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any 
property other than cash contributed, 
 
                                               
156  IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201334039 (released Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/1334039.pdf.  
157 See IRS on Conservation Easement Appraisals, supra note 153 (discussing this issue). 
158 IRC § 170(f)(8)(A). While not a conservation easement donation case, Van Dusen v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 515, contains 
a detailed discussion of the CWA requirement. 
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(ii) whether the donee provided any goods or services in 
consideration, in whole or in part, for the contributed property, and 
 
(iii) if goods and services were provided, a description and good 
faith estimate of the value of such goods or services.159 
 
b. A CWA will be contemporaneous only if the taxpayer obtains it on or 
before the earlier of 
 
(i) the date on which the taxpayer files a return for the taxable year 
in which the contribution was made, or 
 
(ii) the due date (including extensions) for the filing of such 
return.160 
 
2. Form 990 Filing Insufficient. Failure of a donor to obtain a CWA cannot be 
cured by having the donee file a Form 990 containing the required information. In 
15 West 17th St. LLC, the Tax Court held that § 170(f)(8)(D)’s exception to the 
CWA requirement, which provided that the requirement shall not apply if the donee 
files a return including the CWA information “on such form and in accordance with 
such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe,” was not available because the 
Treasury had not issued such form or regulations.161 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
signed into law by President Trump on December 22, 2017, repealed the § 
170(f)(8)(D) exception to the CWA requirement for contributions made in tax years 
beginning after December 31, 2016.162  
 
3. Substantial Compliance Doctrine Inapplicable. As noted in 310 Retail LLC, 
“‘[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply to excuse failure to obtain 
a CWA meeting the statutory requirements.’” To justify the seeming harshness of 
the rule disallowing a deduction for failure to obtain a CWA, the Ninth Circuit 
explained: “The deterrence value of section 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a deduction 
comports with the effective administration of a self-assessment and self-reporting 
system.”163 
 
4. No Particular Form Required but Form 8283 is not a CWA.  
 
a. As noted in 310 Retail LLC, a CWA need not take any particular form 
and may be furnished to the donor by (for example) letter, postcard, or 
computer-generated media. Whatever form the acknowledgment takes, 
                                               
159 IRC § 170(f)(8)(B). 
160 IRC § 170(f)(8)(C). 
161 See also 310 Retail LLC; Big River Development, LP; IRS Chief Counsel Advice 201120022 (May 20, 2011). 15 West 
17th St. LLC involved a New York facade easement for which the taxpayer claimed a $64,490,000 deduction. The 
property had been acquired 2½ years before the donation for $10 million, and the taxpayer was positing that the property 
had appreciated in value by almost 600% during that time. By deciding the case on lack of CWA grounds, the court 
avoided the fact-intensive valuation issue. 
162 Pub. L. 115-97, § 13705. 
163 See Addis v. Commissioner, 374 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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however, it must include all of the information required by § 170(f)(8)(B), 
including an affirmative indication that the donee has provided no goods or 
services to the donor, if that is the case.  
 
b. An IRS Form 8283 (appraisal summary), even if fully completed, does 
not constitute a CWA because only Section B, Part IV of that form 
constitutes a donee acknowledgement, and that acknowledgement does not 
contain all of the information required by § 170(f)(8)(B).164 
 
5. Case Law Unpredictable. In Schrimsher and French, the Tax Court held that 
the conservation easement deed could not serve as a CWA. See also Bruzewicz 
(letter identifying cash contributions relating to façade easement donation was not 
a CWA; doctrine of substantial compliance inapplicable) and Didonato (settlement 
agreement was not a CWA). In Simmons I,165 Averyt, RP Golf I, 310 Retail LLC,  
and Big River Development, LP, however, the Tax Court held that the conservation 
easement deed could serve as a CWA. And in Irby, the Tax Court held that 
documents associated with the bargain sale of two easements collectively 
constituted a CWA. Given the fact-specific holdings in the cases, donors should not 
rely on a conservation easement deed or other documentation to serve as the CWA. 
Rather, donors should always obtain a separate CWA from the donee.   
 
6. Safety Valve. Some government entities accepting conservation easement 
donations have refused to provide donors with a CWA. Donors and their counsel 
should discuss this issue early on with a prospective government holder. To address 
this issue and, in general, to serve as both a good “safety valve” and a reminder to 
the parties, some practitioners include a statement in the easement deed that (i) no 
goods or services were provided by the donee in consideration for the easement (if 
that is the case) and (ii) the donee agrees to provide the donor with a separate letter 
containing the information required by § 170(f)(8). 
 
E. Compelling and Timely Baseline Documentation 
 
1. The Treasury Regulations require that an easement donor make available to the 
donee, prior to the time the donation is made, documentation sufficient to establish 
the condition of the subject property at the time of the gift (“baseline 
documentation”).166  
 
                                               
164 See Final Substantiation and Reporting Regulations, supra note 131, at 36419. 
165 In Simmons I, Tax Court Judge Goeke stated that the easement deed could serve as a CWA. However, the donee in 
Simmons had provided the donor with a separate letter that complied with the statutory CWA requirements, so it is not 
clear why the Judge addressed the issue. The judge did not fully discuss whether or how the easement deed satisfied the 
CWA requirements. 
166 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). Although this requirement is applicable only if the “donor reserves rights the 
exercise of which may impair the conservation interests associated with the property,” that will almost always be the 
case. Moreover, it is common practice and recommended that this requirement be satisfied with regard to every 
conservation easement donation because it helps to ensure the holder will have the information needed to properly enforce 
the easement. 
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a. The baseline documentation must describe in detail the subject property 
and its open space, habitat, scenic, historic, and other conservation values. 
In addition, if the easement deed contains restrictions with regard to a 
particular natural resource to be protected, such as water quality or air 
quality, then the condition of that resource at or near the time of the gift 
must also be established in the baseline documentation.167 
 
b. The baseline documentation must be accompanied by a statement signed 
by the donor and a representative of the donee clearly referencing the 
documentation and in substance stating: “This natural resources inventory 
is an accurate representation of [the protected property] at the time of the 
transfer” (referred to hereinafter as a “certification”).168 
 
• In some cases, the parties have drafted the certification to provide 
that the parties agree the inventory (or baseline documentation) may 
be supplemented in the future (e.g., where the baseline 
documentation is prepared when the property is covered with snow). 
This has caused problems on audit. The baseline documentation 
must be fully completed prior to the time the donation is made. 
While annual or more frequent monitoring reports should be added 
to the file maintained for the easement following its donation, the 
baseline documentation is a snapshot of the condition of the property 
at the time of the easement’s donation and should not be modified. 
 
• Assuming the baseline documentation is timely completed, 
easement drafters may want to include language in the easement 
deed confirming that the baseline documentation is complete and 
that the parties agree that it is an accurate representation of the 
protected property at the time of the donation. 
 
c. The baseline documentation should be detailed and compelling; it is the 
donor’s best opportunity (as part of the tax filing) to persuade the IRS that 
the property has important conservation or historic values worthy of 
preservation. In some instances, easement donees hire qualified consultants 
to put together comprehensive and extensive baseline documentation. The 
Treasury Regulations, however, technically put the burden on the donor to 
make the baseline documentation available to the donee prior to the time 
the donation is made.169 Accordingly, it is the donor’s responsibility to 
ensure that the baseline documentation requirements are satisfied. 
 
d. The baseline documentation is also critical for enforcement purposes; it 
provides evidence of the condition of the property, including the property’s 
conservation values and any improvements or incursions, on the date of the 
                                               
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i)(D). 
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i)(D). 
169 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
  75 
donation. The Treasury Regulations explain that the purpose of the baseline 
is to “protect the conservation interests associated with the property, which 
although protected in perpetuity by the easement, could be adversely 
affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.”170 The baseline is thus 
essential to ensuring that the conservation purpose of the easement is 
“protected in perpetuity,” and failure to timely prepare a fully completed 
baseline could be fatal to the deduction. 
 
e. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide provides that a 
comprehensive baseline study would generally include the following: 
 
• A description of the encumbrance 
• A description and map of the conservation characteristics and 
areas (i.e., listing of identified plants or wildlife) 
• A map or series of maps depicting roads, fences, existing 
structures, trails, water bodies, wetlands, and any other property 
features 
• Identification of any reserved building sites 
• Surveys or plat maps 
• Description of any management plans, such as a timber plan 
• On-site photographs including aerial photographs 
• The study author’s name and professional credentials171 
 
The Guide explains that the IRS examiner will need to assess the credibility 
of the baseline study. A baseline study prepared by an independent qualified 
expert such as a conservationist, biologist, forester or botanist would 
generally be given greater evidentiary weight than one prepared by a less 
qualified person or the taxpayer’s self-assessment. Also, a baseline with a 
lot of documentary support is more credible than one with little support.172 
 
The Guide further explains that some baseline studies are not property-
specific and, instead, include a narrative about the general area or State 
without any specific reference to the donated property, and those baseline 
studies do not meet Treasury Regulation requirements.173 
 
2. In Bosque Canyon Ranch, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
$15.9 million of deductions claimed for the donation of conservation easements to 
the North American Land Trust (NALT). Among other things, the court found that 
the baseline documentation reports, which NALT had prepared, were “slipshod” 
and “unreliable, incomplete, and insufficient to establish the condition of the 
relevant property on the date the respective easements were granted.” Although the 
                                               
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). 
171 See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 69. 
172 See id., at 70. 
173 See id., at 70. 
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Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, its opinion should not be viewed as a green 
light for shoddy and untimely baselines.  
 
• Bosque Canyon Ranch is controlling only in the Fifth Circuit. 
 
• Preparation of comprehensive baseline documentation at the time of the 
donation is in the interest of both the donor and the donee. Aside from the 
risk of having the deduction denied, if there is no or an incomplete record 
of the improvements and incursions on the subject property at the time the 
donation was made, it may be impossible for the holder to prove, at some 
later date, that a violation has occurred. Similarly, if there is no or an 
incomplete record of the condition of the conservation values the easement 
is intended to protect at the time the donation was made, it may be 
impossible for the holder to prove, at some later date, that such conservation 
values have been degraded or destroyed, or the extent of the damage or 
destruction. 
 
3. The IRS routinely asks for the baseline documentation on audit. 
 
F. Correct and Timely Lender Agreement (if applicable) 
 
1. Full Subordination. Donors should obtain a lender agreement that subordinates 
the lender’s rights to all of the rights of the holder under the conservation easement, 
including the holder’s right to at least a minimum proportionate share of the 
proceeds received following extinguishment of the easement as specified in 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii).174 Although the First Circuit took a 
somewhat liberal approach to this issue in Kaufman III, in Palmolive I the Tax 
Court indicated that it will not follow the First Circuit’s holding regarding this issue 
in other circuits, and it appears that the IRS will continue to challenge deductions 
on this ground in other circuits.  
 
a. Kaufman III. In Kaufman III, the First Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s 
holdings in Kaufman I and II that priority language in a lender agreement 
impermissibly limited the operation of the “proceeds” clause included in a 
facade easement to satisfy Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii). The 
lender agreement in Kaufman provided that, if the easement were 
extinguished as a result of a casualty event (such as a fire or flood) or 
condemnation, the bank holding an outstanding mortgage on the property 
                                               
174 For an example of such a “full subordination” clause, see the subordination agreement template of the Compact of 
Cape Cod Conservation Trusts, which provides: 
[Name and address of financial institution] ("Mortgagee"), present holder of a mortgage from, [donors] 
("Mortgagor"), recorded on [date] in the [County] Registry of Deeds in Deed Book [ ] Page [ ], for consideration 
paid, hereby recognizes and assents to the terms and provisions of a Conservation Restriction running to the 
___________ Conservation Trust, to be recorded herewith, and agrees to subordinate and hold its mortgage 
subject to the terms and provisions of said Conservation Restriction to the same extent as if said mortgage had 
been recorded subsequent to the recording of the Conservation Restriction, and the undersigned shall, in the 
exercise of its rights pursuant to said instrument, recognize the terms and provisions of the aforesaid 
Conservation Restriction. 
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had first priority to any insurance or condemnation proceeds. The Tax Court 
held that the easement, as qualified by the lender agreement, failed to satisfy 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) because the intent of the drafters 
of that regulation was that the donee have a right to a share of the proceeds 
following extinguishment, and not merely a contractual claim against the 
owner of the property for an amount equal to such share. The First Circuit 
reversed, holding that it was sufficient that the donee had such a contractual 
claim against the owner.  
 
In footnote 5 of Kaufman III, however, the First Circuit noted that Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the “mortgage subordination” regulation) 
could be read broadly to require that a lender subordinate its rights to the 
donee’s right to post-extinguishment proceeds, which, pursuant to Treasury 
Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i), must be used by the donee to advance 
conservation purposes. The First Circuit noted that it did not pursue this 
issue because the IRS had “disclaimed” that broad reading of the mortgage 
subordination regulation in Kaufman III. 
 
b. Palmolive I. In Palmolive I, which is appealable to the Seventh Circuit, 
the Tax Court declined to follow the First Circuit’s holding in Kaufman III 
and, instead, reaffirmed its decisions Kaufman I and II.175 In Palmolive I, 
the easement deed and the lender agreements provided that two banks 
holding outstanding mortgages on the subject property had first priority to 
any insurance or condemnation proceeds. The Tax Court held that these 
priority rights violated both Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (the 
“mortgage subordination” regulation) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
14(g)(6)(ii) (the “proceeds” regulation).   
 
Among other things, the Tax Court rejected the argument that the mortgage 
subordination regulation is satisfied as long as the lender is prevented from 
extinguishing the easement in foreclosure. The court explained that, if the 
mortgage subordination regulation was intended to require that a lender 
subordinate only its right to foreclose on the property to the rights of the 
donee, then the regulation would have been drafted to say that. Instead, the 
regulation requires that a lender subordinate its rights in the property 
                                               
175 In Irby, decided after Kaufman III, the Tax Court noted: 
In cases involving a conservation easement where we determined that the regulation's requirements were not 
met and thus denied the claimed charitable contribution deduction, the grantee organization had been prevented 
by the deeds themselves from receiving the full proportionate value of the extinguishment proceeds…. The 
funds diverted by the deeds were used to further the donor taxpayer's interests. For example, in Wall, the deed 
of conservation easement provided that if the property was condemned, the grantee conservation organization 
would be entitled to the easement's proportionate value, but only after any claim of a mortgagee was satisfied. 
Hence, the first use of the extinguishment proceeds was to further the donor taxpayer's interest in repaying the 
mortgage on the property, with the grantee conservation organization's receiving only a residual amount of 
money…. Our conclusions in those cases (i.e., denying the deduction) reflect the purpose of the regulation. 
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(including its rights to any insurance and condemnation proceeds) to the 
rights of the donee.176 
 
The Tax Court also held that the “so remote as to be negligible” rule of 
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3) is not an alternative provision on 
which taxpayers may rely if they otherwise fail to satisfy the express 
requirements of the regulations, like the mortgage subordination and 
extinguishment requirements. 
Finally, the Tax Court rejected Palmolive’s argument that a “savings 
clause” in the easement, which purportedly operated to amend the easement 
after the donation to the extent necessary to comply with the Treasury 
Regulations, saved the deduction. The court explained that the requirements 
of § 170 and the Treasury Regulations must be satisfied at the time of the 
gift, and a savings clause cannot retroactively modify an easement to 
comply with such requirements. 
 
2. Mortgages Must be Subordinated at Time of Donation.  
 
a. Mitchell III. In Mitchell III, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s 
holdings in Mitchell I and II that, to be eligible for a deduction for the 
donation of a conservation easement under § 170(h), any outstanding 
mortgages on the underlying property must be subordinated to the rights of 
the holder of the easement at the time of the gift. This means the lender 
agreement should be recorded at the same time as the conservation 
easement. 
 
(i) The Facts. The donor in Mitchell did not obtain a subordination 
agreement from the lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the 
subject property until almost two years following the date of the 
donation. The IRS argued that the mortgage subordination 
requirement in the Treasury Regulations is a bright-line requirement 
that requires any existing mortgage to be subordinated to the rights 
of the holder of the easement at the time of the gift, irrespective of 
                                               
176 See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally 
Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 1, The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 473, 493 (2010), which 
explains: 
The Treasury Regulations do not provide that a lender must subordinate its rights to the right of the holder to 
enforce the easement. Rather, the regulations provide that the lender must subordinate its rights to the rights of 
the holder to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity. That language embraces all of the 
elements of a donated easement’s perpetual nature, not just the holder’s right to enforce the particular 
restrictions in the easement. Thus, the holder’s rights to which a lender must subordinate its rights should 
necessarily include, among other things, the holder’s right to receive proceeds upon extinguishment of the 
easement to be used to replace lost conservation values as provided in Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-
14(g)(6). This makes sense from a policy perspective because the value attributable to the gift that was made 
for the benefit public and for which a federal subsidy was provided should remain in the charitable sector and 
be devoted to similar conservation purposes (as opposed to being paid to the landowner’s lender). If the holder 
is not entitled to receive proceeds upon extinguishment because of a limited subordination agreement, the 
donation should not be deemed to comply with the statutory mandate that the conservation purpose of the 
contribution be protected in perpetuity. (emphasis added) 
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the likelihood of foreclosure or any alternate safeguards. The IRS 
also asserted that subordination must occur at the time of the gift 
because, without subordination, the easement would be vulnerable 
to extinguishment upon foreclosure and, thus, the conservation 
purpose would not be protected in perpetuity as required under § 
170(h). The Tenth Circuit agreed. 
  
(ii) Deference to Commissioner. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 131 S.Ct. 704, 711 (2011), the Tenth Circuit explained that, 
because the Commissioner promulgated the regulations under            
§ 170(h) pursuant to the authority granted to him by Congress, the 
regulations are binding unless they are “arbitrary and capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Where Congress 
has delegated to the Commissioner the power to promulgate 
regulations, said the court, “we must defer to his regulatory 
interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable.’” 
Requiring existing mortgages to be subordinated to conservation 
easements prevents extinguishment of the easements in the event the 
landowners default on the mortgages. In this way, said the Tenth 
Circuit, the mortgage subordination requirement is “reasonably 
related” to Congress’s mandate in § 170(h)(5)(A) that the 
conservation purpose of an easement be “protected in perpetuity.”  
• The Tenth Circuit also rejected the donor’s claim that the 
mortgage subordination regulation is arbitrary and 
capricious, and therefore unenforceable. Although declining 
to consider that argument because it was raised for the first 
time on appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that the argument 
would fail because the regulation is “a reasonable exercise 
of the Commissioner’s authority to implement the statute.” 
 
(iii) Subordination Must Be Timely. The donor in Mitchell argued 
that, since the mortgage subordination regulation contains no 
explicit time frame for compliance, it should be interpreted to allow 
for subordination to occur at any time. The Tenth Circuit rejected 
this argument, noting that the regulation “expressly provides that 
subordination is a prerequisite to allowing a deduction.” The Tenth 
Circuit further noted that, even if it were to view the regulation as 
ambiguous with respect to timing, the result would be no different 
because the court must defer to the Commissioner’s reasonable 
interpretation on this point. 
 
(iv) Functional Subordination Not Sufficient. The donor in Mitchell 
argued that strict compliance with the mortgage subordination 
requirement was unnecessary because the easement deed allegedly 
contained sufficient safeguards to protect the conservation purpose 
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in perpetuity. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as 
inconsistent with the plain language of the mortgage subordination 
provision. The court pointed out that the regulation contains one 
narrow exception to the “unambiguous” subordination 
requirement—for donations occurring prior to 1986.177 In the case 
of a pre-1986 donation, a taxpayer may be entitled to a deduction 
without subordination if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the 
conservation purpose is nonetheless protected in perpetuity. The 
negative implication of this express, time-limited exception, said the 
court, is that no alternative to subordination will suffice for post–
1986 donations.178  
 
(v) Likelihood of Foreclosure Irrelevant. The donor in Mitchell 
argued that strict compliance with the mortgage subordination 
requirement was unnecessary in her case because the risk of 
foreclosure was “so remote as to be negligible” (the partnership that 
donated the easement apparently paid its debts on time and had 
sufficient assets to satisfy in full the amounts due).179 The donor 
pointed to Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(3), which provides 
that a deduction will not be disallowed merely because the interest 
that passes to the donee organization may be defeated by the 
happening of some future event, “if on the date of the gift it appears 
that the possibility that such … event will occur is so remote as to 
be negligible.” She argued that this provision acts as an exception to 
the mortgage subordination provision—i.e., that because the risk of 
foreclosure in her case was arguably so remote as to be negligible, 
failure to satisfy the mortgage subordination requirement should be 
forgiven.  
 
• The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the 
“so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” provision cannot be 
reasonably read as modifying the strict mortgage 
subordination requirement. In promulgating the rules, 
explained the court, the Commissioner specifically 
considered the risk of mortgage foreclosure to be neither 
remote nor negligible, and therefore chose to target the 
accompanying risk of extinguishment of the conservation 
easement by strictly requiring mortgage subordination.  
 
                                               
177 The mortgage subordination requirement first appeared when the Treasury Regulations were finalized in 1986, hence 
the 1986 effective date. 
178 In Palmolive I, the Tax Court similarly explained: 
The different regime for contributions before February 1986 should be noted: Literal subordination was not 
required, as long as “protect[ion] in perpetuity” by other means could be demonstrated. For subsequent 
contributions, “no deduction will be permitted” without subordination. 
179 A partnership of which Ms. Mitchell was a partner donated the easement. For convenience purposes, Ms. Mitchell is 
referred to as the donor in this summary. 
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• The Tenth Circuit also noted that, even if the regulations 
were unclear with respect to the interplay between the 
mortgage subordination and remote future event provisions, 
the donor would not prevail because the court is required to 
defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation to resolve any 
ambiguity unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulations” or there is any other “reason to suspect the 
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter.” “[I]t is reasonable,” 
said the court, “for the Commissioner to adopt an easily-
applied subordination requirement over a case-by-case, fact-
specific inquiry into the financial strength or credit history 
of each taxpayer.” The court quoted a law review article in 
support of its holding: 
 
The specific requirements in the Code and Treasury 
Regulations establish bright-line rules that promote 
efficient and equitable administration of the federal 
tax incentive program. If individual taxpayers could 
fail to comply with such requirements and claim that 
their donations are nonetheless deductible because 
the possibility of defeat of the gift is so remote as to 
be negligible, the Service and the courts would be 
required to engage in an almost endless series of 
factual inquiries with regard to each individual 
conservation easement donation.180 
 
b. Minnick III. In Minnick III, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s 
holding in Minnick I that, to be eligible for a deduction for the donation of 
a conservation easement, any outstanding mortgages on the underlying 
property must be subordinated to the rights of the holder of the easement at 
the time of the gift.  
 
(i) Citing to Mitchell III, the Ninth Circuit explained that the plain 
language of the mortgage subordination regulation supports the Tax 
Court’s interpretation. The regulation specifies that “no deduction 
will be permitted … unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in 
the property.” Strictly construed, said the Ninth Circuit, that 
language makes clear that “subordination is a prerequisite to 
allowing a deduction.” Since there was no dispute that Minnick’s 
lender had not subordinated its rights in the subject property when 
Minnick donated the easement at issue (despite warranties in the 
easement deed to the contrary), under the plain meaning of the 
regulation no deduction was permitted. 
                                               
180  Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally 
Subsidized Conservation Easements Part 1: The Standards, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 473, 505–06 (2010). 
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(ii) The Ninth Circuit further explained that, even if the regulation 
was deemed ambiguous, that would not change the outcome. Under 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), courts defer to the IRS’s 
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations and, as explained in 
Mitchell III, the IRS’s interpretation is reasonable and not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The Ninth Circuit 
noted: 
An easement can hardly be said to be protected ‘in 
perpetuity’ if it is subject to extinguishment at essentially 
any time by a mortgage holder who was not a party to, and 
indeed (as here) may not even have been aware of, the 
agreement between the Taxpayers and a [land] trust. 
 
(iii) In Minnick II, an unpublished opinion issued the same day as 
Minnick III, the Ninth Circuit addressed the remaining issues in 
Minnick, holding for the IRS on each point. 
 
• Like the Tenth Circuit in Mitchell III, the Ninth Circuit in 
Minnick II held that the taxpayer’s failure to comply with the 
mortgage subordination requirement could not be excused 
by invoking the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible regulation. 
 
• The Minnicks argued that their failure to obtain a timely 
subordination agreement should be excused because there 
was “verifiable evidence of original intent to enforce the 
easement in perpetuity” in the easement deed, which 
specifically stated that there were “no outstanding 
mortgages...in the Property that have not been expressly 
subordinated to the Easement.” The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument, explaining that, even if the statement in the 
deed evidenced an intent to subordinate, intent is irrelevant. 
A mortgage must be subordinated at the time of the gift. 
 
• The Minnicks argued that Idaho’s cy pres doctrine, which 
“restricted the Minnicks from abandoning or otherwise 
encumbering the easement,” adequately ensured that the 
easement would continue in perpetuity and, thus, the 
subordination requirement was satisfied. The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument, noting that the “cy pres doctrine is 
inapplicable here because it has no effect on the ability of the 
bank holding the unsubordinated mortgage to extinguish the 
easement by foreclosure.” Cy pres would have no effect on 
the ability of the bank to extinguish the easement in the event 
of foreclosure because the easement had been granted to the 
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land trust subject to the mortgage and, thus, the bank’s rights 
had priority over those of the land trust and the public. 
 
• The Minnicks argued that the Tax Court improperly imposed 
a 20% negligence penalty on them under IRC § 6662(a). The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the 
Minnicks did not have reasonable cause for claiming a 
deduction because Mr. Minnick had a law degree and 
reading the Treasury Regulations would have given him 
notice that subordination may have been required. 
 
(iv) Mr. Minnick (a former member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives from Idaho) sued his attorney for malpractice. The 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the suit was not barred by the statute 
of limitations.181  
 
c. RP Golf III. In RP Golf III, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s 
holding in RP Golf II that, to be eligible for a deduction for the donation of 
a conservation easement, any outstanding mortgages on the underlying 
property must be subordinated to the rights of the holder of the easement at 
the time of the gift. In RP Golf II, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s 
disallowance of a $16.4 million deduction for the donation of a conservation 
easement on two private golf courses in Kansas City, Missouri. Although 
the IRS challenged the claimed deduction on a number of grounds 
(including failure to satisfy the conservation purposes test, overvaluation, 
and the taxpayer’s lack of ownership of a portion of the subject property), 
in RP Golf II, the Tax Court denied the deduction because the taxpayer 
failed to obtain subordination agreements at the time of the gift of the 
easement. The Tax Court considered and rejected the taxpayer’s argument 
that the lenders had orally agreed to subordinate their interests before the 
date of the gift, finding no evidence of a binding oral or written agreement 
under state law. The Tax Court explained that, because the easement could 
have been extinguished by foreclosure after the date of the gift, the easement 
“was not protected in perpetuity and, therefore, was not a qualified 
conservation contribution.” In affirming the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit 
relied in part on Mitchell and Minnick and determined that the Tax Court’s 
finding that there were no oral agreements to subordinate was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
G. So-Remote-As-To-Be-Negligible Does Not Cure Noncompliance. Based on the 
holdings in numerous cases, the “so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” provision182 will not cure 
                                               
181 Legal Malpractice Lawyer Blog, Minnick v. Ennis, No. 41663: Supreme Court of Idaho Remands Dismissal of Legal 
Malpractice Case, http://www.legalmalpracticelawyer.com/2015/01/22/461/ (last visited April 25, 2015). 
182 Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(3) provides in part: 
[a] deduction shall not be disallowed ... merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee 
organization may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if on the date of 
the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so remote as to be negligible. 
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noncompliance with a specific requirement in the § 170(h) or the Treasury Regulations. 
Below is a sampling of the relevant cases.183 
 
1. In Carpenter I, the Tax Court held that the “so-remote-as-to-be-negligible” 
provision does not modify Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–14(g)(6)(i). Thus, failure 
to comply with the extinguishment requirements of Treasury Regulation § 1.170A–
14(g)(6)(i) cannot be cured by a showing that the possibility of extinguishment is 
so remote as to be negligible.  
 
2. In Mitchell I, the Tax Court explained that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
standard cannot be used to avoid any of the following specific requirements:            
(i) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(2)’s mortgage subordination requirement, 
(ii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A- 14(g)(6)(i)’s judicial proceeding requirement, 
or (iii) Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)’s proceeds requirement.  
 
3. In Mitchell III, the Tenth Circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit in Simmons did not 
excuse the taxpayer from complying with the mortgage subordination requirement, 
or excuse noncompliance with any express precondition to taking a deduction 
contained in the regulations. Rather, it applied the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible 
provision to allow a deduction despite the risk of noncompliance with § 1.170A–
14’s more general perpetuity requirement. Thus Simmons does not support an 
interpretation that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible provision will excuse 
noncompliance with the mortgage subordination provision’s plain and specific 
mandate that “no deduction will be permitted...unless” the mortgage is 
subordinated. The Tenth Circuit also noted that Kaufman III similarly “provides 
little guidance.” In Kaufman III the First Circuit held that the taxpayer was entitled 
to a deduction because the donation satisfied the in perpetuity requirement, but 
specifically declined to address whether the taxpayer had complied with the 
mortgage subordination provision or to base its holding on the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible provision.  
 
4. In Palmolive I, the Tax Court explained that: 
 
Paragraph (g)(3) of section 1.170A–14 is not an alternative provision on 
which taxpayers may rely if they otherwise fail to satisfy the express 
requirements of paragraph (g)(2) or (g)(6) … regularly occurring 
circumstances that are expressly foreseen and are explicitly provided for in 
the regulations (i.e., mortgages and extinguishment proceeds) are by their 
nature not “remote”, and the specific requirements in the regulations as to 
those contingencies are not affected by paragraph (g)(3). 
                                               
183 See also Hoffman Order (discussed in Part II.A.13 above), and Wachter, Carroll, and Salt Point Timber. 
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III. Other Important Issues 
 
A. Valuation. For a comprehensive discussion of conservation and facade easement 
valuation rules and the relevant valuation case law through 2015, see Nancy A. 
McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum. 184  For cases 
involving valuation after 2015, see, e.g., Gemperle, Palmer Ranch, Mountanos, McGrady, 
Wendell Falls, PBBM Rose-Hill II, Pine Mountain I.185 
 
B. Penalties.  
 
1. Penalty Provisions. As part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (the PPA), 
Congress expanded the circumstances under which penalties can be imposed for 
overvaluations. Before enactment of the PPA, a substantial valuation misstatement 
(subject to a 20% penalty) existed if the value of property reported on a tax return 
was two times (200%) or more of the amount determined to be the correct value. A 
gross valuation misstatement (subject to a 40% penalty) existed if the value 
reported on a tax return was four times (400%) or more of the amount determined 
to be the correct value.186 Taxpayers could avoid these penalties if they made the 
valuation misstatement in good faith and with reasonable cause. 
 
The PPA lowered the threshold from 200% to 150% for a substantial valuation 
misstatement and from 400% to 200% for a gross valuation misstatement. The PPA 
also eliminated the reasonable cause exception for gross valuation misstatements 
of charitable deduction property, making that penalty a strict liability penalty. The 
PPA further enacted new penalties for preparers of an appraisal to be used to 
support a tax position if the appraisal results in a substantial or gross valuation 
misstatement.187 The PPA changes apply to (i) returns claiming deductions for 
façade easement donations that are filed after July 25, 2006, and (ii) returns 
claiming deductions for donations of  easements encumbering land that are filed 
after August 17, 2006.188  
 
2. Case Law. Below is a sampling of court holdings regarding penalties. For 
additional more recent cases involving penalties, see, e.g., Partita Partners II, 
Graev III, Roth, PBBM Rose-Hill II, and Palmolive II. 
 
a. Kaufman V. In Kaufman V, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s 
holding in Kaufman IV that the Kaufmans were liable for gross valuation 
misstatement penalties for claiming a deduction “for a worthless historic 
preservation easement on their home.” Because the Kaufmans’ returns were 
                                               
184 Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704576.  
185 For a recent case that did not involve a conservation easement donation but discusses the definition of “fair market 
value” for charitable deduction purposes, see Grainger v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-117. 
186 If the correct value of an easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed on the taxpayer’s return is deemed to 
be 400% or more of the correct amount and, thus, a gross valuation misstatement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–5(g). 
187 See IRC § 6695A. 
188 For an explanation of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) changes, see JCT Explanation of Pension Protection 
Act of 2006, supra note 17. See also Chandler (discussing the PPA effective dates). 
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filed before the effective date of the PPA, the gross valuation misstatement 
penalty was not a strict liability penalty. However, the Kaufmans were 
unable to avoid penalties by showing that they made a good-faith 
investigation of the value of the easement or acted with reasonable cause 
and in good faith. This was due, in large part, to the following factors. 
 
• The Kaufmans represented in a letter to the lender holding an 
outstanding mortgage on the subject property (for purposes of 
obtaining a subordination agreement) that “[t]he easement 
restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as those imposed by 
current local ordinances that govern this property.” 
 
• The Kaufmans used an appraiser that the donee—the National 
Architectural Trust (NAT)—both recommended and taught to do 
façade easement appraisals. NAT also suggested language for the 
appraiser to include in his appraisals, which he incorporated “almost 
verbatim” into all of his reports, regardless of the property involved. 
The First Circuit further noted that the appraiser “at least arguably 
had an incentive to calculate a high value for the easement, given 
that he performed appraisals for [NAT] and [NAT] received cash 
donations corresponding to a set percentage of the assessed value of 
the donated easements.” 
 
• After receiving the appraisal indicating that the easement would 
reduce the value of their home by $220,800 (or by 12%), Dr. 
Kaufman expressed concern to NAT that the reduction in the resale 
value of the home would be so large as to “overwhelm the tax 
savings” from the donation. In a “smoking gun email,” NAT 
responded that façade easements do not actually reduce the value of 
the properties they encumber. Among other things, the email noted: 
 
One of our directors, Steve McClain, owns fifteen or so historic 
properties and has taken advantage of this tax deduction himself. 
He would never have granted any easement if he thought there 
would be a risk or loss of value in his properties. 
 
Despite the evidence indicating that the easement had no value, the 
Kaufmans proceeded to claim a $220,800 deduction. The First Circuit 
agreed with the Tax Court that “the Kaufmans should have recognized 
obvious warning signs indicating that the appraisal’s validity was subject to 
serious question, and should have undertaken further analysis in response.” 
The First Circuit further noted that the Tax Court did not purport to equate 
“good faith investigation” with “exhaustive investigation.” Rather, it 
“merely required that the Kaufmans do some basic inquiry into the validity 
of an appraisal whose result was squarely contradicted by other available 
evidence glaringly in front of them.” The Kaufmans were highly intelligent 
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and very well educated, said the First Circuit, 189  “and the Tax Court 
reasonably found that developments casting doubt on the…appraisal should 
have alerted them that they needed to take further steps to assess their 
‘proper tax liability.’” 
 
The First Circuit also noted that decisions in which the courts have declined 
to impose penalties (Whitehouse, Chandler, Zarlengo, and Scheidelman) 
were not inconsistent with its conclusion to impose penalties in Kaufman V. 
In contrast to Kaufman, there were no “red flags” in those other cases 
suggesting that the easements had no value.   
 
b. Chandler. In Chandler, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete 
disallowance of deductions claimed with regard to two façade easement 
donations on the same grounds as in Kaufman (the easements had no value 
because the typical buyer would find the easement restrictions no more 
burdensome than local historic preservation restrictions). The taxpayers in 
Chandler claimed deductions with regard to the easement donations on their 
2004, 2005, and 2006 returns and, because the Tax Court determined the 
easements had no value, the valuation misstatement for each year was a 
gross valuation misstatement. Chandler raised the novel issue of whether 
the taxpayers could assert the reasonable cause defense for the 
underpayment on their 2006 return (despite the PPA having made the gross 
valuation misstatement penalty a strict liability penalty with regard to 
returns filed after August 17, 2006) because the underpayment was the 
result of a carryover of deductions from their 2004 return. The taxpayers 
argued that denying their right to raise a reasonable cause defense with 
regard to their 2006 return would amount to retroactively applying the PPA. 
The Tax Court disagreed, noting that (i) the penalty statute as revised by the 
PPA by its plain language applies to returns filed after a certain date and 
(ii) when the taxpayers filed their 2006 return they “reaffirmed” the 
easement’s grossly misstated value. For similar holdings, see Reisner and 
Mountanos III. 
 
The court in Chandler did, however, find that the taxpayers were not liable 
for penalties for their 2004 and 2005 underpayments because they 
underpaid with reasonable cause and in good faith. The IRS argued that Mr. 
Chandler should have known the easements were overvalued because he 
was well educated (he had a JD and an MBA). The Tax Court disagreed, 
noting that even experienced appraisers find valuing conservation 
easements difficult, and the flaws in the appraisals would not have been 
evident to the Chandlers. The court also distinguished Kaufman because the 
Kaufmans had been assured by the donee that their easement would not 
reduce the value of the property. In Chandler there was no evidence that the 
taxpayers had similarly relied on appraisals in bad faith. 
                                               
189 Dr. Kaufman was an emeritus professor of statistics at MIT and Mrs. Kaufman was a company president with a Ph.D. 
in psychology. 
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c. Gorra. In Gorra, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the 
gross valuation misstatement penalty was an “excessive fine” under the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, noting that such 
penalties are remedial in nature, not “punishments,” and are an important 
tool because they enhance voluntary compliance with tax laws. 
d. Legg. In Legg, the Tax Court held that the IRS’s determination that the 
Leggs were liable for strict liability 40% gross valuation misstatement 
penalties was proper. The Leggs argued that the IRS examiner had not made 
an “initial determination” of the 40% penalties as required by IRC § 
6751(b)(1) because the examination report calculated the penalties using the 
20% rate and the 40% penalties were posed only as an alternative position. 
The Tax Court disagreed, explaining that Congress enacted § 6751(b) to 
ensure that taxpayers understand the penalties imposed on them and the 
examination report sent to the Leggs clearly explained why the Leggs were 
liable for the 40% penalties. Accordingly, the IRS satisfied the procedural 
requirements of § 6751(b) and imposition of the 40% penalties was proper.  
 
e. Carroll. In Carroll, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
deductions claimed with regard to the donation of a conservation easement 
because the easement contained a noncompliant “proceeds” clause. The 
court also found that the taxpayers were liable for 20% accuracy-related 
penalties and did not qualify for the reasonable cause exception to those 
penalties. The court explained that one of the taxpayers was a highly 
educated medical school graduate who had previous experience with 
conservation easements; although the taxpayers had hired an attorney to 
draft a related gift deed for the subject property, that attorney was not a tax 
attorney and “d[id] not answer tax-related questions or give tax advice;” the 
taxpayers offered no evidence that would explain why the terms of the 
easement varied from the proceeds requirement in the Treasury Regulation; 
and the taxpayers did not explain why they failed to seek competent advice 
from a tax attorney or other adviser to ensure that the easement complied 
with the pertinent regulations. The court concluded that, in the light of the 
high level of sophistication of one of the taxpayers and his experience with 
conservation easements, the taxpayers did not demonstrate that they acted 
with reasonable cause and in good faith in not seeking competent tax advice 
regarding the donation. The court declined to impose substantial or gross 
valuation misstatement penalties, however, because the IRS did not assert 
those penalties on a timely basis. 
 
C. Date of Donation and Recordation Date. Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g)(1) 
provides: 
 
any interest in the property retained by the donor (and the donor’s successors in 
interest) must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by 
recordation in the land records of the jurisdiction in which the property is located) 
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that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation 
purposes of the donation. 
 
The donor of a conservation easement should see to it that the easement is recorded in the 
year in which the donor intends to claim the donation was made. Absent recordation of an 
easement, a purchaser of the subject property who records the purchase deed will generally 
take the property free of the easement. In addition, many state conservation easement 
enabling statutes specifically require recordation for an easement to be legally 
enforceable.190 Accordingly, absent recordation in the year of the purported donation, the 
IRS can argue that the easement was not “granted in perpetuity” and its conservation 
purpose was not “protected in perpetuity” in that year. 
 
1. IRS Position on Year of Donation. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit 
Techniques Guide provides that “An easement is not enforceable in perpetuity 
before it is recorded.” 191  The Guide further instructs that, “for conservation 
easements, the year of the deduction is the year of recordation” and provides the 
following as an example: 
 
A conservation easement was granted to a qualified organization on 
December 20, 2007, as evidenced by the dated signatures on the 
conservation easement deed. However, the easement was not recorded in 
the public records until March 12, 2008. The year of donation is 2008.192 
 
The Guide also instructs that, in addition to the easement deed, all exhibits or 
attachments to the deed, such as diagrams and lender agreements, may need to be 
recorded.193 
 
2. Case Law.  
 
a. Gorra. Gorra involved a donation to the National Architectural Trust 
(NAT) of a façade easement on a building in the Carnegie Hill Historic 
District of New York City. NAT delivered the easement to the recorder’s 
office on December 28, 2006, paid the recording fees and taxes, and 
obtained a receipt for the delivery. Due to a cover sheet error, however, the 
easement was not recorded until January 18, 2007. The IRS argued that the 
deed was not recorded until 2007. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that, 
under New York law, delivery of the deed to the recorder’s office, with 
receipt acknowledged, constituted recordation, even though there was a 
delay in the actual recording until the following year because of the cover 
sheet error. The court cited N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 317, which provides that 
                                               
190 For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act provides that “[n]o right or duty in favor of or against a holder 
and no right in favor of a person having a third-party right of enforcement arises under a conservation easement before 
its acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.” Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 2(b) (Last 
Revised or Amended in 2007). 
191 See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 12.  
192 Id., at 9. 
193 Id., at 12. 
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every instrument entitled to be recorded is considered recorded from the 
time of delivery to the recording officer. 
 
b. Zarlengo. Zarlengo involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement on 
a building in a Manhattan historic district. The easement donors and NAT 
signed the easement in 2004, NAT sent the donors a letter thanking them 
for the donation in 2004, and the donors claimed deductions for the donation 
on their 2004 returns. For reasons not explained in the Tax Court’s opinion, 
however, the easement was not recorded until January 26, 2005. The IRS 
argued that the taxpayers were not entitled to deductions in 2004 because 
the façade easement was neither (i) a “qualified real property interest” as 
defined in § 170(h)(2)(C) (i.e., “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the 
use which may be made of the real property”) nor (ii) donated exclusively 
for conservation purposes as required under § 170(h)(5) (i.e., the 
conservation purpose of the easement was not “protected in perpetuity”) in 
2004. 
 
In analyzing these issues, the Tax Court first reiterated the well settled rule 
that, “[i]n a Federal tax controversy, State law controls the determination of 
a taxpayer’s interest in property while the tax consequences are determined 
under Federal law.” Accordingly, New York law governed when the 
taxpayers’ donation of the façade easement was regarded as complete, but 
Federal tax law determined the tax consequences. Because New York law 
provides that conservation easements in the state have no legal effect unless 
they are recorded, the court found that the façade easement was not effective 
until January 26, 2005.194 Unlike in Gorra, the façade easement in Zarlengo 
presumably was not delivered to the recording office in 2004 and thus, was 
not considered recorded in that year. 
 
The Tax Court further explained that, even assuming the façade easement 
had been legally enforceable by NAT against the donors in 2004 because 
both parties signed the easement that year, the easement still would not have 
satisfied the perpetuity requirements in 2004 “because neither the use 
restriction nor the conservation purpose of the conservation easement was 
protected in perpetuity until January 26, 2005.” The court explained that, if 
a buyer had purchased the subject townhouse and recorded the purchase 
deed before January 26, 2005, the buyer would have taken the townhouse 
free and clear of the conservation easement. Moreover, the possibility that 
this could have occurred was not so remote as to be negligible. 
 
The Tax Court concluded that the donors in Zarlengo were not entitled to 
deductions on their 2004 returns because the perpetuity requirements were 
                                               
194 The Tax Court held similarly in Rothman I. See also Satullo (although decided on lack of mortgage subordination 
grounds, the Tax Court stated “Georgia law clearly provides that until an easement is recorded its intended property 
restrictions are legally unenforceable” and “although the Deed of Gift created an easement that was accepted by [the land 
trust] during December 1985, its terms were not enforceable as required by [Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- 14(g)(1)] until January 
19, 1988, when it was recorded”). 
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not satisfied in 2004, and it followed that the donors also were not entitled 
to carryover deductions on subsequent years’ returns. However, the IRS had 
acknowledged that the easement could be considered “made in perpetuity” 
in 2005 for purposes of § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h)(5)(A) because the 
easement was recorded in that year, and the Tax Court determined that “both 
the use restriction and the conservation purpose of the conservation 
easement were protected in perpetuity as of January 26, 2005.” 
Accordingly, given that the other requirements of § 170(h) and the 
substantiation requirements were satisfied, the donors’ tax liability for 
2005, 2006, and 2007 could be redetermined assuming the donation had 
been made in 2005. 
 
c. Mecox. Mecox involved a donation to NAT of a façade easement on a 
building in New York’s Greenwich Village Historic District. The donor (the 
Mecox partnership) and NAT signed the easement in December 2004 and 
Mecox claimed a $2.21 million deduction for the donation on its 2004 
partnership tax return. However, the easement was not recorded until 
November 17, 2005, almost one year later. The IRS disallowed the claimed 
deduction in full, arguing that (i) the contribution was not made until 2005, 
the year in which the easement was recorded, and (ii) the appraisal was not 
timely because it was made more than 60 days before the date of the 
contribution. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
held for the IRS on both counts. 
 
As in Zarlengo and Rothman I, the District Court found that, as a matter of 
law, Mecox had not made a charitable contribution of the façade easement 
in 2004 because the easement was not effective under New York law until 
it was recorded in November 2005. The District Court further explained 
that, even if the court were to accept that the date the easement was 
contributed was the date of the delivery of the deed to NAT, the easement 
still did not satisfy § 170(h)’s definition of a “qualified conservation 
contribution” until the easement was recorded in 2005 (i.e., the conservation 
purpose of the contribution was not “protected in perpetuity” and the 
underlying property was not “subject to legally enforceable restrictions” 
until 2005). Absent recordation, a purchaser of the property who recorded 
the purchase deed would take the property free of the easement. 
 
Mecox argued that, because the easement did not specifically reference the 
New York conservation easement enabling statute, that statute did not apply 
and the easement was a common law restrictive covenant that does not 
require recordation to be effective. The court dismissed that argument, 
finding that there was “no question” that the easement fell under the New 
York enabling statute’s definition of a conservation easement.  
 
Failure to record the easement until November 2005 also rendered Mecox’s 
appraisal untimely. The appraisal was dated June 13, 2005, and estimated 
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the value of the easement as of November 1, 2004. The court found that the 
appraisal was “conducted” on June 13, 2005, but the easement was not 
“contributed” to NAT until it was recorded on November 17, 2005 (5 
months later). Accordingly, the appraisal “took place” more than 60 days 
before the contribution date and thus, did not satisfy the timing requirement 
in Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i).   
 
d. Ten Twenty Six Investors. Ten Twenty Six Investors also involved a 
donation to NAT of a façade easement on a building in New York City. The 
donor (a partnership) and a representative of NAT signed the easement in 
December 2004 and the partnership claimed a $11.3 million deduction for 
the donation on its 2004 partnership tax return. However, the easement was 
not recorded until December 2006. The IRS disallowed the claimed 
deduction in full and the Tax Court sustained the disallowance.  
The partnership in Ten Twenty Six Investors argued that Zarlengo, Rothman, 
and Mecox were wrongly decided. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that 
those closely analogous cases compelled the conclusion that the partnership 
was not entitled to a deduction in 2004 for the conveyance. However, “for 
the sake of completeness,” the court addressed the partnership’s key 
arguments in greater detail in the Ten Twenty Six Investors opinion and 
concluded that the perpetuity requirements of § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h) 
(5)(A) were not met for 2004 because neither the use restriction nor the 
conservation purpose of the easement was protected in perpetuity as of the 
date of donation. 
  
3. Finer Points of Delivery and Recording. In many jurisdictions, where the 
recording offices are backed up, a document may be delivered to the recording 
office in December but not recorded by the office staff until January or even later. 
As explained in the discussion of Gorra above, in some states, like New York, 
delivery to the recording office constitutes recording, but that may not be the rule 
in all states. In addition, many conservation easement deeds have an “effective 
date” provision that says the easement is effective when it is signed and recorded. 
Legal counsel to donors should consider whether it would be prudent to instead 
include a provision in an easement deed stating that the easement is effective when 
the deed is signed and “delivered for recording.” In addition, the person who 
delivers the signed easement deed to the recording office should obtain a date-
stamped copy indicating the delivery date. At the very least, easement holders, 
donors, and their advisors should be aware of this issue. 
 
D. Quid Pro Quo.  
 
1. Treasury Regulation Requirements. A charitable contribution is not deductible 
if it is structured as a quid pro quo exchange.195 Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-
14(h)(3)(i) provides: 
                                               
195 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 681 (1989) (“The legislative history of the ‘contribution or gift’ limitation 
reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients, which are deductible, 
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• If, as a result of the donation of a [conservation easement], the donor or a 
related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, financial or 
economic benefits that are greater than those that will inure to the general 
public from the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this section. 
 
• However, if the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect 
to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly 
shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the transfer, then a 
deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the amount 
transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or 
reasonably expected to be received by the donor or the related person.196 
 
2. Case Law. Quid pro quo has been an issue in a number of cases. 
 
a. Pollard. In Pollard, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of a 
deduction of more than $1 million claimed with respect to a conservation 
easement conveyance because the conveyance was part of a quid pro quo 
exchange. The taxpayer had purchased a 67-acre parcel in Boulder County, 
Colorado, and had to obtain approval from the county to increase the 
property’s building density. After public hearings, the board of county 
commissioners agreed to grant the taxpayer’s subdivision exemption 
request, which allowed the property to be split into two residential lots, 
provided the taxpayer granted a conservation easement encumbering the 
property to the county. 
 
The taxpayer in Pollard maintained that no quid pro quo arrangement 
existed, arguing, among other things, that approval of his subdivision 
                                               
and payments made to such recipients with some expectation of a quid pro quo in terms of goods or services, which are 
not deductible.”). See also Boone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-101 (conveyance of fill to city not a deductible charitable 
contribution because taxpayer failed to meet its burden of proving that the fair market value of the fill exceeded the fair 
market value of the consideration received in exchange); Perlmutter v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 311 (1965) (transfers of land to 
school districts and a recreation district in accordance with zoning regulations were not charitable contributions); Ottawa 
Silica Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.), 49 A.F.T.R.2d 82-1162, 82-1 USTC P 9308 (“It is...quite apparent that plaintiff 
conveyed the land to the school district fully expecting that as a consequence of the construction of public access roads 
through its property it would receive substantial benefits in return”); Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation 
Easements—Not as Simple as it Sounds, 19-JUN PROB. & PROP. 24 (2005). 
196 See Rev. Rul. 76-185, from which the Treasury Regulation language appears to be derived, and which provides that 
“payments made by the taxpayer for the restoration and maintenance of the historic mansion and its grounds are not 
deductible as charitable contributions...unless the taxpayer can establish that the payments exceed the monetary value of 
all benefits received or expected to be received.” See also United States v. Amer. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986) 
(“The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration. The 
taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the 
value of any benefit he received in return.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1) (“No part of a payment that a taxpayer makes 
to or for the use of an organization described in section 170(c) that is in consideration for…goods or services...is a 
contribution or gift within the meaning of section 170(c) unless the taxpayer—(i) Intends to make a payment in an amount 
that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services; and (ii) Makes a payment in an amount that exceeds the fair 
market value of the goods or services.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(2)(i) (“The charitable contribution deduction under 
section 170(a) for a payment a taxpayer makes partly in consideration for goods or services may not exceed the excess 
of - (A) The amount of any cash paid and the fair market value of any property (other than cash) transferred by the 
taxpayer to an organization described in section 170(c); over (B) The fair market value of the goods or services the 
organization provides in return.”). 
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exemption request had been “virtually guaranteed,” that the land use code 
sections governing his exemption request did not require the grant of a 
conservation easement, and that all documents relating to the grant of the 
easement referred to it as a “gift.” One of the county commissioners even 
wrote a letter to the taxpayer (apparently at the taxpayer’s request in 
preparation for the Tax Court trial) stating that, to the best of his 
recollection, he did not require the taxpayer to grant the easement in 
exchange for the subdivision exemption. 
 
The Tax Court was not persuaded. Based on its examination of the “external 
features of the transaction,” the court found that the subdivision exemption 
request was far from being virtually guaranteed and, in fact, had little 
chance of being granted without the taxpayer’s promise to grant the 
easement. 197  The taxpayer also did not establish that the value of the 
easement he conveyed to the county exceeded the value of the subdivision 
exemption granted to him, or that he intended to make a charitable 
contribution.198 
 
The Tax Court also sustained the IRS’s imposition of an accuracy-related 
penalty in Pollard, finding that the taxpayer did not act with reasonable 
cause and in good faith in claiming the deduction. The evidence produced 
at trial, said the court, demonstrated that all of the parties involved 
understood that the easement was contributed for the express purpose of 
encouraging the county to grant the taxpayer a subdivision exemption, and 
it would be unreasonable for the court to believe that anyone involved in 
the transaction (i.e., the taxpayer, his advisers, or the county 
commissioners) believed there was an unrequited contribution. 
 
b. Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street. In Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, 
the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of an LLC's 
claimed $7.15 million deduction for the conveyance of interior and exterior 
easements restricting the use of a shrine in Denver, Colorado, because the 
conveyance was part of a quid pro quo exchange. The shrine is listed on the 
National Register of Historic Places and as a historic landmark by the City 
and County of Denver. The LLC owned two properties on Sherman Street—
the shrine and a parking lot. Prior to granting the easements, the LLC and 
the City of Denver entered into a development agreement in which, among 
other things, the LLC agreed to convey the easements to Historic Denver 
and rehabilitate the shrine in exchange for certain zoning changes to the 
shrine and the parking lot. 
 
                                               
197 In ascertaining whether a given payment is a contribution or gift, or is made with the expectation of quid pro quo, the 
IRS and the courts examine “the external features of the transaction,” thus avoiding the need to conduct an imprecise 
inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 701–702 (1989). 
198 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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The Tax Court’s opinion detailed the following elements of a quid pro quo 
analysis in the charitable deduction context. 
 
• A taxpayer's contribution is deductible ‘only if and to the extent it 
exceeds the market value of the benefit received.’ 
• ‘[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money 
or property without adequate consideration.’ 
• ‘a charitable gift or contribution must be a payment made for 
detached and disinterested motives. This formulation is designed to 
ensure that the payor’s primary purpose is to assist the charity and 
not to secure some benefit personal to the payor.’ 
• The consideration received by the taxpayer need not be financial. 
Medical, educational, scientific, religious, or other benefits can be 
consideration that vitiates charitable intent. 
• In ascertaining whether a given payment was made with the 
expectation of anything in return, courts examine the external 
features of the transaction. This avoids the need to conduct an 
imprecise inquiry into the motivations of individual taxpayers. 
• The taxpayer claiming a deduction must, at a minimum, demonstrate 
that “he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the 
value of any benefit he received in return.” 
• Thus, a taxpayer who receives goods or services in exchange for a 
contribution of property may still be entitled to a charitable 
deduction if the taxpayer (1) makes a contribution that exceeds the 
fair market value of the benefits received in exchange and (2) makes 
the excess payment with the intention of making a gift.199  
• If the taxpayer satisfies these requirements, the taxpayer is entitled 
to a deduction not to exceed the fair market value of the property the 
taxpayer transferred less the fair market value of the goods or 
services received.200 
 
The Tax Court explained that a quid pro quo analysis in the conservation 
easement donation context ordinarily consists of two parts—(1) valuation 
of the contributed conservation easement and then (2) valuation of the 
consideration received in exchange for the easement. The court explained, 
however, that when a taxpayer grants a conservation easement as part of a 
quid pro quo exchange and fails to identify or value all of the consideration 
received, the taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction because he failed to 
comply with § 170 and the regulations. In such a case, it is unnecessary to 
determine either the value of the easement or whether the taxpayer made an 
excess payment with the intention of making a gift. The taxpayer’s failure 
to identify or value all of the consideration received and, thus, to prove that 
                                               
199 See id. 
200 See id.  
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the value of the easement exceeded the value of the consideration is fatal to 
the deduction.201 
 
The Tax Court determined that the LLC had received two types of 
consideration in exchange for its conveyance of the interior and exterior 
easements: 
 
• a zoning change that eliminated authorization to develop residential 
condominium units within the shrine but also permitted 
development on the parking lot up to 650 feet, subject to a “view 
plane” restriction of 155 feet (a view plane restriction limits the 
height of buildings from a specified view point within Denver's city 
park and is meant to preserve the view of the Rocky Mountain 
Skyline from that view point), and 
 
• the Denver Community Planning and Development Agency’s 
recommendation to the Denver Planning Board to approve a view 
plane variance (which variance was ultimately approved). 
 
On its 2003 tax return, however, the LLC claimed a $7.15 million charitable 
deduction for its conveyance of the easements and made no adjustment for 
the consideration it received in exchange. At trial, the LLC conceded that it 
had received the zoning change in exchange for its conveyance of the 
easements and argued that its deduction should be reduced by just over $2 
million as a result. The LLC also asserted that the Planning and 
Development Agency’s recommendation to the Planning Board to approve 
a view plane variance was either not consideration received in exchange for 
the grant of the easements, or was consideration but had no real value. The 
Tax Court disagreed, finding that the Agency’s view-plane-variance 
recommendation was consideration and had substantial value. The court 
concluded that the LLC’s failure to identify or value all of the consideration 
received, or to provide any credible evidence to permit the court to 
accurately value all of the consideration received, was fatal to the deduction.  
 
Also notable is that the consideration the LLC received in exchange for its 
conveyance of the easements did not come from the donee, Historic Denver, 
but instead came from the City of Denver. The IRS argued that the LLC 
failed to substantiate its claimed deduction because it failed to (i) obtain a 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment (CWA) meeting the 
requirements of IRC § 170(f)(8) or (ii) disclose that the contribution was 
part of a bargain sale on Form 8283. The LLC argued that § 170(f)(8) 
                                               
201 See also Cohan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-8, in which the Tax Court upheld the IRS’s complete disallowance of 
a charitable income tax deduction claimed with respect to a bargain sale transaction because the contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment (CWA) that the donee provided to the donor did not include a description or good faith estimate of the 
total consideration provided to the donor, and the donor’s reliance on the CWA was therefore unreasonable. The court 
explained that “the deterrence value of § 170(f)(8)’s total denial of a deduction comports with the effective administration 
of a self-assessment and self-reporting system.” 
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requires a donor to obtain a CWA providing a good-faith estimate of the 
value of the consideration received from the donee (i.e., Historic Denver), 
and it received no consideration from Historic Denver. The LLC also argued 
that the grant of the easements to Historic Denver was not a bargain sale 
because it received no consideration from Historic Denver and, thus, it was 
not required to report the conveyance as a bargain sale on the Form 8283. 
The Tax Court found these contentions “dubious.” The court noted that the 
grant of the easements was a complex negotiation among the LLC, the city, 
and Historic Denver, and Historic Denver's role was largely as the city's 
designee to hold the easements. The court thus generally found persuasive 
the IRS’s argument that the consideration received should have been 
disclosed on the CWA and the Form 8283. However, because the court 
denied the deduction in full on quid pro quo grounds, it did not decide these 
substantiation issues. 
 
The Tax Court also agreed with the IRS that the LLC was liable for the 
accuracy-related penalty because it acted negligently or in disregard of the 
requirements of § 170 and the regulations. “Negligence,” said the court, is 
strongly indicated where a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to 
ascertain the correctness of a deduction that would seem to a reasonable and 
prudent person to be “too good to be true.” And a taxpayer acts with 
“disregard” when, among other things, he does not exercise reasonable 
diligence to determine the correctness of a return position. The LLC 
conveyed the easements as part of a quid pro quo exchange but reported the 
conveyance on its 2003 return as a charitable contribution without making 
any adjustment for the consideration it received in exchange. The court 
found that the LLC acted negligently or with disregard because it did not 
make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of the deduction. 
 
The LLC argued that it was eligible for the reasonable cause and good faith 
exception to the penalty because it relied on professional advice. The Tax 
Court disagreed. Although the LLC had consulted with a tax attorney 
regarding the conveyance, that attorney testified at trial that he had advised 
the LLC that it had to reduce the value of its deduction by the consideration 
received in the quid pro quo exchange. The Tax Court noted that it would 
be unreasonable for the court to believe that at the time of the contribution 
or at the time of filing the LLC’s return either the LLC or its advisers 
believed that the contribution of the easements was an unrequited 
contribution or that the consideration received had no value. Consequently, 
the LLC's disregard of the attorney’s advice was not reasonable and in good 
faith, and the LLC could not rely on the professional advice of the attorney 
to negate the penalty. 
 
c. Wendell Falls. In Wendell Falls I, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s 
disallowance of a $1.798 million deduction claimed by the Wendell Falls 
Development, LLC, with regard to a conservation easement donation. The 
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LLC owned 1,280 acres in Wake County, North Carolina, and planned to 
subdivide the land into a master-planned community with residential areas, 
commercial spaces, an elementary school, and a park. The LLC identified 
125 of the 1,280 acres as the land upon which the park would be placed. 
 
In mid-2005, the LLC and the county began discussions regarding the 
county’s purchase of the 125 acres for use as a county park. Sometime after 
those discussions began, the LLC proposed placing a conservation easement 
on the 125 acres before the sale to restrict the 125 acres to park use. The 
LLC presumably wanted to be able to assure purchasers of the residential 
and commercial lots on the remaining land that the 125 acres would be 
permanently protected as a park. Throughout 2006, the LLC and the county 
discussed the restrictions the easement would include and which charitable 
organization would hold the easement. 
 
In October 2006, the Town of Wendell approved the Planned Unit 
Development (PUD), which contemplated up to 4,000 residential lots and 
stated that 125 acres would be dedicated to the creation of a park. However, 
the 125 acres was “unaffected by the town’s approval of the PUD” because, 
even though the 125 acres was described in the PUD, it was outside the 
boundaries of the town and therefore not subject to the town’s zoning 
ordinances. The Tax Court noted that “[t]he PUD stated that Wendell Falls 
received no preferential zoning in exchange for setting aside the 125 acres 
for use as a park. This statement is consistent with the rest of the record.” 
 
In December 2006, the county and the LLC entered into a purchase 
agreement regarding the 125 acres. The purchase agreement stated that 
placing a mutually agreeable conservation easement on the land was a 
precondition to the sale. The purchase agreement was later revised to correct 
for some errors, and in June of 2007, the county reauthorized the purchase 
of the 125 acres for just over $3 million, which was the appraised value of 
the 125 acres unrestricted by the easement (i.e., the “before” easement value 
of the 125 acres). In exchange for $3 million, the LLC (i) conveyed a 
conservation easement on the 125 acres to a local land trust and (ii) 
conveyed the restricted fee to the county. Thus, it appears that the county 
paid the LLC for both the easement and the restricted fee, although the 
easement was conveyed to a third-party land trust. 
 
The LLC then claimed a $1.8 million deduction for its “donation” of the 
easement to the land trust based on an appraisal that asserted that the 
easement had a value of more than $4.8 million (that is, the LLC claimed a 
deduction for the difference between an alleged $4.8 million value for the 
easement and the $3 million the LLC had received from the county). The 
LLC then later filed an amended return on which it claimed it was entitled 
to a deduction for full $4.8 million and, at trial, its valuation expert asserted 
that the easement had a value of over $5.9 million. 
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The IRS argued, among other things, that the deduction should be 
disallowed because LLC expected a substantial benefit from the 
easement—namely that the prospect of a public park on the 125 acres would 
increase the value of the rest of the adjoining 1,280 acres owned by the LLC. 
The Tax Court agreed, explaining that (i) no deduction for a charitable 
contribution is allowed if the taxpayer expects a substantial benefit from the 
contribution, (ii) in assessing whether a taxpayer expected a substantial 
benefit, the court looks to the external features of the transaction, and (iii) 
the LLC did expect a substantial benefit from the easement because having 
the park as an amenity would increase the value of the lots on the LLC’s 
adjoining land. 
 
The Tax Court also held, in the alternative, that the easement had no value. 
The court explained that, as evidenced by the LLC’s development plan for 
the 1,280 acres (which included the 125 acres), the best use of the 125 acres 
was as parkland in the midst of a master-planned community. The 
conservation easement therefore did not diminish the value of the 125 acres 
because it did not prevent it from being put to its best use. The court further 
explained that its answer would not change if the land valued before and 
after the easement were the entire contiguous parcel (the entire 1,280 acres). 
Using the 125 acres as a park would make the master-planned community 
more desirable and therefore increase the value of the residential and 
commercial lots the LLC intended to sell. Taking that enhancement into 
account, the court said, the total value of the 1,280 acres would be 
undiminished by the easement. 
The LLC was not, however, found liable for a 20% penalty because it 
satisfied the reasonable cause and good faith exception. The court noted that 
the most important factor in determining reasonable cause and good faith is 
the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to ascertain the proper tax treatment of 
the transaction in question. As to the value of the easement, the LLC had 
retained two different state-certified real estate appraisers to appraise the 
easement. Although neither appraiser correctly accounted for the 
enhancement conferred by the easement on the unencumbered property, 
neither did the IRS’s trial expert. Thus, the court held that “[u]nder the 
narrow circumstances of this case,” there was reasonable cause for reporting 
the deduction and the deduction was reported in good faith. 
 
In Wendell Falls II, the Tax Court denied the LLC’s motion for 
reconsideration and supplemented its first opinion.  
 
d. Costello. In Costello, taxpayers conveyed a conservation easement to 
Howard County, Maryland, in exchange for the right to sell 16 development 
rights to a developer pursuant to the county’s transfer of development rights 
program. The right to sell the development rights was conditioned on the 
conveyance of the easement, which prohibited any future development of 
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the subject property. In filing their tax return and claiming a deduction for 
the conveyance of the easement, the taxpayers failed to indicate that they 
had received the right to sell the development rights (and $2.5 million on 
their sale) as a result of the conveyance. The Tax Court held that, even if 
the taxpayers had complied with the qualified appraisal and appraisal 
summary requirements (which they did not), the court would nonetheless 
disallow the deduction because the easement was conveyed as part of a quid 
pro quo exchange.  
 
The taxpayers argued that easement’s value exceeded the $2.5 million of 
consideration they received in exchange for its conveyance (in the form of 
proceeds from their sale of the 16 development rights). The Tax Court 
dismissed that argument because (i) the taxpayers failed to provide evidence 
that the property could have been developed into more than 16 lots and (ii) 
the taxpayers could not sell the 16 development rights until they had placed 
the easement on the property and, once they did, all future development was 
prohibited, so there was no “excess” development potential that they could 
have contributed to the county in the form of a bargain sale.  
 
The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s imposition of accuracy-related penalties 
in Costello, explaining, in part, that the taxpayers “knew or reasonably 
should have known” that the sale of the development rights for $2.5 million 
was relevant in determining any deduction to which they might be entitled. 
 
e. McGrady. In McGrady, the taxpayers donated a conservation easement 
on their 25-acre homestead property to a Bucks County, Pennsylvania, 
Township, and fee-title to an adjacent 20-acres to a local nonprofit. The 
taxpayers claimed a $2.35 million deduction for each donation. The 
conveyances were components of a complex conservation transaction 
involving the taxpayers’ property and neighboring property, and the parties 
involved included the Township, the local nonprofit, the owners of the 
neighboring property, and a local developer. 
 
The IRS disallowed the deductions, claiming that the donations were made 
as part of a quid pro quo transaction. The IRS argued that the donations 
were components of a conservation transaction that benefited the taxpayers 
by reducing development on the neighboring property and ensuring that 
much of that property was conserved, thus protecting the taxpayers’ privacy 
and views. The Tax Court rejected that argument, finding that neither the 
grant of the easement nor the conveyance of the 20-acre parcel was 
conditioned on the Township or nonprofit supplying any return benefit to 
the taxpayers. The court held that the taxpayers were mere “incidental 
beneficiaries” of the overall conservation transaction, and neither the 
nonprofit, the Township, nor the developer intended to benefit the 
taxpayers.  
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The court, however, reduced the allowable deductions for the donations of 
the 20-acre parcel and the conservation easement to $2.19 million and $1.49 
million respectively, and further reduced those deductions by $29,000 for 
an access easement the taxpayers received as part of the overall 
conservation transaction. Although the taxpayers had an informal access 
agreement with the owners of the neighboring property, they received a 
recorded access easement as part of the overall transaction, and the court 
found that the access easement constituted a return benefit that had to be 
valued and reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s charitable contributions.   
 
The value of the conservation easement reported on the taxpayer’s return 
($2.35 million) exceeded 150% of the value that the court determined to be 
correct ($1.49 million) and, thus, constituted a substantial valuation 
misstatement. The taxpayers were not liable for valuation or other penalties, 
however, because they met the reasonable cause and good faith exceptions. 
 
f. Pesky. In Pesky, the IRS asserted not only that the taxpayer’s conveyance 
of a conservation easement was made in exchange for a quid pro quo, but 
also that the taxpayer was liable for a civil fraud penalty under IRC § 6663. 
Section 6663 imposes a 75% penalty on tax underpayments due to fraud. 
Fraud is defined as an “intentional wrongdoing on the part of the taxpayer 
with the specific intent to avoid a tax known to be owing.” The government 
must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence, but intent can be 
inferred from strong circumstantial evidence. 
 
After a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the easement 
conveyance, the District Court was unable to conclude that a reasonable jury 
could find it “highly likely” that the taxpayer’s deduction was due to fraud. 
Because the government did not produce sufficient evidence to meet its 
burden of showing fraud by clear and convincing evidence, the court 
granted the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue. The 
court determined, however, that other issues could not be resolved on 
summary judgment, including whether the conveyance of the easement was 
made in exchange for quid pro quo and whether the taxpayer obtained a 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment accurately reflecting any goods 
and services provided by the donee in exchange for the contribution. The 
parties in Pesky appear to have settled the case after the District Court 
rejected the fraud claim. 
 
E. Side Agreements. In Graev I, the Tax Court sustained the IRS’s disallowance of 
deductions claimed with regard to the donation to the National Architectural Trust (NAT) 
of both a façade easement valued at $990,000 and an accompanying $99,000 cash 
contribution. NAT had written a side letter to Mr. Graev, the donor, promising that, if the 
deduction for the easement were disallowed, NAT would “promptly refund [Mr. Graev’s] 
entire cash endowment contribution and join with [him] to immediately remove the facade 
conservation easement from the property’s title.” The Tax Court disallowed the deductions 
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for both the easement and cash contributions because the gifts were conditional and, at the 
time they were made, the possibility they would be defeated was not so remote as to be 
negligible. 
 
Section 170 and the corresponding Treasury Regulations provide instructions and 
limitations that, at least in part, ensure that a donor will be able to deduct no more than 
what the donee actually receives. Three such limitations effectively provide that no 
deduction for a charitable contribution will be allowed unless, on the date of the 
contribution, the possibility that the donee’s interest in the contribution will be defeated is 
“so remote as to be negligible.” Those limitations are found in Treasury Regulations § 
1.170A-1(e) (pertaining to conditional gifts), § 1.170A-7 (pertaining to partial interest 
gifts), and § 1.170A-14(g)(3) (pertaining to gifts of conservation easements). 
 
Based on the facts in Graev I, the court found that, on the date of the contributions, the 
possibility that the IRS would disallow the easement deduction and NAT would return the 
cash to Mr. Graev and remove the easement (i.e., that the gifts would be defeated) was not 
so remote as to be negligible. The facts the court found persuasive included the IRS’s 
announced intention to scrutinize deductions for facade easement donations; Mr. Graev’s 
insistence that NAT issue the side letter; NAT’s practice of issuing side letters, the very 
essence of which “implies a non-negligible risk;” the enforceability of the side letter under 
state law; and NAT’s incentive to honor its promises in the side letter so as not to impair 
its ability to obtain future contributions. 
 
The possibility that a gift will be defeated will be considered so remote as to be negligible 
only if it is “so highly improbable that one might ignore it with reasonable safety in 
undertaking a serious business transaction” or “so highly improbable and remote as to be 
lacking in reason and substance.”202 In Graev I, the court explained: “the mere fact that he 
required the side letter is strong evidence that, at the time of Mr. Graev’s contribution, the 
risk that his corresponding deductions might be disallowed could not be (and was not) 
‘ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business transaction.’” Obtaining 
the side letter also indicated that Mr. Graev did not think the chance of disallowance was 
“so highly improbable and remote as to be lacking in reason and substance.” Accordingly, 
the mere fact of obtaining a side letter such as that at issue in Graev I may be a tripwire 
that destroys deductibility. 
 
F. Donation by Term-Limited Lessee. In Harbor Lofts, the Tax Court held that the 
Harbor Lofts partnership, which leased two buildings from a Massachusetts public 
corporation for a term of years, was not entitled to a deduction for a façade easement on 
the buildings that Harbor Lofts and the corporation jointly conveyed to a historic 
preservation nonprofit. Harbor Lofts claimed a $4,457,515 deduction for the donation, 
presumably because the owner of the building, the Massachusetts public corporation, 
which is a nonprofit corporation established under state law, could not benefit from the 
deduction.  
 
                                               
202 See Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656-57 (1979). 
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Harbor Lofts argued, among other things, that § 170(h)(2)(C) does not explicitly require 
that an easement donor own the real property that is subject to the easement and that 
multiple parties, such as tenants in common, may join together in granting an easement. 
The IRS argued that Harbor Lofts, as a “time-limited” lessee, did not have a perpetual 
interest to give and that a time-limited leasehold interest could not be equated to the fee 
interest of a tenant in common.  
 
In agreeing with the IRS, the Tax Court explained that: 
(i) state law determines the nature of property rights, whereas federal law 
determines the appropriate tax treatment of those rights, and under Massachusetts 
law, a term-of-years leasehold interest constitutes personal property, 
(ii) Harbor Lofts was not a tenant in common and the limited duration of a leasehold 
interest is far different from fee ownership as a tenant in common, 
(iii) Harbor Lofts did not hold perpetual property rights in the buildings, so it was 
not possible for it to contribute a perpetual restriction on the use of the buildings as 
required by § 170(h)(2)(C), 
(iv) while § 170(h) does not specifically require that an easement donor hold a fee 
interest, only the holder of a fee interest is able to grant a perpetual conservation 
restriction, 
(v) when Harbor Lofts joined in the grant of the easement, it gave up contractual 
rights under the lease agreement, which are personal property rights, and a 
charitable contribution of a personal property right is not a “qualified real property 
interest” under § 170(h)(2)(C), 
(vi) while Harbor Lofts gave up something of value when it joined in the grant of 
the easement (the rights it held under the lease contract to make certain 
improvements or alterations to the buildings), it ceded those rights to the 
Massachusetts public corporation, not the holder of the easement, 
(vii) even if Harbor Lofts were deemed to hold equitable ownership interests in the 
buildings as a result of the long-term lease, those interests would be for only a finite 
period and could not satisfy the perpetuity requirements of § 170(h), and 
(viii) as a time-limited lessee, Harbor Lofts did not have the power to impose 
perpetual restrictions on the buildings—it could not give what it did not have—and, 
thus, it could not protect the conservation purpose in perpetuity. 
 
The Harbor Lofts opinion raises a number of questions. For example, could the holder of 
a life estate and the holder of the remainder interest in real property jointly donate a 
conservation easement on the property and share the deduction based on the value of their 
respective interests? Or is the owner of a life estate, which is effectively a term-limited 
interest, prevented from granting a perpetual use restriction? What if a long-term lessee 
and the owner of the fee contribute their interests to a partnership, the partnership donates 
an easement, and the partnership allocates the entire resulting deduction to the lessee? If a 
term-limited lessee like Harbor Lofts were deemed to have a sufficient interest in the real 
property to claim a deduction, would other parties with limited interests similarly be 
entitled to claim a deduction, such as a lender holding an outstanding mortgage on the 
property? Or is the answer that any party holding an interest that is not an undivided portion 
of the entire fee must agree to subordinate its interest to the easement for the easement to 
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qualify for the deduction, but the deduction can be claimed only by the owner (or owners) 
of undivided portions of the fee (like the sole owner of the fee or tenants in common)? 
 
G. “Qualified Farmer or Rancher.” Pursuant to IRC § 170(b)(1), an individual can 
generally claim the deduction generated by a conservation easement donation to the extent 
of 50% of the individual’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation 
and the following fifteen years. However, an individual who is a “qualified farmer or 
rancher” can deduct the value of the donation to the extent of 100% of his or her AGI in 
each of the year of the donation and the following fifteen years. A “qualified farmer or 
rancher” is an individual whose gross income from the trade or business of farming (within 
the meaning of IRC § 2032A(e)(5)) is greater than 50% of the individual’s gross income 
for the taxable year.203  
 
In Rutkoske, two brothers who ran a complex farming operation involving multiple entities 
claimed that they were qualified farmers or ranchers and, thus, eligible to benefit from the 
100% of AGI deduction provision with regard to the donation component of the bargain-
sale of a conservation easement by an LLC in which they each owned a 50% interest. The 
Tax Court disagreed, finding that neither brother had gross income from the trade or 
business of farming greater than 50% of his gross income for the taxable year on two 
grounds. 
 
1. Neither the sale of land nor the bargain sale of a conservation easement are 
activities listed in § 2032A(e)(5). Accordingly, the proceeds from such sales, which 
flowed through the LLC to the brothers for the taxable year, did not constitute 
“income from the trade or business of farming.”  
 
2. If a partnership is not in the trade or business of farming, income or gain flowing 
through the partnership to the partners does not constitute “income from the trade 
or business of farming.” In Rutkoske, the LLC was not in the business of farming; 
it was in the business of leasing real estate. Thus, the income from the LLC that 
flowed through to the Rutkoske brothers did not constitute income from the trade 
or business of farming. 
 
The court acknowledged that the statutory rules make it difficult for a farmer to receive the 
maximum charitable contribution deduction if the farmer sells property in a year in which 
he donates a conservation easement, especially in a state with high land values. However, 
the court explained that it is not its task to rewrite statutes, and “being a farmer does not 
make one a ‘qualified farmer’” for purposes of the 100% of AGI deduction rule. 
 
H. Disguised Sales. In each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231, LLC v. Comm’r, 
810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked a tax avoidance principle—the 
“disguised sales” rules under IRC § 707—to attack the special allocation of state income 
tax credits generated by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement. The courts 
held that each partnership’s transfer to a 1% partner of more than 90% of the state income 
                                               
203 For guidance on deductions by individuals for qualified conservation contributions, including farmers and ranchers, 
see IRS Notice 2007-50. 
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tax credits generated by the donation was a taxable disguised sale. In Route 231, LLC, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that § 707 “prevents use of the partnership provisions to render 
nontaxable what would in substance have been a taxable exchange if it had not been ‘run 
through’ the partnership.” 
 
In Bosque Canyon Ranch I, the Tax Court held that two partnerships’ transfers of 5-acre 
homesites on a shared-amenities ranch to limited partners in exchange for purported 
“capital contributions” were, in fact, taxable disguised sales. The court found that the 
distributions of the 5-acre homesites to the limited partners were made in exchange for the 
limited partners’ payments and were not subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the 
partnerships’ operations. Accordingly, the court held that the partnerships were required to 
recognize and include in their gross income any gains relating to the disguised sales. In 
Bosque Canyon Ranch II, however,  the Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s determination 
that the entirety of the limited partners’ contributions were disguised sales and remanded 
for that court to determine the correct amount of any taxable income that resulted from the 
disguised sales. 
 
I. PLRs Recommending Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status.204 The IRS has issued a 
number of Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) recommending revocation of the tax-exempt 
status of organizations holding conservation easements based on fairly egregious facts.205 
These PLRs illustrate some of the issues the IRS has focused on when examining 
organizations that accept and hold conservation easements. 
 
1. Although the PLRs are impossible to accurately summarize in an outline because 
of their highly fact specific nature, some of the problems noted in the PLRs include: 
 
• the organization served as a vehicle for its founder, the founder’s family, or 
other related parties to donate conservation easements and claim 
deductions; 
• the easements donated to the organization did not satisfy the conservation 
purpose test under § 170(h)(4) (e.g., the preservation was not pursuant to a 
clearly delineated government conservation policy; the easement 
encumbered ordinary farmland with no unique features like native plants, 
trees, or animals; or the easement encumbered land in a gated condominium 
tennis resort and contained a private miniature golf course used for the 
pleasure of the residents only); 
• the organization did not take steps to ensure that the easements it accepts 
serve a conservation purpose (e.g., the organization’s officers, trustees, and 
employees did not have backgrounds or expertise in botany, biology, 
ecological sciences, or other fields that would enable them to credibly 
process or evaluate the property, or no baselines were obtained or consisted 
                                               
204 See supra note 116 for a description of Private Letter Rulings. 
205 See, e.g., PLR 201044026; PLR 201048045; PLR 201109030; PLR 201110020; PLR 201405018. See also PLR 
201234029 (organization created for the purpose of carrying on a for-profit hay farm on property that is not ecologically 
significant or open to the public is not operated for an exempt purpose). 
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of one page or one paragraph reports; or the organization was unaware of 
the extensive retained rights in the easements it accepted); 
• the organization did not monitor the easements it accepted on a regular basis 
(or at all), did not have the commitment to protect the conservation purposes 
(if any) of the donations, and did not have the resources to enforce the 
easements should enforcement become necessary; 
• there was no one associated with the organization that had any formal 
education, training, or expertise in conservation matters; 
• the organization allowed one of its easement-encumbered properties to be 
damaged by illegal dumping and vehicles, and another, located in an 
exclusive small waterfront residential development, to be encroached upon 
by the residents who constructed, among other things, large ponds and a 
boat and recreational vehicle storage facility for the exclusive use of the 
residents; 
• the organization amended a conservation easement to allow additional 
development for a fee; 
• the easements the organization acquired violated the perpetuity requirement 
under § 170(h) because the organization had the right to terminate the 
easements; 
• the organization did not develop or sponsor any educational events, solicit 
the general public for support, or appear to hold itself out to the public as a 
charitable conservation organization; and 
• the organization was not operated in accordance with its bylaws (e.g., there 
were no meetings of officers or board members, no elections, and no 
internal controls, and there was only the bare minimum with regard to 
records and recordkeeping). 
 
2. PLR 201048045 explains: 
To establish that it operates exclusively for charitable conservation 
purposes under section 501(c)(3), an organization must do more than 
merely accept and hold easements for which donors are claiming charitable 
contribution deductions under section 170(h). The organization must 
establish that any accepted easements actually serve a conservation purpose. 
The organization must also operate as an effective steward to ensure that 
the easement continues to further a conservation purpose. The easement is 
a set of legal rights. It can serve conservation purposes only if enforced 
where necessary. The need for enforcement can be determined only through 
monitoring. The extent of an organization's due diligence and monitoring 
activities, combined with its capacity for and commitment to enforcement 
when necessary, becomes highly significant in determining whether 
accepting and holding easements actually furthers a charitable conservation 
purpose and thus whether an organization with the primary purpose of 
accepting and holding easements qualifies for exemption under section 
501(c)(3). 
 
3. The IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide notes: 
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A “self-serving” donee organization organized solely for the purpose of 
accepting one easement may lack charitable purpose or be engaged in self-
dealing. If there is a question or concern as to the operations of the 
organization, examiners should submit a referral to Tax Exempt and 
Governmental Entities (TEGE). 206 
 
The Guide also provides that an IRS examiner should: 
 
Ask for the [donee] organization’s monitoring reports to verify whether the 
taxpayer is in compliance with, and the donee organization is enforcing, the 
terms of the easement. In some cases, donee organizations have allowed 
changes that were in violation of the terms of the easement. 
 
Examiners should consult Counsel for assistance if the easement was 
terminated or not being enforced. In addition, a referral to TEGE should be 
considered.207 
 
J. State Tax Credits. A number of states offer state income tax credits to donors of 
conservation easements and several cases have addressed issues relating to such credits. 
 
Esgar involved three taxpayers, each of whom donated a conservation easement on land 
located in Colorado, received transferable income tax credits from Colorado as a result of 
the donation, and sold a portion of the credits to third parties within two weeks. The 
taxpayers reported the proceeds from the credit sales as long-term capital gain, short-term 
capital gain, and ordinary income, respectively. After an audit of the taxpayers’ income tax 
returns, the IRS determined that the proceeds from the sales of the credits should have been 
reported as ordinary income. 
 
In Tempel v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 341 (2011), the Tax Court held that the taxpayers’ state tax 
credits were zero-basis capital assets and, given the short holding periods, income from the 
sale of such credits was short-term capital gain. Several months later, the IRS released a 
Chief Counsel Advice that addresses the tax consequences of the sale of state tax credits to 
both the seller and the buyer.208 
 
The taxpayers appealed both Esgar I (in which the Tax Court held that the taxpayers had 
substantially overvalued the conservation easements) and Tempel to the Tenth Circuit. In 
Esgar II, the taxpayers argued that their state tax credits, which they held for only about 
two weeks, were nonetheless long-term capital assets because they held the underlying real 
properties for longer than one year, they relinquished development rights in those 
properties through the donation of the easements, and they received the tax credits because 
of the donations. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that the Tax Court correctly 
concluded in Tempel that the taxpayers had no property rights in the tax credits until the 
easement donations were complete and the credits were granted, and the credits never were, 
                                               
206 See IRS Conservation Easement Audit Techniques Guide, supra note 23, at 57. 
207 See id., at 71. 
208 Chief Counsel Advice 201147024, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1147024.pdf. 
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nor did they become, part of the taxpayers’ real property rights. The Tenth Circuit also 
agreed with the Tax Court that the taxpayers’ holding period in the credits began at the 
time the credits were granted and ended when taxpayers sold them, and since the taxpayers 
sold the credits in the same month in which they received them, the gains from the sale of 
the credits were short-term capital gains. 
 
The Tenth Circuit also summarily rejected the argument that the transactions amounted to 
some sort of like-kind exchange of conservation easements for tax credits that might result 
in the “tacking” of holding periods. The court further noted that if these were like-kind 
exchanges it would negate the charitable nature of the taxpayers’ contributions of the 
easements. 
 
As noted in Part III.H above, in each of SWF Real Estate, LLC, and Route 231, LLC v. 
Comm’r, 810 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2016), the IRS successfully invoked the “disguised sales” 
rules under § 707 to attack the nonpro rata allocation of state income tax credits generated 
by a partnership’s donation of a conservation easement. 
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Appendix	A	
Internal	Revenue	Code	§	170(h)	
	
(h)	Qualified	conservation	contribution.	
(1)	In	general.	For	purposes	of	subsection	(f)(3)(B)(iii),	the	term	"qualified	
conservation	contribution"	means	a	contribution--	
(A)	of	a	qualified	real	property	interest,	
(B)	to	a	qualified	organization,	
(C)	exclusively	for	conservation	purposes.	
	
(2)	Qualified	real	property	interest.	For	purposes	of	this	subsection,	the	term	
"qualified	real	property	interest"	means	any	of	the	following	interests	in	real	
property:	
(A)	the	entire	interest	of	the	donor	other	than	a	qualified	mineral	
interest,	
(B)	a	remainder	interest,	and	
(C)	a	restriction	(granted	in	perpetuity)	on	the	use	which	may	be	made	of	
the	real	property.	
	
(3)	Qualified	organization.	For	purposes	of	paragraph	(1),	the	term	"qualified	
organization"	means	an	organization	which--	
(A)	is	described	in	clause	(v)	or	(vi)	of	subsection	(b)(1)(A),	or	
(B)	is	described	in	section	501(c)(3)	[IRC	Sec.	501(c)(3)]	and--	
(i)	meets	the	requirements	of	section	509(a)(2)	[IRC	Sec.	
509(a)(2)],	or	
(ii)	meets	the	requirements	of	section	509(a)(3)	[IRC	Sec.	
509(a)(3)]	and	is	controlled	by	an	organization	described	in	
subparagraph	(A)	or	in	clause	(i)	of	this	subparagraph.	
	
(4)	Conservation	purpose	defined.	
(A)	In	general.	For	purposes	of	this	subsection,	the	term	"conservation	
purpose"	means--	
(i)	the	preservation	of	land	areas	for	outdoor	recreation	by,	or	the	
education	of,	the	general	public,	
(ii)	the	protection	of	a	relatively	natural	habitat	of	fish,	wildlife,	or	
plants,	or	similar	ecosystem,	
(iii)	the	preservation	of	open	space	(including	farmland	and	forest	
land)	where	such	preservation	is--	
(I)	for	the	scenic	enjoyment	of	the	general	public,	or	
(II)	pursuant	to	a	clearly	delineated	Federal,	State,	or	local	
governmental	conservation	policy,	
and	will	yield	a	significant	public	benefit,	or	
(iv)	the	preservation	of	an	historically	important	land	area	or	a	
certified	historic	structure.	
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(B)	Special	rules	with	respect	to	buildings	in	registered	historic	districts.	In	
the	case	of	any	contribution	of	a	qualified	real	property	interest	which	is	
a	restriction	with	respect	to	the	exterior	of	a	building	described	in	
subparagraph	(C)(ii),	such	contribution	shall	not	be	considered	to	be	
exclusively	for	conservation	purposes	unless--	
(i)	such	interest--	
(I)	includes	a	restriction	which	preserves	the	entire	
exterior	of	the	building	(including	the	front,	sides,	rear,	
and	height	of	the	building),	and	
(II)	prohibits	any	change	in	the	exterior	of	the	building	
which	is	inconsistent	with	the	historical	character	of	such	
exterior,	
(ii)	the	donor	and	donee	enter	into	a	written	agreement	
certifying,	under	penalty	of	perjury,	that	the	donee--	
(I)	is	a	qualified	organization	(as	defined	in	paragraph	(3))	
with	a	purpose	of	environmental	protection,	land	
conservation,	open	space	preservation,	or	historic	
preservation,	and	
(II)	has	the	resources	to	manage	and	enforce	the	
restriction	and	a	commitment	to	do	so,	and	
(iii)	in	the	case	of	any	contribution	made	in	a	taxable	year	
beginning	after	the	date	of	the	enactment	of	this	subparagraph	
[Aug.	17,	2006],	the	taxpayer	includes	with	the	taxpayer's	return	
for	the	taxable	year	of	the	contribution--	
(I)	a	qualified	appraisal	(within	the	meaning	of	subsection	
(f)(11)(E))	of	the	qualified	property	interest,	
(II)	photographs	of	the	entire	exterior	of	the	building,	and	
(III)	a	description	of	all	restrictions	on	the	development	of	
the	building.	
(C)	Certified	historic	structure.	For	purposes	of	subparagraph	(A)(iv),	the	
term	"certified	historic	structure"	means--	
(i)	any	building,	structure,	or	land	area	which	is	listed	in	the	
National	Register,	or	
(ii)	any	building	which	is	located	in	a	registered	historic	district	(as	
defined	in	section	47(c)(3)(B)	and	is	certified	by	the	Secretary	of	
the	Interior	to	the	Secretary	as	being	of	historic	significance	to	the	
district.	
A	building,	structure,	or	land	area	satisfies	the	preceding	sentence	if	it	
satisfies	such	sentence	either	at	the	time	of	the	transfer	or	on	the	due	
date	(including	extensions)	for	filing	the	transferor's	return	under	this	
chapter	for	the	taxable	year	in	which	the	transfer	is	made.	
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(5)	Exclusively	for	conservation	purposes.	For	purposes	of	this	subsection--	
(A)	Conservation	purpose	must	be	protected.	A	contribution	shall	not	be	
treated	as	exclusively	for	conservation	purposes	unless	the	conservation	
purpose	is	protected	in	perpetuity.	
(B)	No	surface	mining	permitted.	
(i)	In	general.	Except	as	provided	in	clause	(ii),	in	the	case	of	a	
contribution	of	any	interest	where	there	is	a	retention	of	a	
qualified	mineral	interest,	subparagraph	(A)	shall	not	be	treated	
as	met	if	at	any	time	there	may	be	extraction	or	removal	of	
minerals	by	any	surface	mining	method.	
(ii)	Special	rule.	With	respect	to	any	contribution	of	property	in	
which	the	ownership	of	the	surface	estate	and	mineral	interests	
has	been	and	remains	separated,	subparagraph	(A)	shall	be	
treated	as	met	if	the	probability	of	surface	mining	occurring	on	
such	property	is	so	remote	as	to	be	negligible.	
	
(6)	Qualified	mineral	interest.	For	purposes	of	this	subsection,	the	term	
"qualified	mineral	interest"	means--	
(A)	subsurface	oil,	gas,	or	other	minerals,	and	
(B)	the	right	to	access	to	such	minerals	
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§		1.170A-14	Qualified	conservation	contributions.			
	
				 (a)	 Qualified	 conservation	 contributions.	 A	 deduction	 under	 section	 170	 is	 generally	 not	
allowed	 for	 a	 charitable	 contribution	 of	 any	 interest	 in	 property	 that	 consists	 of	 less	 than	 the	
donor's	entire	interest	in	the	property	other	than	certain	transfers	in	trust	(see	§		1.170A-6	relating	
to	charitable	contributions	in	trust	and	§		1.170A-7	relating	to	contributions	not	in	trust	of	partial	
interests	in	property).	However,	a	deduction	may	be	allowed	under	section	170(f)(3)(B)(iii)	for	the	
value	 of	 a	 qualified	 conservation	 contribution	 if	 the	 requirements	 of	 this	 section	 are	 met.	 A	
qualified	 conservation	 contribution	 is	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 qualified	 real	 property	 interest	 to	 a	
qualified	organization	exclusively	for	conservation	purposes.	To	be	eligible	for	a	deduction	under	
this	section,	the	conservation	purpose	must	be	protected	in	perpetuity.		
				(b)	Qualified	real	property	 interest	 --	 (1)	Entire	 interest	of	donor	other	than	qualified	mineral	
interest.	 (i)	The	entire	 interest	of	 the	donor	other	than	a	qualified	mineral	 interest	 is	a	qualified	
real	property	interest.	A	qualified	mineral	interest	is	the	donor's	interest	in	subsurface	oil,	gas,	or	
other	minerals	and	the	right	of	access	to	such	minerals.		
	(ii)	 A	 real	 property	 interest	 shall	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 an	 entire	 interest	 other	 than	 a	 qualified	
mineral	interest	by	reason	of	section	170(h)(2)(A)	and	this	paragraph	(b)(1)	if	the	property	in	which	
the	donor's	 interest	exists	was	divided	prior	 to	 the	contribution	 in	order	 to	enable	 the	donor	 to	
retain	 control	 of	more	 than	 a	 qualified	mineral	 interest	 or	 to	 reduce	 the	 real	 property	 interest	
donated.	 See	 Treasury	 regulations	 §	 	 1.170A-7(a)(2)(i).	 An	 entire	 interest	 in	 real	 property	 may	
consist	of	an	undivided	interest	 in	the	property.	But	see	section	170(h)(5)(A)	and	the	regulations	
thereunder	(relating	to	the	requirement	that	the	conservation	purpose	which	is	the	subject	of	the	
donation	must	 be	 protected	 in	 perpetuity).	Minor	 interests,	 such	 as	 rights-of-way,	 that	will	 not	
interfere	 with	 the	 conservation	 purposes	 of	 the	 donation,	 may	 be	 transferred	 prior	 to	 the	
conservation	contribution	without	affecting	the	treatment	of	a	property	interest	as	a	qualified	real	
property	interest	under	this	paragraph	(b)(1).		
	(2)	Perpetual	conservation	restriction.	A	"perpetual	conservation	restriction"	is	a	qualified	real	
property	 interest.	A	"perpetual	conservation	restriction"	 is	a	restriction	granted	 in	perpetuity	on	
the	use	which	may	be	made	of	 real	property	 --	 including,	 an	easement	or	other	 interest	 in	 real	
property	that	under	state	law	has	attributes	similar	to	an	easement	(e.g.,	a	restrictive	covenant	or	
equitable	 servitude).	 For	purposes	of	 this	 section,	 the	 terms	easement,	 conservation	 restriction,	
and	 perpetual	 conservation	 restriction	 have	 the	 same	 meaning.	 The	 definition	 of	 perpetual	
conservation	restriction	under	this	paragraph	(b)(2)	is	not	intended	to	preclude	the	deductibility	of	
a	donation	of	affirmative	rights	to	use	a	 land	or	water	area	under	§	 	1.170A-13(d)(2).	Any	rights	
reserved	by	the	donor	in	the	donation	of	a	perpetual	conservation	restriction	must	conform	to	the	
requirements	of	this	section.	See	e.g.,	paragraph	(d)(4)(ii),	(d)(5)(i),	(e)(3),	and	(g)(4)	of	this	section.		
	(c)	Qualified	organization	--	(1)	Eligible	donee.	To	be	considered	an	eligible	donee	under	this	
section,	 an	 organization	 must	 be	 a	 qualified	 organization,	 have	 a	 commitment	 to	 protect	 the	
conservation	 purposes	 of	 the	 donation,	 and	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 enforce	 the	 restrictions.	 A	
conservation	group	organized	or	operated	primarily	or	 substantially	 for	one	of	 the	 conservation	
purposes	specified	in	section	170(h)(4)(A)	will	be	considered	to	have	the	commitment	required	by	
the	 preceding	 sentence.	 A	 qualified	 organization	 need	 not	 set	 aside	 funds	 to	 enforce	 the	
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restrictions	 that	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 contribution.	 For	 purposes	 of	 this	 section,	 the	 term	
qualified	organization	means:		
	(i)	A	governmental	unit	described	in	section	170(b)(1)(A)(v);		
	(ii)	An	organization	described	in	section	170(b)(1)(A)(vi);		
	(iii)	A	charitable	organization	described	in	section	501(c)(3)	that	meets	the	public	support	test	
of	section	509(a)(2);		
	(iv)	A	 charitable	 organization	described	 in	 section	501(c)(3)	 that	meets	 the	 requirements	 of	
section	509(a)(3)	and	is	controlled	by	an	organization	described	in	paragraphs	(c)(1)	(i),	(ii),	or	(iii)	
of	this	section.		
	(2)	Transfers	by	donee.	A	deduction	shall	be	allowed	for	a	contribution	under	this	section	only	
if	in	the	instrument	of	conveyance	the	donor	prohibits	the	donee	from	subsequently	transferring	
the	 easement	 (or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 remainder	 interest	 or	 the	 reservation	 of	 a	 qualified	mineral	
interest,	 the	 property),	 whether	 or	 not	 for	 consideration,	 unless	 the	 donee	 organization,	 as	 a	
condition	 of	 the	 subsequent	 transfer,	 requires	 that	 the	 conservation	 purposes	 which	 the	
contribution	was	originally	intended	to	advance	continue	to	be	carried	out.	Moreover,	subsequent	
transfers	must	be	restricted	to	organizations	qualifying,	at	the	time	of	the	subsequent	transfer,	as	
an	eligible	donee	under	paragraph	(c)(1)	of	 this	section.	When	a	 later	unexpected	change	 in	the	
conditions	surrounding	the	property	that	is	the	subject	of	a	donation	under	paragraph	(b)(1),	(2),	
or	 (3)	 of	 this	 section	 makes	 impossible	 or	 impractical	 the	 continued	 use	 of	 the	 property	 for	
conservation	purposes,	 the	 requirement	of	 this	 paragraph	will	 be	met	 if	 the	property	 is	 sold	or	
exchanged	and	any	proceeds	are	used	by	the	donee	organization	in	a	manner	consistent	with	the	
conservation	 purposes	 of	 the	 original	 contribution.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 donation	 under	 paragraph	
(b)(3)	of	this	section	to	which	the	preceding	sentence	applies,	see	also	paragraph	(g)(5)(ii)	of	this	
section.		
	(d)	Conservation	purposes	 --	 (1)	 In	general.	For	purposes	of	section	170(h)	and	this	section,	
the	term	conservation	purposes	means	--		
	(i)	The	preservation	of	land	areas	for	outdoor	recreation	by,	or	the	education	of,	the	general	
public,	within	the	meaning	of	paragraph	(d)(2)	of	this	section,		
	(ii)	 The	 protection	 of	 a	 relatively	 natural	 habitat	 of	 fish,	 wildlife,	 or	 plants,	 or	 similar	
ecosystem,	within	the	meaning	of	paragraph	(d)(3)	of	this	section,		
	(iii)	 The	 preservation	 of	 certain	 open	 space	 (including	 farmland	 and	 forest	 land)	within	 the	
meaning	of	paragraph	(d)(4)	of	this	section,	or		
	(iv)	 The	 preservation	 of	 a	 historically	 important	 land	 area	 or	 a	 certified	 historic	 structure,	
within	the	meaning	of	paragraph	(d)(5)	of	this	section.		
	(2)	Recreation	or	education	--	(i)	In	general.	The	donation	of	a	qualified	real	property	interest	
to	preserve	land	areas	for	the	outdoor	recreation	of	the	general	public	or	for	the	education	of	the	
general	 public	 will	 meet	 the	 conservation	 purposes	 test	 of	 this	 section.	 Thus,	 conservation	
purposes	would	include,	for	example,	the	preservation	of	a	water	area	for	the	use	of	the	public	for	
boating	or	fishing,	or	a	nature	or	hiking	trail	for	the	use	of	the	public.		
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	(ii)	Access.	The	preservation	of	land	areas	for	recreation	or	education	will	not	meet	the	test	of	
this	section	unless	the	recreation	or	education	is	for	the	substantial	and	regular	use	of	the	general	
public.		
	(3)	 Protection	 of	 environmental	 system	 --	 (i)	 In	 general.	 The	 donation	 of	 a	 qualified	 real	
property	interest	to	protect	a	significant	relatively	natural	habitat	in	which	a	fish,	wildlife,	or	plant	
community,	or	 similar	ecosystem	normally	 lives	will	meet	 the	conservation	purposes	 test	of	 this	
section.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 habitat	 or	 environment	 has	 been	 altered	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 human	
activity	will	not	result	in	a	deduction	being	denied	under	this	section	if	the	fish,	wildlife,	or	plants	
continue	to	exist	there	in	a	relatively	natural	state.	For	example,	the	preservation	of	a	lake	formed	
by	 a	man-made	 dam	or	 a	 salt	 pond	 formed	by	 a	man-made	 dike	would	meet	 the	 conservation	
purposes	test	if	the	lake	or	pond	were	a	nature	feeding	area	for	a	wildlife	community	that	included	
rare,	endangered,	or	threatened	native	species.		
	(ii)	Significant	habitat	or	ecosystem.	Significant	habitats	and	ecosystems	 include,	but	are	not	
limited	to,	habitats	for	rare,	endangered,	or	threatened	species	of	animal,	fish,	or	plants;	natural	
areas	that	represent	high	quality	examples	of	a	terrestrial	community	or	aquatic	community,	such	
as	 islands	 that	 are	 undeveloped	 or	 not	 intensely	 developed	 where	 the	 coastal	 ecosystem	 is	
relatively	 intact;	 and	natural	 areas	which	 are	 included	 in,	 or	which	 contribute	 to,	 the	ecological	
viability	 of	 a	 local,	 state,	 or	 national	 park,	 nature	 preserve,	 wildlife	 refuge,	 wilderness	 area,	 or	
other	similar	conservation	area.		
	(iii)	Access.	Limitations	on	public	access	to	property	that	is	the	subject	of	a	donation	under	this	
paragraph	 (d)(3)	 shall	 not	 render	 the	 donation	 nondeductible.	 For	 example,	 a	 restriction	 on	 all	
public	access	to	the	habitat	of	a	threatened	native	animal	species	protected	by	a	donation	under	
this	paragraph	(d)(3)	would	not	cause	the	donation	to	be	nondeductible.		
	(4)	 Preservation	 of	 open	 space	 --	 (i)	 In	 general.	 The	 donation	 of	 a	 qualified	 real	 property	
interest	 to	preserve	open	space	 (including	 farmland	and	 forest	 land)	will	meet	 the	conservation	
purposes	test	of	this	section	if	such	preservation	is	--		
	(A)	Pursuant	to	a	clearly	delineated	Federal,	state,	or	local	governmental	conservation	policy	
and	will	yield	a	significant	public	benefit,	or		
	(B)	For	the	scenic	enjoyment	of	the	general	public	and	will	yield	a	significant	public	benefit.		
An	open	space	easement	donated	on	or	after	December	18,	1980,	must	meet	the	requirements	of	
section	170(h)	in	order	to	be	deductible.		
	(ii)	Scenic	enjoyment	 --	 (A)	Factors.	A	contribution	made	 for	 the	preservation	of	open	space	
may	be	for	the	scenic	enjoyment	of	the	general	public.	Preservation	of	land	may	be	for	the	scenic	
enjoyment	of	the	general	public	if	development	of	the	property	would	impair	the	scenic	character	
of	 the	 local	 rural	 or	 urban	 landscape	 or	 would	 interfere	 with	 a	 scenic	 panorama	 that	 can	 be	
enjoyed	from	a	park,	nature	preserve,	road,	waterbody,	trail,	or	historic	structure	or	land	area,	and	
such	area	or	transportation	way	is	open	to,	or	utilized	by,	the	public.	"Scenic	enjoyment"	will	be	
evaluated	 by	 considering	 all	 pertinent	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 germane	 to	 the	 contribution.	
Regional	variations	in	topography,	geology,	biology,	and	cultural	and	economic	conditions	require	
flexibility	 in	 the	 application	 of	 this	 test,	 but	 do	 not	 lessen	 the	 burden	 on	 the	 taxpayer	 to	
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demonstrate	 the	 scenic	 characteristics	 of	 a	 donation	under	 this	 paragraph.	 The	 application	of	 a	
particular	objective	factor	to	help	define	a	view	as	"scenic"	in	one	setting	may	in	fact	be	entirely	
inappropriate	in	another	setting.	Among	the	factors	to	be	considered	are:		
	(1)	The	compatibility	of	the	land	use	with	other	land	in	the	vicinity;		
	(2)	The	degree	of	contrast	and	variety	provided	by	the	visual	scene;		
	(3)	The	openness	of	the	land	(which	would	be	a	more	significant	factor	in	an	urban	or	densely	
populated	setting	or	in	a	heavily	wooded	area);		
	(4)	Relief	from	urban	closeness;		
	(5)	The	harmonious	variety	of	shapes	and	textures;		
	(6)	The	degree	to	which	the	land	use	maintains	the	scale	and	character	of	the	urban	landscape	
to	preserve	open	space,	visual	enjoyment,	and	sunlight	for	the	surrounding	area;		
	(7)	The	consistency	of	the	proposed	scenic	view	with	a	methodical	state	scenic	identification	
program,	such	as	a	state	landscape	inventory;	and		
	(8)	The	consistency	of	the	proposed	scenic	view	with	a	regional	or	 local	 landscape	inventory	
made	pursuant	to	a	sufficiently	rigorous	review	process,	especially	if	the	donation	is	endorsed	by	
an	appropriate	state	or	local	governmental	agency.		
	(B)	Access.	To	satisfy	the	requirement	of	scenic	enjoyment	by	the	general	public,	visual	(rather	
than	physical)	access	to	or	across	the	property	by	the	general	public	is	sufficient.	Under	the	terms	
of	 an	 open	 space	 easement	 on	 scenic	 property,	 the	 entire	 property	 need	 not	 be	 visible	 to	 the	
public	for	a	donation	to	qualify	under	this	section,	although	the	public	benefit	from	the	donation	
may	be	insufficient	to	qualify	for	a	deduction	if	only	a	small	portion	of	the	property	is	visible	to	the	
public.		
	(iii)	Governmental	conservation	policy	--	(A)	In	general.	The	requirement	that	the	preservation	
of	open	space	be	pursuant	 to	a	clearly	delineated	Federal,	 state,	or	 local	governmental	policy	 is	
intended	 to	protect	 the	 types	of	 property	 identified	by	 representatives	of	 the	 general	 public	 as	
worthy	 of	 preservation	 or	 conservation.	 A	 general	 declaration	 of	 conservation	 goals	 by	 a	 single	
official	or	legislative	body	is	not	sufficient.	However,	a	governmental	conservation	policy	need	not	
be	 a	 certification	 program	 that	 identifies	 particular	 lots	 or	 small	 parcels	 of	 individually	 owned	
property.	This	requirement	will	be	met	by	donations	that	further	a	specific,	identified	conservation	
project,	 such	 as	 the	 preservation	 of	 land	within	 a	 state	 or	 local	 landmark	 district	 that	 is	 locally	
recognized	 as	 being	 significant	 to	 that	 district;	 the	 preservation	 of	 a	 wild	 or	 scenic	 river,	 the	
preservation	 of	 farmland	 pursuant	 to	 a	 state	 program	 for	 flood	 prevention	 and	 control;	 or	 the	
protection	 of	 the	 scenic,	 ecological,	 or	 historic	 character	 of	 land	 that	 is	 contiguous	 to,	 or	 an	
integral	 part	 of,	 the	 surroundings	 of	 existing	 recreation	 or	 conservation	 sites.	 For	 example,	 the	
donation	of	a	perpetual	conservation	restriction	to	a	qualified	organization	pursuant	to	a	 formal	
resolution	or	certification	by	a	local	governmental	agency	established	under	state	law	specifically	
identifying	the	subject	property	as	worthy	of	protection	for	conservation	purposes	will	meet	the	
requirement	of	this	paragraph.	A	program	need	not	be	funded	to	satisfy	this	requirement,	but	the	
program	 must	 involve	 a	 significant	 commitment	 by	 the	 government	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
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conservation	project.	For	example,	a	governmental	program	according	preferential	tax	assessment	
or	preferential	zoning	for	certain	property	deemed	worthy	of	protection	for	conservation	purposes	
would	constitute	a	significant	commitment	by	the	government.		
	(B)	Effect	of	acceptance	by	governmental	agency.	Acceptance	of	an	easement	by	an	agency	of	
the	 Federal	 Government	 or	 by	 an	 agency	 of	 a	 state	 or	 local	 government	 (or	 by	 a	 commission,	
authority,	or	similar	body	duly	constituted	by	the	state	or	local	government	and	acting	on	behalf	of	
the	 state	 or	 local	 government)	 tends	 to	 establish	 the	 requisite	 clearly	 delineated	 governmental	
policy,	 although	 such	acceptance,	without	more,	 is	not	 sufficient.	 The	more	 rigorous	 the	 review	
process	by	the	governmental	agency,	the	more	the	acceptance	of	the	easement	tends	to	establish	
the	requisite	clearly	delineated	governmental	policy.	For	example,	in	a	state	where	the	legislature	
has	 established	 an	 Environmental	 Trust	 to	 accept	 gifts	 to	 the	 state	 which	 meet	 certain	
conservation	purposes	and	to	submit	the	gifts	to	a	review	that	requires	the	approval	of	the	state's	
highest	officials,	acceptance	of	a	gift	by	the	Trust	tends	to	establish	the	requisite	clearly	delineated	
governmental	policy.	However,	if	the	Trust	merely	accepts	such	gifts	without	a	review	process,	the	
requisite	clearly	delineated	governmental	policy	is	not	established.		
	(C)	 Access.	 A	 limitation	 on	 public	 access	 to	 property	 subject	 to	 a	 donation	 under	 this	
paragraph	(d)(4)(iii)	shall	not	render	the	deduction	nondeductible	unless	the	conservation	purpose	
of	 the	 donation	 would	 be	 undermined	 or	 frustrated	 without	 public	 access.	 For	 example,	 a	
donation	pursuant	 to	a	governmental	policy	 to	protect	 the	 scenic	 character	of	 land	near	a	 river	
requires	 visual	 access	 to	 the	 same	extent	as	would	a	donation	under	paragraph	 (d)(4)(ii)	of	 this	
section.		
	(iv)	Significant	public	benefit	--	(A)	Factors.	All	contributions	made	for	the	preservation	of	open	
space	must	 yield	 a	 significant	 public	 benefit.	 Public	 benefit	will	 be	 evaluated	 by	 considering	 all	
pertinent	facts	and	circumstances	germane	to	the	contribution.	Factors	germane	to	the	evaluation	
of	 public	 benefit	 from	 one	 contribution	 may	 be	 irrelevant	 in	 determining	 public	 benefit	 from	
another	contribution.	No	single	factor	will	necessarily	be	determinative.	Among	the	factors	to	be	
considered	are:		
	(1)	The	uniqueness	of	the	property	to	the	area;		
	(2)	 The	 intensity	 of	 land	 development	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 the	 property	 (both	 existing	
development	and	foreseeable	trends	of	development);		
	(3)	The	consistency	of	the	proposed	open	space	use	with	public	programs	(whether	Federal,	
state	or	local)	for	conservation	in	the	region,	including	programs	for	outdoor	recreation,	irrigation	
or	 water	 supply	 protection,	 water	 quality	 maintenance	 or	 enhancement,	 flood	 prevention	 and	
control,	erosion	control,	shoreline	protection,	and	protection	of	land	areas	included	in,	or	related	
to,	a	government	approved	master	plan	or	land	management	area;		
	(4)	 The	 consistency	 of	 the	 proposed	 open	 space	 use	 with	 existing	 private	 conservation	
programs	 in	 the	 area,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 other	 land,	 protected	 by	 easement	 or	 fee	 ownership	 by	
organizations	referred	to	in	§		1.170A-14(c)(1),	in	close	proximity	to	the	property;		
	(5)	 The	 likelihood	 that	 development	 of	 the	 property	 would	 lead	 to	 or	 contribute	 to	
degradation	of	the	scenic,	natural,	or	historic	character	of	the	area;		
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	(6)	 The	 opportunity	 for	 the	 general	 public	 to	 use	 the	 property	 or	 to	 appreciate	 its	 scenic	
values;		
	(7)	The	importance	of	the	property	in	preserving	a	local	or	regional	landscape	or	resource	that	
attracts	tourism	or	commerce	to	the	area;		
	(8)	 The	 likelihood	 that	 the	 donee	 will	 acquire	 equally	 desirable	 and	 valuable	 substitute	
property	or	property	rights;		
	(9)	The	cost	to	the	donee	of	enforcing	the	terms	of	the	conservation	restriction;		
	(10)	The	population	density	in	the	area	of	the	property;	and		
	(11)	The	consistency	of	the	proposed	open	space	use	with	a	 legislatively	mandated	program	
identifying	particular	parcels	of	land	for	future	protection.		
	(B)	Illustrations.	The	preservation	of	an	ordinary	tract	of	land	would	not	in	and	of	itself	yield	a	
significant	 public	 benefit,	 but	 the	 preservation	 of	 ordinary	 land	 areas	 in	 conjunction	with	 other	
factors	 that	demonstrate	significant	public	benefit	or	 the	preservation	of	a	unique	 land	area	 for	
public	 employment	would	 yield	 a	 significant	 public	 benefit.	 For	 example,	 the	 preservation	 of	 a	
vacant	downtown	lot	would	not	by	itself	yield	a	significant	public	benefit,	but	the	preservation	of	
the	downtown	lot	as	a	public	garden	would,	absent	countervailing	factors,	yield	a	significant	public	
benefit.	 The	 following	 are	 other	 examples	 of	 contributions	 which	 would,	 absent	 countervailing	
factors,	yield	a	significant	public	benefit:	The	preservation	of	farmland	pursuant	to	a	state	program	
for	 flood	 prevention	 and	 control;	 the	 preservation	 of	 a	 unique	 natural	 land	 formation	 for	 the	
enjoyment	of	the	general	public;	the	preservation	of	woodland	along	a	public	highway	pursuant	to	
a	government	program	to	preserve	the	appearance	of	the	area	so	as	to	maintain	the	scenic	view	
from	the	highway;	and	the	preservation	of	a	stretch	of	undeveloped	property	located	between	a	
public	highway	and	the	ocean	in	order	to	maintain	the	scenic	ocean	view	from	the	highway.		
	(v)	 Limitation.	 A	 deduction	 will	 not	 be	 allowed	 for	 the	 preservation	 of	 open	 space	 under	
section	 170(h)(4)(A)(iii),	 if	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 easement	 permit	 a	 degree	 of	 intrusion	 or	 future	
development	 that	 would	 interfere	 with	 the	 essential	 scenic	 quality	 of	 the	 land	 or	 with	 the	
governmental	conservation	policy	that	is	being	furthered	by	the	donation.	See	§		1.170A-14(e)(2)	
for	rules	relating	to	inconsistent	use.		
	(vi)	Relationship	of	requirements	 --	(A)	Clearly	delineated	governmental	policy	and	significant	
public	 benefit.	 Although	 the	 requirements	 of	 "clearly	 delineated	 governmental	 policy"	 and	
"significant	 public	 benefit"	 must	 be	 met	 independently,	 for	 purposes	 of	 this	 section	 the	 two	
requirements	may	also	be	related.	The	more	specific	the	governmental	policy	with	respect	to	the	
particular	 site	 to	be	protected,	 the	more	 likely	 the	governmental	decision,	by	 itself,	will	 tend	 to	
establish	the	significant	public	benefit	associated	with	the	donation.	For	example,	while	a	statute	
in	State	X	permitting	preferential	assessment	for	farmland	is,	by	definition,	governmental	policy,	it	
is	 distinguishable	 from	a	 state	 statute,	 accompanied	by	appropriations,	naming	 the	X	River	 as	 a	
valuable	resource	and	articulating	the	legislative	policy	that	the	X	River	and	the	relatively	natural	
quality	of	 its	surrounding	be	protected.	On	these	 facts,	an	open	space	easement	on	 farmland	 in	
State	X	would	have	to	demonstrate	additional	factors	to	establish	"significant	public	benefit."	The	
specificity	 of	 the	 legislative	 mandate	 to	 protect	 the	 X	 River,	 however,	 would	 by	 itself	 tend	 to	
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establish	the	significant	public	benefit	associated	with	an	open	space	easement	on	 land	fronting	
the	X	River.		
	(B)	Scenic	enjoyment	and	significant	public	benefit.	With	respect	to	the	relationship	between	
the	 requirements	 of	 "scenic	 enjoyment"	 and	 "significant	 public	 benefit,"	 since	 the	 degrees	 of	
scenic	enjoyment	offered	by	a	variety	of	open	space	easements	are	subjective	and	not	as	easily	
delineated	as	are	increasingly	specific	levels	of	governmental	policy,	the	significant	public	benefit	
of	preserving	a	scenic	view	must	be	independently	established	in	all	cases.		
	(C)	Donations	may	satisfy	more	than	one	test.	 In	some	cases,	open	space	easements	may	be	
both	for	scenic	enjoyment	and	pursuant	to	a	clearly	delineated	governmental	policy.	For	example,	
the	preservation	of	a	particular	scenic	view	identified	as	part	of	a	scenic	landscape	inventory	by	a	
rigorous	 governmental	 review	 process	 will	 meet	 the	 tests	 of	 both	 paragraphs	 (d)(4)(i)(A)	 and	
(d)(4)(i)(B)	of	this	section.		
	(5)	Historic	preservation	--	(i)	In	general.	The	donation	of	a	qualified	real	property	interest	to	
preserve	 an	 historically	 important	 land	 area	 or	 a	 certified	 historic	 structure	 will	 meet	 the	
conservation	purposes	test	of	 this	section.	When	restrictions	to	preserve	a	building	or	 land	area	
within	 a	 registered	 historic	 district	 permit	 future	 development	 on	 the	 site,	 a	 deduction	will	 be	
allowed	 under	 this	 section	 only	 if	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 restrictions	 require	 that	 such	 development	
conform	 with	 appropriate	 local,	 state,	 or	 Federal	 standards	 for	 construction	 or	 rehabilitation	
within	the	district.	See	also,	§		1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii).		
	(ii)	Historically	important	land	area.	The	term	historically	important	land	area	includes:		
	(A)	 An	 independently	 significant	 land	 area	 including	 any	 related	 historic	 resources	 (for	
example,	 an	 archaeological	 site	 or	 a	 Civil	 War	 battlefield	 with	 related	 monuments,	 bridges,	
cannons,	or	houses)	that	meets	the	National	Register	Criteria	for	Evaluation	in	36	CFR	60.4	(Pub.	L.	
89-665,	80	Stat.	915);		
	(B)	Any	land	area	within	a	registered	historic	district	including	any	buildings	on	the	land	area	
that	can	reasonably	be	considered	as	contributing	to	the	significance	of	the	district;	and		
	(C)	 Any	 land	 area	 (including	 related	 historic	 resources)	 adjacent	 to	 a	 property	 listed	
individually	in	the	National	Register	of	Historic	Places	(but	not	within	a	registered	historic	district)	
in	a	case	where	the	physical	or	environmental	features	of	the	land	area	contribute	to	the	historic	
or	cultural	integrity	of	the	property.		
	(iii)	 Certified	 historic	 structure.	 The	 term	 certified	 historic	 structure,	 for	 purposes	 of	 this	
section,	means	any	building,	structure	or	land	area	which	is	--		
	(A)	Listed	in	the	National	Register,	or		
	(B)	Located	in	a	registered	historic	district	(as	defined	in	section	48(g)(3)(B))	and	is	certified	by	
the	Secretary	of	the	Interior	(pursuant	to	36	CFR	67.4)	to	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	as	being	of	
historic	significance	to	the	district.		
A	 structure	 for	 purposes	 of	 this	 section	means	 any	 structure,	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 depreciable.	
Accordingly	 easements	 on	 private	 residences	 may	 qualify	 under	 this	 section.	 In	 addition,	 a	
structure	would	be	considered	to	be	a	certified	historic	structure	if	it	were	certified	either	at	the	
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time	the	transfer	was	made	or	at	the	due	date	(including	extensions)	for	filing	the	donor's	return	
for	the	taxable	year	in	which	the	contribution	was	made.		
	(iv)	Access.	 (A)	 In	order	 for	 a	 conservation	 contribution	described	 in	 section	170(h)(4)(A)(iv)	
and	this	paragraph	 (d)(5)	 to	be	deductible,	 some	visual	public	access	 to	 the	donated	property	 is	
required.	In	the	case	of	an	historically	important	land	area,	the	entire	property	need	not	be	visible	
to	 the	public	 for	 a	donation	 to	qualify	under	 this	 section.	However,	 the	public	benefit	 from	 the	
donation	may	be	insufficient	to	qualify	for	a	deduction	if	only	a	small	portion	of	the	property	is	so	
visible.	 Where	 the	 historic	 land	 area	 or	 certified	 historic	 structure	 which	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	
donation	 is	 not	 visible	 from	 a	 public	 way	 (e.g.,	 the	 structure	 is	 hidden	 from	 view	 by	 a	 wall	 or	
shrubbery,	the	structure	is	too	far	from	the	public	way,	or	interior	characteristics	and	features	of	
the	structure	are	the	subject	of	the	easement),	the	terms	of	the	easement	must	be	such	that	the	
general	public	is	given	the	opportunity	on	a	regular	basis	to	view	the	characteristics	and	features	
of	the	property	which	are	preserved	by	the	easement	to	the	extent	consistent	with	the	nature	and	
condition	of	the	property.		
	(B)	 Factors	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 determining	 the	 type	 and	 amount	of	 public	 access	 required	
under	 paragraph	 (d)(5)(iv)(A)	 of	 this	 section	 include	 the	 historical	 significance	 of	 the	 donated	
property,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 features	 that	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 easement,	 the	 remoteness	 or	
accessibility	of	 the	site	of	 the	donated	property,	 the	possibility	of	physical	hazards	 to	 the	public	
visiting	the	property	(for	example,	an	unoccupied	structure	in	a	dilapidated	condition),	the	extent	
to	which	public	access	would	be	an	unreasonable	intrusion	on	any	privacy	interests	of	individuals	
living	on	the	property,	the	degree	to	which	public	access	would	impair	the	preservation	interests	
which	are	the	subject	of	the	donation,	and	the	availability	of	opportunities	for	the	public	to	view	
the	property	by	means	other	than	visits	to	the	site.		
	(C)	 The	 amount	 of	 access	 afforded	 the	 public	 by	 the	 donation	 of	 an	 easement	 shall	 be	
determined	with	reference	to	the	amount	of	access	permitted	by	the	terms	of	the	easement	which	
are	established	by	 the	donor,	 rather	 than	 the	amount	of	access	actually	provided	by	 the	donee	
organization.	However,	if	the	donor	is	aware	of	any	facts	indicating	that	the	amount	of	access	that	
the	donee	organization	will	provide	is	significantly	less	than	the	amount	of	access	permitted	under	
the	 terms	of	 the	easement,	 then	 the	amount	of	 access	afforded	 the	public	 shall	 be	determined	
with	reference	to	this	lesser	amount.		
	(v)	Examples.	The	provisions	of	paragraph	 (d)(5)(iv)	of	 this	 section	may	be	 illustrated	by	 the	
following	examples:		
	Example	1.	A	and	his	family	live	in	a	house	in	a	certified	historic	district	in	the	State	of	X.	The	
entire	house,	including	its	interior,	has	architectural	features	representing	classic	Victorian	period	
architecture.	 A	 donates	 an	 exterior	 and	 interior	 easement	 on	 the	 property	 to	 a	 qualified	
organization	but	continues	to	live	in	the	house	with	his	family.	A's	house	is	surrounded	by	a	high	
stone	wall	which	 obscures	 the	 public's	 view	of	 it	 from	 the	 street.	 Pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	of	 the	
easement,	the	house	may	be	opened	to	the	public	from	10:00	a.m.	to	4:00	p.m.	on	one	Sunday	in	
May	and	one	Sunday	 in	November	each	year	 for	house	and	garden	tours.	These	tours	are	to	be	
under	the	supervision	of	the	donee	and	open	to	members	of	the	general	public	upon	payment	of	a	
small	fee.	In	addition,	under	the	terms	of	the	easement,	the	donee	organization	is	given	the	right	
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to	 photograph	 the	 interior	 and	 exterior	 of	 the	 house	 and	 distribute	 such	 photographs	 to	
magazines,	newsletters,	or	other	publicly	available	publications.	The	terms	of	 the	easement	also	
permit	 persons	 affiliated	with	 educational	 organizations,	 professional	 architectural	 associations,	
and	 historical	 societies	 to	 make	 an	 appointment	 through	 the	 donee	 organization	 to	 study	 the	
property.	The	donor	is	not	aware	of	any	facts	indicating	that	the	public	access	to	be	provided	by	
the	donee	organization	will	be	significantly	less	than	that	permitted	by	the	terms	of	the	easement.	
The	2	opportunities	for	public	visits	per	year,	when	combined	with	the	ability	of	the	general	public	
to	view	the	architectural	characteristics	and	features	that	are	the	subject	of	the	easement	through	
photographs,	 the	opportunity	 for	 scholarly	 study	of	 the	property,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	house	 is	
used	 as	 an	 occupied	 residence,	 will	 enable	 the	 donation	 to	 satisfy	 the	 requirement	 of	 public	
access.	
	Example	2.	 B	owns	an	unoccupied	 farmhouse	built	 in	 the	1840's	 and	 located	on	a	property	
that	is	adjacent	to	a	Civil	War	battlefield.	During	the	Civil	War	the	farmhouse	was	used	as	quarters	
for	Union	troops.	The	battlefield	is	visited	year	round	by	the	general	public.	The	condition	of	the	
farmhouse	 is	such	that	the	safety	of	visitors	will	not	be	 jeopardized	and	opening	 it	 to	the	public	
will	not	result	in	significant	deterioration.	The	farmhouse	is	not	visible	from	the	battlefield	or	any	
public	way.	 It	 is	accessible	only	by	way	of	a	private	 road	owned	by	B.	B	donates	a	conservation	
easement	on	the	farmhouse	to	a	qualified	organization.	The	terms	of	the	easement	provide	that	
the	 donee	 organization	 may	 open	 the	 property	 (via	 B's	 road)	 to	 the	 general	 public	 on	 four	
weekends	each	year	 from	8:30	a.m.	 to	4:00	p.m.	The	donation	does	not	meet	 the	public	access	
requirement	 because	 the	 farmhouse	 is	 safe,	 unoccupied,	 and	 easily	 accessible	 to	 the	 general	
public	who	have	come	to	the	site	to	visit	Civil	War	historic	land	areas	(and	related	resources),	but	
will	only	be	open	to	the	public	on	four	weekends	each	year.	However,	the	donation	would	meet	
the	public	access	requirement	if	the	terms	of	the	easement	permitted	the	donee	organization	to	
open	the	property	to	the	public	every	other	weekend	during	the	year	and	the	donor	is	not	aware	
of	any	facts	 indicating	that	the	donee	organization	will	provide	significantly	 less	access	than	that	
permitted.		
	(e)	Exclusively	for	conservation	purposes	 --	(1)	 In	general.	To	meet	the	requirements	of	this	
section,	a	donation	must	be	exclusively	for	conservation	purposes.	See	paragraphs	(c)(1)	and	(g)(1)	
through	(g)(6)(ii)	of	this	section.	A	deduction	will	not	be	denied	under	this	section	when	incidental	
benefit	 inures	 to	 the	 donor	merely	 as	 a	 result	 of	 conservation	 restrictions	 limiting	 the	 uses	 to	
which	the	donor's	property	may	be	put.		
	(2)	Inconsistent	use.	Except	as	provided	in	paragraph	(e)(4)	of	this	section,	a	deduction	will	not	
be	allowed	 if	 the	 contribution	would	 accomplish	one	of	 the	enumerated	 conservation	purposes	
but	 would	 permit	 destruction	 of	 other	 significant	 conservation	 interests.	 For	 example,	 the	
preservation	of	farmland	pursuant	to	a	State	program	for	flood	prevention	and	control	would	not	
qualify	under	paragraph	(d)(4)	of	 this	section	 if	under	the	terms	of	the	contribution	a	significant	
naturally	 occurring	 ecosystem	 could	 be	 injured	 or	 destroyed	 by	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides	 in	 the	
operation	of	the	farm.	However,	this	requirement	is	not	intended	to	prohibit	uses	of	the	property,	
such	as	selective	timber	harvesting	or	selective	farming	if,	under	the	circumstances,	those	uses	do	
not	impair	significant	conservation	interests.		
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	(3)	 Inconsistent	 use	 permitted.	 A	 use	 that	 is	 destructive	 of	 conservation	 interests	 will	 be	
permitted	only	if	such	use	is	necessary	for	the	protection	of	the	conservation	interests	that	are	the	
subject	of	the	contribution.	For	example,	a	deduction	for	the	donation	of	an	easement	to	preserve	
an	 archaeological	 site	 that	 is	 listed	 on	 the	 National	 Register	 of	 Historic	 Places	 will	 not	 be	
disallowed	 if	 site	excavation	 consistent	with	 sound	archaeological	 practices	may	 impair	 a	 scenic	
view	of	which	the	land	is	a	part.	A	donor	may	continue	a	pre-existing	use	of	the	property	that	does	
not	conflict	with	the	conservation	purposes	of	the	gift.		
	(f)	 Examples.	 The	 provisions	 of	 this	 section	 relating	 to	 conservation	 purposes	 may	 be	
illustrated	by	the	following	examples.		
	Example	1.	State	S	contains	many	large	tract	forests	that	are	desirable	recreation	and	scenic	
areas	 for	 the	 general	 public.	 The	 forests'	 scenic	 values	 attract	 millions	 of	 people	 to	 the	 State.	
However,	due	to	the	increasing	intensity	of	land	development	in	State	S,	the	continued	existence	
of	forestland	parcels	greater	than	45	acres	is	threatened.	J	grants	a	perpetual	easement	on	a	100-
acre	parcel	of	forestland	that	is	part	of	one	of	the	State's	scenic	areas	to	a	qualifying	organization.	
The	 easement	 imposes	 restrictions	 on	 the	 use	 of	 the	 parcel	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	maintaining	 its	
scenic	 values.	 The	 restrictions	 include	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	 parcel	 be	 maintained	 forever	 as	
open	space	devoted	exclusively	to	conservation	purposes	and	wildlife	protection,	and	that	there	
be	 no	 commercial,	 industrial,	 residential,	 or	 other	 development	 use	 of	 such	 parcel.	 The	 law	 of	
State	S	recognizes	a	limited	public	right	to	enter	private	land,	particularly	for	recreational	pursuits,	
unless	 such	 land	 is	 posted	 or	 the	 landowner	 objects.	 The	 easement	 specifically	 restricts	 the	
landowner	 from	posting	 the	parcel,	 or	 from	objecting,	 thereby	maintaining	public	 access	 to	 the	
parcel	according	to	the	custom	of	the	State.	J's	parcel	provides	the	opportunity	for	the	public	to	
enjoy	the	use	of	the	property	and	appreciate	its	scenic	values.	Accordingly,	J's	donation	qualifies	
for	a	deduction	under	this	section.		
	Example	2.	A	qualified	conservation	organization	owns	Greenacre	in	fee	as	a	nature	preserve.	
Greenacre	 contains	 a	 high	 quality	 example	 of	 a	 tall	 grass	 prairie	 ecosystem.	 Farmacre,	 an	
operating	farm,	adjoins	Greenacre	and	is	a	compatible	buffer	to	the	nature	preserve.	Conversion	
of	 Farmacre	 to	a	more	 intense	use,	 such	as	 a	housing	development,	would	adversely	 affect	 the	
continued	 use	 of	 Greenacre	 as	 a	 nature	 preserve	 because	 of	 human	 traffic	 generated	 by	 the	
development.	The	owner	of	Farmacre	donates	an	easement	preventing	any	 future	development	
on	 Farmacre	 to	 the	 qualified	 conservation	 organization	 for	 conservation	 purposes.	 Normal	
agricultural	uses	will	be	allowed	on	Farmacre.	Accordingly,	the	donation	qualifies	for	a	deduction	
under	this	section.		
	Example	3.	H	owns	Greenacre,	a	900-acre	parcel	of	woodland,	rolling	pasture,	and	orchards	on	
the	crest	of	a	mountain.	All	of	Greenacre	is	clearly	visible	from	a	nearby	national	park.	Because	of	
the	strict	enforcement	of	an	applicable	zoning	plan,	the	highest	and	best	use	of	Greenacre	is	as	a	
subdivision	of	40-acre	tracts.	H	wishes	to	donate	a	scenic	easement	on	Greenacre	to	a	qualifying	
conservation	organization,	but	H	would	 like	 to	reserve	the	right	 to	subdivide	Greenacre	 into	90-
acre	parcels	with	no	more	than	one	single-family	home	allowable	on	each	parcel.	Random	building	
on	the	property,	even	as	little	as	one	home	for	each	90	acres,	would	destroy	the	scenic	character	
of	the	view.	Accordingly,	no	deduction	would	be	allowable	under	this	section.		
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	Example	4.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(3),	except	that	not	all	of	Greenacre	is	visible	
from	the	park	and	the	deed	of	easement	allows	for	limited	cluster	development	of	no	more	than	
five	nine-acre	clusters	(with	four	houses	on	each	cluster)	located	in	areas	generally	not	visible	from	
the	national	park	and	subject	to	site	and	building	plan	approval	by	the	donee	organization	in	order	
to	preserve	the	scenic	view	from	the	park.	The	donor	and	the	donee	have	already	identified	sites	
where	 limited	 cluster	development	would	not	be	 visible	 from	 the	park	or	would	not	 impair	 the	
view.	Owners	of	 homes	 in	 the	 clusters	will	 not	have	any	 rights	with	 respect	 to	 the	 surrounding	
Greenacre	 property	 that	 are	 not	 also	 available	 to	 the	 general	 public.	 Accordingly,	 the	 donation	
qualifies	for	a	deduction	under	this	section.		
	Example	5.	In	order	to	protect	State	S's	declining	open	space	that	is	suited	for	agricultural	use	
from	increasing	development	pressure	that	has	 led	to	a	marked	decline	 in	such	open	space,	 the	
Legislature	of	State	S	passed	a	statute	authorizing	the	purchase	of	"agricultural	land	development	
rights"	on	open	acreage.	Agricultural	land	development	rights	allow	the	State	to	place	agricultural	
preservation	 restrictions	 on	 land	 designated	 as	worthy	 of	 protection	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 open	
space	and	 farm	 resources.	Agricultural	 preservation	 restrictions	prohibit	 or	 limit	 construction	or	
placement	 of	 buildings	 except	 those	used	 for	 agricultural	 purposes	 or	 dwellings	 used	 for	 family	
living	by	the	farmer	and	his	family	and	employees;	removal	of	mineral	substances	in	any	manner	
that	adversely	affects	 the	 land's	agricultural	potential;	or	other	uses	detrimental	 to	 retention	of	
the	land	for	agricultural	use.	Money	has	been	appropriated	for	this	program	and	some	landowners	
have	 in	 fact	 sold	 their	 "agricultural	 land	development	 rights"	 to	State	S.	K	owns	and	operates	a	
small	 dairy	 farm	 in	 State	 S	 located	 in	 an	 area	 designated	 by	 the	 Legislature	 as	 worthy	 of	
protection.	 K	 desires	 to	 preserve	 his	 farm	 for	 agricultural	 purposes	 in	 perpetuity.	 Rather	 than	
selling	 the	 development	 rights	 to	 State	 S,	 K	 grants	 to	 a	 qualified	 organization	 an	 agricultural	
preservation	 restriction	 on	 his	 property	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 conservation	 easement.	 K	 reserves	 to	
himself,	his	heirs	and	assigns	the	right	to	manage	the	farm	consistent	with	sound	agricultural	and	
management	 practices.	 The	 preservation	 of	 K's	 land	 is	 pursuant	 to	 a	 clearly	 delineated	
governmental	 policy	 of	 preserving	 open	 space	 available	 for	 agricultural	 use,	 and	 will	 yield	 a	
significant	public	benefit	by	preserving	open	space	against	increasing	development	pressures.		
	(g)	Enforceable	in	perpetuity	--	(1)	In	general.	In	the	case	of	any	donation	under	this	section,	
any	interest	in	the	property	retained	by	the	donor	(and	the	donor's	successors	in	interest)	must	be	
subject	to	legally	enforceable	restrictions	(for	example,	by	recordation	in	the	land	records	of	the	
jurisdiction	 in	 which	 the	 property	 is	 located)	 that	 will	 prevent	 uses	 of	 the	 retained	 interest	
inconsistent	with	 the	 conservation	 purposes	 of	 the	 donation.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 contribution	 of	 a	
remainder	 interest,	 the	contribution	will	not	qualify	 if	 the	tenants,	whether	they	are	tenants	 for	
life	or	a	term	of	years,	can	use	the	property	in	a	manner	that	diminishes	the	conservation	values	
which	are	intended	to	be	protected	by	the	contribution.		
	(2)	 Protection	 of	 a	 conservation	 purpose	 in	 case	 of	 donation	 of	 property	 subject	 to	 a	
mortgage.	In	the	case	of	conservation	contributions	made	after	February	13,	1986,	no	deduction	
will	 be	 permitted	 under	 this	 section	 for	 an	 interest	 in	 property	which	 is	 subject	 to	 a	mortgage	
unless	 the	 mortgagee	 subordinates	 its	 rights	 in	 the	 property	 to	 the	 right	 of	 the	 qualified	
organization	 to	 enforce	 the	 conservation	 purposes	 of	 the	 gift	 in	 perpetuity.	 For	 conservation	
contributions	made	prior	to	February	14,	1986,	the	requirement	of	section	170	(h)(5)(A)	is	satisfied	
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in	the	case	of	mortgaged	property	(with	respect	to	which	the	mortgagee	has	not	subordinated	its	
rights)	only	if	the	donor	can	demonstrate	that	the	conservation	purpose	is	protected	in	perpetuity	
without	subordination	of	the	mortgagee's	rights.		
	(3)	 Remote	 future	 event.	 A	 deduction	 shall	 not	 be	 disallowed	 under	 section	 170(f)(3)(B)(iii)	
and	 this	 section	 merely	 because	 the	 interest	 which	 passes	 to,	 or	 is	 vested	 in,	 the	 donee	
organization	may	be	defeated	by	the	performance	of	some	act	or	the	happening	of	some	event,	if	
on	the	date	of	the	gift	it	appears	that	the	possibility	that	such	act	or	event	will	occur	is	so	remote	
as	to	be	negligible.	See	paragraph	(e)	of	§		1.170A-1.	For	example,	a	state's	statutory	requirement	
that	use	restrictions	must	be	rerecorded	every	30	years	to	remain	enforceable	shall	not,	by	itself,	
render	an	easement	nonperpetual.		
	(4)	 Retention	 of	 qualified	mineral	 interest	 --	 (i)	 In	 general.	 Except	 as	 otherwise	 provided	 in	
paragraph	(g)(4)(ii)	of	this	section,	the	requirements	of	this	section	are	not	met	and	no	deduction	
shall	 be	 allowed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 contribution	 of	 any	 interest	when	 there	 is	 a	 retention	 by	 any	
person	of	 a	qualified	mineral	 interest	 (as	defined	 in	paragraph	 (b)(1)(i)	 of	 this	 section)	 if	 at	 any	
time	there	may	be	extractions	or	removal	of	minerals	by	any	surface	mining	method.	Moreover,	in	
the	 case	of	 a	qualified	mineral	 interest	 gift,	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 conservation	purposes	be	
protected	 in	 perpetuity	 is	 not	 satisfied	 if	 any	 method	 of	 mining	 that	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	
particular	 conservation	purposes	of	a	 contribution	 is	permitted	at	any	 time.	See	also	§	 	1.170A-
14(e)(2).	 However,	 a	 deduction	 under	 this	 section	 will	 not	 be	 denied	 in	 the	 case	 of	 certain	
methods	of	mining	that	may	have	limited,	 localized	impact	on	the	real	property	but	that	are	not	
irremediably	destructive	of	significant	conservation	interests.	For	example,	a	deduction	will	not	be	
denied	in	a	case	where	production	facilities	are	concealed	or	compatible	with	existing	topography	
and	landscape	and	when	surface	alteration	is	to	be	restored	to	its	original	state.		
	(ii)	Exception	for	qualified	conservation	contributions	after	July	1984.	(A)	A	contribution	made	
after	July	18,	1984,	of	a	qualified	real	property	interest	described	in	section	170(h)(2)(A)	shall	not	
be	 disqualified	 under	 the	 first	 sentence	 of	 paragraph	 (g)(4)(i)	 of	 this	 section	 if	 the	 following	
requirements	are	satisfied.		
	(1)	The	ownership	of	the	surface	estate	and	mineral	interest	were	separated	before	June	13,	
1976,	and	remain	so	separated	up	to	and	including	the	time	of	the	contribution.		
	(2)	The	present	owner	of	the	mineral	interest	is	not	a	person	whose	relationship	to	the	owner	
of	 the	 surface	 estate	 is	 described	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 contribution	 in	 section	 267(b)	 or	 section	
707(b),	and		
	(3)	The	probability	of	extraction	or	 removal	of	minerals	by	any	surface	mining	method	 is	 so	
remote	as	to	be	negligible.		
Whether	the	probability	of	extraction	or	removal	of	minerals	by	surface	mining	is	so	remote	as	to	
be	negligible	is	a	question	of	fact	and	is	to	be	made	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	Relevant	factors	to	be	
considered	in	determining	if	the	probability	of	extraction	or	removal	of	minerals	by	surface	mining	
is	 so	 remote	 as	 to	 be	 negligible	 include:	 Geological,	 geophysical	 or	 economic	 data	 showing	 the	
absence	of	mineral	reserves	on	the	property,	or	the	 lack	of	commercial	 feasibility	at	the	time	of	
the	contribution	of	surface	mining	the	mineral	interest.		
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	(B)	 If	 the	ownership	of	 the	 surface	estate	and	mineral	 interest	 first	became	separated	after	
June	 12,	 1976,	 no	 deduction	 is	 permitted	 for	 a	 contribution	 under	 this	 section	 unless	 surface	
mining	on	the	property	is	completely	prohibited.		
	(iii)	Examples.	The	provisions	of	paragraph	(g)(4)(i)	and	(ii)	of	this	section	may	be	illustrated	by	
the	following	examples:		
	Example	1.	K	owns	5,000	acres	of	bottomland	hardwood	property	along	a	major	watershed	
system	in	the	southern	part	of	the	United	States.	Agencies	within	the	Department	of	the	Interior	
have	determined	that	southern	bottomland	hardwoods	are	a	rapidly	diminishing	resource	and	a	
critical	ecosystem	in	the	south	because	of	 the	 intense	pressure	to	cut	the	trees	and	convert	 the	
land	 to	 agricultural	 use.	 These	 agencies	 have	 further	 determined	 (and	 have	 indicated	 in	
correspondence	 with	 K)	 that	 bottomland	 hardwoods	 provide	 a	 superb	 habitat	 for	 numerous	
species	 and	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 controlling	 floods	 and	 purifying	 rivers.	 K	 donates	 to	 a	
qualified	organization	his	entire	interest	in	this	property	other	than	his	interest	in	the	gas	and	oil	
deposits	that	have	been	identified	under	K's	property.	K	covenants	and	can	ensure	that,	although	
drilling	 for	 gas	 and	 oil	 on	 the	 property	may	 have	 some	 temporary	 localized	 impact	 on	 the	 real	
property,	the	drilling	will	not	interfere	with	the	overall	conservation	purpose	of	the	gift,	which	is	to	
protect	 the	 unique	 bottomland	 hardwood	 ecosystem.	 Accordingly,	 the	 donation	 qualifies	 for	 a	
deduction	under	this	section.		
	Example	2.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(1),	except	that	in	1979,	K	sells	the	mineral	
interest	 to	 A,	 an	 unrelated	 person,	 in	 an	 arm's-length	 transaction,	 subject	 to	 a	 recorded	
prohibition	 on	 the	 removal	 of	 any	 minerals	 by	 any	 surface	 mining	 method	 and	 a	 recorded	
prohibition	 against	 any	mining	 technique	 that	 will	 harm	 the	 bottomland	 hardwood	 ecosystem.	
After	 the	 sale	 to	 A,	 K	 donates	 a	 qualified	 real	 property	 interest	 to	 a	 qualified	 organization	 to	
protect	the	bottomland	hardwood	ecosystem.	Since	at	the	time	of	the	transfer,	surface	mining	and	
any	 mining	 technique	 that	 will	 harm	 the	 bottomland	 hardwood	 ecosystem	 are	 completely	
prohibited,	the	donation	qualifies	for	a	deduction	under	this	section.		
	(5)	 Protection	 of	 conservation	 purpose	 where	 taxpayer	 reserves	 certain	 rights.	 (i)	
Documentation.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 donation	made	 after	 February	 13,	 1986,	 of	 any	 qualified	 real	
property	 interest	 when	 the	 donor	 reserves	 rights	 the	 exercise	 of	 which	 may	 impair	 the	
conservation	 interests	 associated	with	 the	 property,	 for	 a	 deduction	 to	 be	 allowable	 under	 this	
section	 the	 donor	must	make	 available	 to	 the	 donee,	 prior	 to	 the	 time	 the	 donation	 is	 made,	
documentation	sufficient	 to	establish	 the	condition	of	 the	property	at	 the	 time	of	 the	gift.	 Such	
documentation	 is	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 conservation	 interests	 associated	 with	 the	 property,	
which	 although	 protected	 in	 perpetuity	 by	 the	 easement,	 could	 be	 adversely	 affected	 by	 the	
exercise	of	the	reserved	rights.	Such	documentation	may	include:		
	(A)	 The	 appropriate	 survey	 maps	 from	 the	 United	 States	 Geological	 Survey,	 showing	 the	
property	line	and	other	contiguous	or	nearby	protected	areas;		
	(B)	 A	 map	 of	 the	 area	 drawn	 to	 scale	 showing	 all	 existing	 man-made	 improvements	 or	
incursions	 (such	as	 roads,	buildings,	 fences,	or	gravel	pits),	 vegetation	and	 identification	of	 flora	
and	fauna	(including,	for	example,	rare	species	locations,	animal	breeding	and	roosting	areas,	and	
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migration	 routes),	 land	 use	 history	 (including	 present	 uses	 and	 recent	 past	 disturbances),	 and	
distinct	natural	features	(such	as	large	trees	and	aquatic	areas);		
	(C)	An	aerial	photograph	of	the	property	at	an	appropriate	scale	taken	as	close	as	possible	to	
the	date	the	donation	is	made;	and		
	(D)	On-site	photographs	 taken	at	 appropriate	 locations	on	 the	property.	 If	 the	 terms	of	 the	
donation	contain	restrictions	with	regard	to	a	particular	natural	resource	to	be	protected,	such	as	
water	quality	or	air	quality,	the	condition	of	the	resource	at	or	near	the	time	of	the	gift	must	be	
established.	The	documentation,	including	the	maps	and	photographs,	must	be	accompanied	by	a	
statement	 signed	 by	 the	 donor	 and	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 donee	 clearly	 referencing	 the	
documentation	 and	 in	 substance	 saying	 "This	 natural	 resources	 inventory	 is	 an	 accurate	
representation	of	[the	protected	property]	at	the	time	of	the	transfer.".		
	(ii)	Donee's	right	to	 inspection	and	legal	remedies.	 In	the	case	of	any	donation	referred	to	in	
paragraph	 (g)(5)(i)	 of	 this	 section,	 the	 donor	must	 agree	 to	 notify	 the	 donee,	 in	writing,	 before	
exercising	any	reserved	right,	e.g.	the	right	to	extract	certain	minerals	which	may	have	an	adverse	
impact	 on	 the	 conservation	 interests	 associated	 with	 the	 qualified	 real	 property	 interest.	 The	
terms	of	the	donation	must	provide	a	right	of	the	donee	to	enter	the	property	at	reasonable	times	
for	the	purpose	of	 inspecting	the	property	to	determine	if	there	is	compliance	with	the	terms	of	
the	donation.	Additionally,	the	terms	of	the	donation	must	provide	a	right	of	the	donee	to	enforce	
the	 conservation	 restrictions	 by	 appropriate	 legal	 proceedings,	 including	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 the	
right	to	require	the	restoration	of	the	property	to	its	condition	at	the	time	of	the	donation.		
	(6)	 Extinguishment.	 (i)	 In	 general.	 If	 a	 subsequent	 unexpected	 change	 in	 the	 conditions	
surrounding	 the	 property	 that	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 donation	 under	 this	 paragraph	 can	 make	
impossible	 or	 impractical	 the	 continued	 use	 of	 the	 property	 for	 conservation	 purposes,	 the	
conservation	purpose	can	nonetheless	be	treated	as	protected	in	perpetuity	if	the	restrictions	are	
extinguished	by	judicial	proceeding	and	all	of	the	donee's	proceeds	(determined	under	paragraph	
(g)(6)(ii)	of	this	section)	from	a	subsequent	sale	or	exchange	of	the	property	are	used	by	the	donee	
organization	in	a	manner	consistent	with	the	conservation	purposes	of	the	original	contribution.		
	(ii)	 Proceeds.	 In	 case	 of	 a	 donation	 made	 after	 February	 13,	 1986,	 for	 a	 deduction	 to	 be	
allowed	under	this	section,	at	the	time	of	the	gift	the	donor	must	agree	that	the	donation	of	the	
perpetual	conservation	restriction	gives	rise	to	a	property	right,	immediately	vested	in	the	donee	
organization,	with	 a	 fair	market	 value	 that	 is	 at	 least	 equal	 to	 the	proportionate	 value	 that	 the	
perpetual	conservation	restriction	at	the	time	of	the	gift,	bears	to	the	value	of	the	property	as	a	
whole	at	that	time.	See	§	 	1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii)	 relating	to	the	allocation	of	basis.	For	purposes	of	
this	 paragraph	 (g)(6)(ii),	 that	 proportionate	 value	 of	 the	 donee's	 property	 rights	 shall	 remain	
constant.	Accordingly,	when	a	change	in	conditions	give	rise	to	the	extinguishment	of	a	perpetual	
conservation	 restriction	 under	 paragraph	 (g)(6)(i)	 of	 this	 section,	 the	 donee	 organization,	 on	 a	
subsequent	sale,	exchange,	or	involuntary	conversion	of	the	subject	property,	must	be	entitled	to	
a	portion	of	the	proceeds	at	least	equal	to	that	proportionate	value	of	the	perpetual	conservation	
restriction,	 unless	 state	 law	 provides	 that	 the	 donor	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	 full	 proceeds	 from	 the	
conversion	without	regard	to	the	terms	of	the	prior	perpetual	conservation	restriction.		
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	(h)	Valuation	--	(1)	Entire	interest	of	donor	other	than	qualified	mineral	interest.	The	value	of	
the	contribution	under	section	170	in	the	case	of	a	contribution	of	a	taxpayer's	entire	interest	in	
property	other	than	a	qualified	mineral	interest	is	the	fair	market	value	of	the	surface	rights	in	the	
property	 contributed.	 The	 value	 of	 the	 contribution	 shall	 be	 computed	 without	 regard	 to	 the	
mineral	rights.	See	paragraph	(h)(4),	example	(1),	of	this	section.		
	(2)	Remainder	interest	in	real	property.	In	the	case	of	a	contribution	of	any	remainder	interest	
in	 real	 property,	 section	 170(f)(4)	 provides	 that	 in	 determining	 the	 value	 of	 such	 interest	 for	
purposes	of	section	170,	depreciation	and	depletion	of	such	property	shall	be	taken	into	account.	
See	 §	 	 1.170A-12.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 remainder	 interest	 for	 conservation	
purposes,	the	current	fair	market	value	of	the	property	(against	which	the	limitations	of	§		1.170A-
12	 are	 applied)	must	 take	 into	 account	 any	 pre-existing	 or	 contemporaneously	 recorded	 rights	
limiting,	for	conservation	purposes,	the	use	to	which	the	subject	property	may	be	put.		
	(3)	 Perpetual	 conservation	 restriction	 --	 (i)	 In	 general.	 The	 value	 of	 the	 contribution	 under	
section	170	in	the	case	of	a	charitable	contribution	of	a	perpetual	conservation	restriction	 is	the	
fair	market	value	of	the	perpetual	conservation	restriction	at	the	time	of	the	contribution.	See	§		
1.170A-7(c).	 If	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 record	 of	 sales	 of	 easements	 comparable	 to	 the	 donated	
easement	(such	as	purchases	pursuant	to	a	governmental	program),	the	fair	market	value	of	the	
donated	easement	 is	based	on	 the	sales	prices	of	 such	comparable	easements.	 If	no	substantial	
record	of	market-place	sales	is	available	to	use	as	a	meaningful	or	valid	comparison,	as	a	general	
rule	(but	not	necessarily	in	all	cases)	the	fair	market	value	of	a	perpetual	conservation	restriction	is	
equal	 to	 the	difference	between	 the	 fair	market	 value	of	 the	property	 it	 encumbers	before	 the	
granting	of	the	restriction	and	the	fair	market	value	of	the	encumbered	property	after	the	granting	
of	 the	 restriction.	 The	 amount	 of	 the	 deduction	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 charitable	 contribution	 of	 a	
perpetual	 conservation	 restriction	 covering	 a	 portion	 of	 the	 contiguous	 property	 owned	 by	 a	
donor	and	the	donor's	 family	 (as	defined	 in	section	267(c)(4))	 is	 the	difference	between	the	 fair	
market	 value	 of	 the	 entire	 contiguous	 parcel	 of	 property	 before	 and	 after	 the	 granting	 of	 the	
restriction.	 If	the	granting	of	a	perpetual	conservation	restriction	after	January	14,	1986,	has	the	
effect	of	increasing	the	value	of	any	other	property	owned	by	the	donor	or	a	related	person,	the	
amount	of	the	deduction	for	the	conservation	contribution	shall	be	reduced	by	the	amount	of	the	
increase	 in	 the	value	of	 the	other	property,	whether	or	not	such	property	 is	 contiguous.	 If,	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 donation	 of	 a	 perpetual	 conservation	 restriction,	 the	 donor	 or	 a	 related	 person	
receives,	or	can	reasonably	expect	to	receive,	financial	or	economic	benefits	that	are	greater	than	
those	that	will	inure	to	the	general	public	from	the	transfer,	no	deduction	is	allowable	under	this	
section.	However,	if	the	donor	or	a	related	person	receives,	or	can	reasonably	expect	to	receive,	a	
financial	or	economic	benefit	that	is	substantial,	but	it	is	clearly	shown	that	the	benefit	is	less	than	
the	amount	of	the	transfer,	then	a	deduction	under	this	section	is	allowable	for	the	excess	of	the	
amount	transferred	over	the	amount	of	the	financial	or	economic	benefit	received	or	reasonably	
expected	 to	 be	 received	 by	 the	 donor	 or	 the	 related	 person.	 For	 purposes	 of	 this	 paragraph	
(h)(3)((i),	related	person	shall	have	the	same	meaning	as	in	either	section	267(b)	or	section	707(b).	
(See	example	(10)	of	paragraph	(h)(4)	of	this	section.)		
	(ii)	Fair	market	value	of	property	before	and	after	restriction.	 If	before	and	after	valuation	 is	
used,	 the	 fair	 market	 value	 of	 the	 property	 before	 contribution	 of	 the	 conservation	 restriction	
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must	take	into	account	not	only	the	current	use	of	the	property	but	also	an	objective	assessment	
of	how	immediate	or	remote	the	 likelihood	is	that	the	property,	absent	the	restriction,	would	 in	
fact	be	developed,	as	well	as	any	effect	 from	zoning,	conservation,	or	historic	preservation	 laws	
that	already	restrict	the	property's	potential	highest	and	best	use.	Further,	there	may	be	instances	
where	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 conservation	 restriction	may	 have	 no	material	 effect	 on	 the	 value	 of	 the	
property	 or	 may	 in	 fact	 serve	 to	 enhance,	 rather	 than	 reduce,	 the	 value	 of	 property.	 In	 such	
instances	no	deduction	would	be	allowable.	In	the	case	of	a	conservation	restriction	that	allows	for	
any	development,	however	limited,	on	the	property	to	be	protected,	the	fair	market	value	of	the	
property	 after	 contribution	 of	 the	 restriction	 must	 take	 into	 account	 the	 effect	 of	 the	
development.	In	the	case	of	a	conservation	easement	such	as	an	easement	on	a	certified	historic	
structure,	the	fair	market	value	of	the	property	after	contribution	of	the	restriction	must	take	into	
account	the	amount	of	access	permitted	by	the	terms	of	the	easement.	Additionally,	if	before	and	
after	valuation	is	used,	an	appraisal	of	the	property	after	contribution	of	the	restriction	must	take	
into	account	 the	effect	of	 restrictions	 that	will	 result	 in	a	 reduction	of	 the	potential	 fair	market	
value	represented	by	highest	and	best	use	but	will,	nevertheless,	permit	uses	of	the	property	that	
will	increase	its	fair	market	value	above	that	represented	by	the	property's	current	use.	The	value	
of	 a	 perpetual	 conservation	 restriction	 shall	 not	 be	 reduced	 by	 reason	 of	 the	 existence	 of	
restrictions	 on	 transfer	 designed	 solely	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 conservation	 restriction	 will	 be	
dedicated	to	conservation	purposes.	See	§		1.170A-14	(c)(3).		
	(iii)	Allocation	 of	 basis.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 donation	 of	 a	 qualified	 real	 property	 interest	 for	
conservation	purposes,	the	basis	of	the	property	retained	by	the	donor	must	be	adjusted	by	the	
elimination	of	that	part	of	the	total	basis	of	the	property	that	is	properly	allocable	to	the	qualified	
real	 property	 interest	 granted.	 The	 amount	 of	 the	 basis	 that	 is	 allocable	 to	 the	 qualified	 real	
property	 interest	 shall	 bear	 the	 same	 ratio	 to	 the	 total	 basis	 of	 the	property	 as	 the	 fair	market	
value	of	the	qualified	real	property	interest	bears	to	the	fair	market	value	of	the	property	before	
the	 granting	 of	 the	 qualified	 real	 property	 interest.	 When	 a	 taxpayer	 donates	 to	 a	 qualifying	
conservation	organization	an	easement	on	a	structure	with	respect	to	which	deductions	are	taken	
for	 depreciation,	 the	 reduction	 required	by	 this	 paragraph	 (h)(3)(ii)	 in	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 property	
retained	by	the	taxpayer	must	be	allocated	between	the	structure	and	the	underlying	land.		
	(4)	Examples.	The	provisions	of	 this	section	may	be	 illustrated	by	the	following	examples.	 In	
examples	 illustrating	 the	 value	 or	 deductibility	 of	 donations,	 the	 applicable	 restrictions	 and	
limitations	 of	 §	 	 1.170A-4,	 with	 respect	 to	 reduction	 in	 amount	 of	 charitable	 contributions	 of	
certain	appreciated	property,	and	§		1.170A-8,	with	respect	to	limitations	on	charitable	deductions	
by	individuals.	must	also	be	taken	into	account.		
	Example	1.	A	owns	Goldacre,	a	property	adjacent	to	a	state	park.	A	wants	to	donate	Goldacre	
to	the	state	to	be	used	as	part	of	the	park,	but	A	wants	to	reserve	a	qualified	mineral	interest	in	
the	property,	to	exploit	currently	and	to	devise	at	death.	The	fair	market	value	of	the	surface	rights	
in	Goldacre	is	$	200,000	and	the	fair	market	value	of	the	mineral	rights	in	$	100.000.	In	order	to	
ensure	that	the	quality	of	the	park	will	not	be	degraded,	restrictions	must	be	imposed	on	the	right	
to	extract	the	minerals	that	reduce	the	fair	market	value	of	the	mineral	rights	to	$	80,000.	Under	
this	section,	the	value	of	the	contribution	is	$	200,000	(the	value	of	the	surface	rights).		
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	Example	2.	 In	1984	B,	who	 is	 62,	donates	a	 remainder	 interest	 in	Greenacre	 to	a	qualifying	
organization	 for	 conservation	 purposes.	 Greenacre	 is	 a	 tract	 of	 200	 acres	 of	 undeveloped	
woodland	that	is	valued	at	$	200,000	at	its	highest	and	best	use.	Under	§		1.170A-12(b),	the	value	
of	a	remainder	interest	in	real	property	following	one	life	is	determined	under	§		25.2512-5	of	this	
chapter	(Gift	Tax	Regulations).	(See	§		25.2512-5A	of	this	chapter	with	respect	to	the	valuation	of	
annuities,	 interests	 for	 life	or	 term	of	years,	and	remainder	or	reversionary	 interests	 transferred	
before	 May	 1,	 1999.)	 Accordingly,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 remainder	 interest,	 and	 thus	 the	 amount	
eligible	for	an	income	tax	deduction	under	section	170(f),	is	$	55,996	($	200,000	x	.27998).		
	Example	3.	Assume	 the	 same	 facts	 as	 in	example	 (2),	 except	 that	Greenacre	 is	B's	 200-acre	
estate	 with	 a	 home	 built	 during	 the	 colonial	 period.	 Some	 of	 the	 acreage	 around	 the	 home	 is	
cleared;	 the	 balance	 of	 Greenacre,	 except	 for	 access	 roads,	 is	 wooded	 and	 undeveloped.	 See	
section	170(f)(3)(B)(i).	However,	B	would	like	Greenacre	to	be	maintained	in	its	current	state	after	
his	 death,	 so	 he	 donates	 a	 remainder	 interest	 in	 Greenacre	 to	 a	 qualifying	 organization	 for	
conservation	purposes	pursuant	to	section	170	(f)(3)(B)(iii)	and	(h)(2)(B).	At	the	time	of	the	gift	the	
land	has	a	value	of	$	200,000	and	the	house	has	a	value	of	$	100,000.	The	value	of	the	remainder	
interest,	 and	 thus	 the	 amount	 eligible	 for	 an	 income	 tax	 deduction	 under	 section	 170(f),	 is	
computed	pursuant	to	§		1.170A-12.	See	§		1.170A-12(b)(3).		
	Example	4.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(2),	except	that	at	age	62	instead	of	donating	
a	 remainder	 interest	 B	 donates	 an	 easement	 in	 Greenacre	 to	 a	 qualifying	 organization	 for	
conservation	 purposes.	 The	 fair	 market	 value	 of	 Greenacre	 after	 the	 donation	 is	 reduced	 to	 $	
110,000.	 Accordingly,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 easement,	 and	 thus	 the	 amount	 eligible	 for	 a	 deduction	
under	section	170(f),	is	$	90,000	($	200,000	less	$	110,000).		
	Example	5.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(4),	and	assume	that	three	years	later,	at	age	
65,	 B	 decides	 to	 donate	 a	 remainder	 interest	 in	 Greenacre	 to	 a	 qualifying	 organization	 for	
conservation	purposes.	Increasing	real	estate	values	in	the	area	have	raised	the	fair	market	value	
of	 Greenacre	 (subject	 to	 the	 easement)	 to	 $	 130,000.	 Accordingly,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 remainder	
interest,	and	thus	the	amount	eligible	for	a	deduction	under	section	170(f),	is	$	41,639	($	130,000	
x	.32030).		
	Example	6.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(2),	except	that	at	the	time	of	the	donation	
of	 a	 remainder	 interest	 in	 Greenacre,	 B	 also	 donates	 an	 easement	 to	 a	 different	 qualifying	
organization	for	conservation	purposes.	Based	on	all	the	facts	and	circumstances,	the	value	of	the	
easement	is	determined	to	be	$	100,000.	Therefore,	the	value	of	the	property	after	the	easement	
is	$	100,000	and	the	value	of	the	remainder	interest,	and	thus	the	amount	eligible	for	deduction	
under	section	170(f),	is	$	27,998	($	100,000	x	.27998).		
	Example	7.	C	owns	Greenacre,	a	200-acre	estate	containing	a	house	built	during	the	colonial	
period.	At	its	highest	and	best	use,	for	home	development,	the	fair	market	value	of	Greenacre	is	$	
300,000.	C	donates	an	easement	(to	maintain	the	house	and	Green	acre	in	their	current	state)	to	a	
qualifying	 organization	 for	 conservation	 purposes.	 The	 fair	market	 value	 of	Greenacre	 after	 the	
donation	is	reduced	to	$	125,000.	Accordingly,	the	value	of	the	easement	and	the	amount	eligible	
for	a	deduction	under	section	170(f)	is	$	175.000	($	300,000	less	$	125,000).		
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	Example	 8.	 Assume	 the	 same	 facts	 as	 in	 example	 (7)	 and	 assume	 that	 three	 years	 later,	 C	
decides	to	donate	a	remainder	interest	in	Greenacre	to	a	qualifying	organization	for	conservation	
purposes.	Increasing	real	estate	values	in	the	area	have	raised	the	fair	market	value	of	Greenacre	
to	$	180.000.	Assume	that	because	of	the	perpetual	easement	prohibiting	any	development	of	the	
land,	the	value	of	the	house	is	$	120,000	and	the	value	of	the	land	is	$	60,000.	The	value	of	the	
remainder	interest,	and	thus	the	amount	eligible	for	an	income	tax	deduction	under	section	170(f),	
is	computed	pursuant	to	§		1.170A-12.	See	§		1.170A-12(b)(3).		
	Example	9.	D	owns	property	with	a	basis	of	$	20,000	and	a	fair	market	value	of	$	80,000.	D	
donates	 to	 a	 qualifying	organization	 an	 easement	 for	 conservation	purposes	 that	 is	 determined	
under	this	section	to	have	a	 fair	market	value	of	$	60,000.	The	amount	of	basis	allocable	to	the	
easement	 is	 $	 15,000	 ($	 60,000/$	 80,000	 =	 $	 15,000/$	 20,000).	 Accordingly,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
property	is	reduced	to	$	5,000	($	20,000	minus	$	15,000).		
	Example	10.	E	owns	10	one-acre	lots	that	are	currently	woods	and	parkland.	The	fair	market	
value	of	each	of	E's	 lots	is	$	15,000	and	the	basis	of	each	lot	is	$	3,000.	E	grants	to	the	county	a	
perpetual	easement	for	conservation	purposes	to	use	and	maintain	eight	of	the	acres	as	a	public	
park	and	to	restrict	any	future	development	on	those	eight	acres.	As	a	result	of	the	restrictions,	
the	 value	 of	 the	 eight	 acres	 is	 reduced	 to	 $	 1,000	 an	 acre.	 However,	 by	 perpetually	 restricting	
development	on	this	portion	of	the	land,	E	has	ensured	that	the	two	remaining	acres	will	always	
be	bordered	by	parkland,	thus	increasing	their	fair	market	value	to	$	22,500	each.	If	the	eight	acres	
represented	all	of	E's	land,	the	fair	market	value	of	the	easement	would	be	$	112,000,	an	amount	
equal	to	the	fair	market	value	of	the	land	before	the	granting	of	the	easement	(8	x	$	15,000	=	$	
120,000)	minus	the	fair	market	value	of	the	encumbered	land	after	the	granting	of	the	easement	
(8	x	$	1,000	=	$	8,000).	However,	because	the	easement	only	covered	a	portion	of	the	taxpayer's	
contiguous	land,	the	amount	of	the	deduction	under	section	170	is	reduced	to	$	97,000	($	150,000	
-	$	53,000),	that	is,	the	difference	between	the	fair	market	value	of	the	entire	tract	of	land	before	
($	150,000)	and	after	((8	x	$	1,000)	+	(2	x	$	22,500))	the	granting	of	the	easement.		
	Example	11.	Assume	the	same	facts	as	in	example	(10).	Since	the	easement	covers	a	portion	of	
E's	land,	only	the	basis	of	that	portion	is	adjusted.	Therefore,	the	amount	of	basis	allocable	to	the	
easement	 is	$	22,400	((8	x	$	3,000)	x	 ($	112,000/$	120,000)).	Accordingly,	 the	basis	of	 the	eight	
acres	encumbered	by	the	easement	is	reduced	to	$	1,600	($	24,000	-	$	22,400),	or	$	200	for	each	
acre.	The	basis	of	the	two	remaining	acres	is	not	affected	by	the	donation.		
	Example	 12.	 F	 owns	 and	 uses	 as	 professional	 offices	 a	 two-story	 building	 that	 lies	within	 a	
registered	historic	district.	F's	building	is	an	outstanding	example	of	period	architecture	with	a	fair	
market	value	of	$	125,000.	Restricted	to	its	current	use,	which	is	the	highest	and	best	use	of	the	
property	without	making	 changes	 to	 the	 facade,	 the	 building	 and	 lot	would	 have	 a	 fair	market	
value	of	$	100,000,	of	which	$	80,000	would	be	allocable	to	the	building	and	$	20,000	would	be	
allocable	 to	 the	 lot.	 F's	 basis	 in	 the	 property	 is	 $	 50,000,	 of	which	 $	 40,000	 is	 allocable	 to	 the	
building	 and	 $	 10,000	 is	 allocable	 to	 the	 lot.	 F's	 neighborhood	 is	 a	 mix	 of	 residential	 and	
commercial	uses,	and	it	is	possible	that	F	(or	another	owner)	could	enlarge	the	building	for	more	
extensive	commercial	use,	which	is	its	highest	and	best	use.	However,	this	would	require	changes	
to	 the	 facade.	 F	 would	 like	 to	 donate	 to	 a	 qualifying	 preservation	 organization	 an	 easement	
restricting	 any	 changes	 to	 the	 facade	 and	 promising	 to	maintain	 the	 facade	 in	 perpetuity.	 The	
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donation	would	qualify	for	a	deduction	under	this	section.	The	fair	market	value	of	the	easement	
is	$	25,000	(the	fair	market	value	of	the	property	before	the	easement,	$	125,000,	minus	the	fair	
market	value	of	the	property	after	the	easement,	$	100,000).	Pursuant	to	§	 	1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii),	
the	basis	allocable	to	the	easement	is	$	10,000	and	the	basis	of	the	underlying	property	(building	
and	lot)	is	reduced	to	$	40,000.		
	(i)	Substantiation	requirement.	If	a	taxpayer	makes	a	qualified	conservation	contribution	and	
claims	 a	 deduction,	 the	 taxpayer	must	maintain	written	 records	 of	 the	 fair	market	 value	 of	 the	
underlying	property	before	and	after	the	donation	and	the	conservation	purpose	furthered	by	the	
donation	and	such	 information	shall	be	stated	 in	the	taxpayer's	 income	tax	return	 if	required	by	
the	return	or	its	instructions.	See	also	§		1.170A-13(c)	(relating	to	substantiation	requirements	for	
deductions	 in	excess	of	$	5,000	 for	charitable	contributions	made	after	1984),	and	section	6659	
(relating	to	additions	to	tax	in	the	case	of	valuation	overstatements).		
	(j)	Effective	date.	 Except	as	otherwise	provided	 in	§	 	1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii),	 this	 section	applies	
only	to	contributions	made	on	or	after	December	18,	1980.			
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Appendix C 
 
Table of § 170(h) Deduction Cases 
 
I. Table Structure 
 
The Table below lists the cases involving challenges to charitable income tax deductions 
claimed with respect to conservation easement donations. Given that § 170(h) and the 
Treasury Regulations are effective only for transfers made on or after December 18, 1980,1 
the cases are separated into two groups: 
 
1. those involving donations made before the effective date of § 170(h) (pre-§ 
170(h) cases) and  
 
2. those involving donations made on or after the effective date of § 170(h) (post-
§ 170(h) cases).  
 
Substantial changes were made to the deduction provision with the enactment of § 170(h) 
in 1980. Accordingly, the law in effect on the date of the donation may be an important 
factor in analyzing the relevance of an older case to a current controversy.2  
 
II. Precedential Value of Tax Court Cases 
 
The Tax Court issues several different types of opinions, the precedential value of which 
differs. 
 
1. Summary Opinions. Certain disputes (for example, disputes involving 
deficiencies of $50,000 or less for each year at issue) qualify for simplified or “S 
case” procedures. The Tax Court generally issues Summary Opinions in these 
cases, and Summary Opinions cannot be relied on as precedent or appealed.  
 
2. Regular Opinions and Memorandum Opinions. The Tax Court generally 
issues two types of opinions in cases that are not “S” cases.  
 
a. Opinions, sometimes referred to as “Regular Opinions,” (cited as “T.C.”) 
are generally issued in cases that the Tax Court believes involve sufficiently 
																																																								
1 Pub. L. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3206, §6(d). Treas. Reg.  § 1.170A-14(j). The mortgage subordination, division of proceeds, 
baseline documentation, and donee notification, access, and enforcement rights requirements apply only to donations 
made after February 13, 1986. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(2), -14(g)(6)(ii), -14(g)(5)(i), -14(g)(5)(ii). The provision 
requiring a reduction in amount of the donor’s deduction for any increase in the value of certain property owned by the 
donor or a related person as a result of the donation applies only to donations made after January 14, 1986. See id. § 
1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
2 For example, cases involving interpretation of the deduction provision in effect before § 170(h) was enacted should not 
be relied upon in interpreting new requirements added to the deduction provision in 1980 to curb abuses and ensure 
protection of the federal investment, such as § 170(h)(5)(A)’s new “protected-in-perpetuity” requirement. On the other, 
hand, some of the general rules governing valuation discussed in the older cases are still relevant to current controversies. 
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important legal issues or principles. Regular Opinions can be cited as legal 
authority and appealed, and the Tax Court treats them as binding precedent.  
 
b. Memorandum Opinions (cited at “T.C. Memo.”) are generally issued in 
cases that do not involve novel legal issues and, instead, address situations 
where the law is settled or factually driven. Memorandum Opinions can be 
cited as legal authority and appealed, but the Tax Court does not treat them 
as binding precedent.  
 
The Chief Judge of the Tax Court decides whether an opinion will be issued as a 
Regular Opinion or a Memorandum Opinion.  
 
3. Bench Opinions. A Tax Court judge is authorized to issue a Bench Opinion in 
an S case or a regular case when the judge is “satisfied as to the factual conclusions 
to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is clear.” To issue a 
Bench Opinion, the judge orally states the findings of fact and the opinion in court 
during the trial session and a transcript reflecting the findings of fact and opinion 
is sent to the parties. Bench Opinions cannot be relied upon as precedent.  
 
III. Tax Court Opinions 
 
T.C. and T.C. Memo. Opinions starting 09/25/95 and Summary Opinions starting 01/01/01 
are available at https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/OpinionSearch.aspx.  
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Pre-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date) 
 
Date of 
Donation 
 
Holder 
Thayer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1977-370  1969 VOF3 
Todd v. U.S., 617 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1985)  1979 WPC4 
Hilborn v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 677 (1985)  1979 VCC5 
Stanley Works v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389 (1986)  1977 HVA6 
Akers v. Comm’r, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986),  
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1984-490  
1977 TCL7 
Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892 (1986)  1979 VOF 
Stotler v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1987-275   1979 Monterey 
County, CA 
Fannon v. Comm'r, 842 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished), 
modifying T.C. Memo. 1986-572  
1979 VOF 
Fannon v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1989-136  1978 VOF 
Dennis v. U.S., 70 A.F.T.R. 2d 92-5946 (E.D. Va. 1992)  Nov. 8, 
1980 
VOF 
McLennan v. U.S., 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993),  
aff’g 24 Cl. Ct. 102 (1991) and 23 Cl. Ct. 99 (1991)  
Nov. 10, 
1980 
WPC 
 
Post-§ 170(h) Cases (In Order of Final Opinion Date) 
§ 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations are effective 
only for transfers made on or after Dec. 18, 1980.8 
 
 
1988 through 2000 
Nicoladis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-163  1981 PANO9 
Losch v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1988-230  Dec. 24, 
1980 
NTHP10 
Richmond v. U.S., 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1988)  Dec. 29, 
1980 
VCC 
Higgins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-103  1981 MET11 
Dorsey v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-242  1981 HFC12 
Griffin v. Comm’r, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990),  
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1989-130  
1981 HFC 
Schapiro v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-128; IRS AOD-1991-23 
(nonacquiesence)  
1981 
1984 
MET 
Clemens v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-436  1982 VOLF13 
Schwab v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-232  1983 AFT14 																																																								
3 Virginia Outdoors Foundation. 
4 Western Pennsylvania Conservancy. 
5 Vieux Carre Commission. 
6 Housatonic Valley Association. 
7 Tennessee Conservation League. 
8 See supra note 1 for exceptions to the effective date for some of the Treasury Regulation provisions.  
9 Preservation Alliance of New Orleans.  
10 National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States. 
11 Maryland Environmental Trust. 
12 Historic Faubourg Corporation (now Preservation Center of New Orleans). 
13 Vineyard Open Land Foundation. 
14 American Farmland Trust. 
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Satullo v. Comm’r, 67 F.3d 314, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 6536 (11th Cir. 
1995), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1993-614  
1985 Easements 
Atlanta, Inc. 
Great Northern Nekoosa v. U.S., 38 Fed. Cl. 645 (1997)  1981 Maine 
Johnston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1997-475  1989 TNC15 
Browning v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 303 (1997)  1990 Howard 
County, MD 
Strasburg v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2000-94   1993 
1994 
MLR16 
2006 
Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006)  1999 Fairfax 
County, VA 
Ney v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-154 (2006)  2001 DALPF17 
Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006) (Glass II),  
aff’g 124 T.C. 258 (2005) (Glass I) 
1992 
1993 
LTC18 
Goldsby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-274  2000 MSLT19 
2009 
Bruzewicz v. U.S., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 2002 LPC of IL20 
Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-94  2000 VLC21 
Kiva Dunes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-145  2002 NALT22 
2010 
Lord v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-196  1999 LPT23 
Evans v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-207  2004 CHT24 
2011 
Schrimsher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-71  2004 AHC25 
Boltar v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 326 (2011) 2003 SHLT26 
1982 East LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-84  2004 NAT27 
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Simmons II), 
aff’g Simmons v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-208 (Simmons I) 
2003 
2004 
L'Enfant 
Trust 
Didonato v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-153  2004 Mercer 
County, NJ 
Herman v. Comm’r, T.C. Bench Op. (Sept. 22, 2011) (Herman II), 
addressing remaining issues in T.C. Memo. 2009-205 (Herman I) 
 
2003 
 
NAT 
2012 
Butler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-72 2003 
2004 
CVLT28 
Dunlap v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-126  2003 NAT 																																																								
15 The Nature Conservancy. 
16 Montana Land Reliance. 
17 Delaware Agricultural Lands Preservation Foundation. 
18 Little Traverse Conservancy. 
19 Mississippi Land Trust. 
20 Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois 
21 Valley Land Conservancy (now Black Canyon Regional Land Trust). 
22 North American Land Trust. 
23 Land Preservation Trust. 
24 Capitol Historic Trust. 
25 Alabama Historical Commission. 
26 Shirley Heinze Land Trust, Inc. 
27 National Architectural Trust (currently known as Trust for Architectural Easements). 
28 Chattahoochee Valley Land Trust. 
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Wall v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-169  2003 LPC of IL 
Averyt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-198  2004 WAT29 
Rothman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-218 (Rothman II),  
vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2012-163 (Rothman I) 
2004 NAT 
Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, 493 Fed. Appx. 944 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished) (Trout Ranch II), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-283 (Trout 
Ranch I) 
 
2003 
 
CBLT30 
Foster v. Comm’r,  T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-90  2003 L'Enfant 
Trust 
Irby v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 371 (2012)  2003 
2004 
COL31 
2013 
Pollard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-38  2003 Boulder 
County, CO 
Pesky v. U.S., 2013 WL 12249656 (D. Idaho, July 17, 2013) 
(unreported), 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5222 (D. Idaho, July 8, 2013) 
(unreported), 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-470 (D. Idaho, Jan. 7, 2013) 
(unreported)  
 
2002 
 
TNC 
Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-172 (Carpenter II), 
denying reconsideration of and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2012-1 
(Carpenter I) 
 
2003 
Greenlands 
Reserve 
Friedberg v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-224 (Friedberg II), 
reversing in part and supplementing T.C. Memo. 2011-238 
(Friedberg I) 
 
2003 
 
NAT 
Gorra v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-254 2006 NAT 
61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2013-266 2006 NAT 
2014 
Esgar Corp. v. Comm’r, 744 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2014) (Esgar II), 
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-35 (Esgar I) and Tempel v. Comm'r, 136 
T.C. 341 (2011) 
 
2004 
Greenlands 
Reserve 
 
Wachter v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 140 (2014) 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
AFW32 
Chandler v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 279 (2014) 2004 
2005 
NAT 
Whitehouse Hotel, LP v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(Whitehouse IV), aff’g in part and vacating in part 139 T.C. 304 
(2012) (Whitehouse III), on remand from 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 
2010) (Whitehouse II), vacating and remanding 131 T.C. 112 
(2008) (Whitehouse I) 
 
 
1997 
 
 
PANO 
Scheidelman v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(Scheidelman IV), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-18 (Scheidelman III), on 
remand from 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (Scheidelman II), 
vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2010-151 (Scheidelman I)  
 
 
2004 
 
 
NAT 
																																																								
29 Wetlands America Trust. 
30 Crested Butte Land Trust. 
31 Colorado Open Lands. 
32 American Foundation for Wildlife. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
Appendix C 6	
Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-
124 
2003 Historic 
Denver 
Schmidt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-159 2003 El Paso 
County, CO 
Zarlengo v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-161 2005 NAT 
Reisner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-230 2004 NAT 
Belk v. Comm’r, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (Belk III),  
aff’g T.C. Memo 2013-154 (Belk II), denying reconsideration of 
and supplementing 140 T.C. 1 (2013) (Belk I) 
 
2004 
 
SMNLT33 
2015 
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (Mitchell III), 
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-204 (Mitchell II),  
denying reconsideration and supplementing 138 T.C. 324 (2012) 
(Mitchell I) 
 
2003 
 
MLC34 
Balsam Mountain v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-43 2003 NALT 
 
SWF Real Estate LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-63 
 
2005 
Albemarle 
County, 
VA35 
Kaufman v. Comm’r, 784 F.3d. 56 (1st Cir. 2015) (Kaufman V), 
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2014-52 (Kaufman IV), on remand from 687 
F.3d. 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufman III), vacating and remanding in 
part 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufman II) and 134 T.C. 182 (2010) 
(Kaufman I) 
 
 
2003 
 
 
NAT 
Costello v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-87 2006 Howard 
County, MD 
Minnick v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (Minnick III) 
and 611 Fed. Appx. 477 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpub) (Minnick II), aff’g 
T.C. Memo. 2012-345 (Minnick I) 
 
2006 
 
LTTV36 
Legg v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 344 (2015) 2007 CNLT37 
Atkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2015-23638 2003 
2005 
NALT 
2016 
Gemperle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-1 2007 LPC of IL 
Mecox v. U.S., 117 A.F.T.R.2d 2016-593 (S.D.N.Y.) 2004 NAT 
Palmer Ranch Holdings, Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-190 
(Palmer Ranch III), supplementing T.C. Memo 2014-79 (Palmer 
Ranch I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 812 F.3d 982 
(11th Cir. 2016) (Palmer Ranch II) 
 
2006 
 
Sarasota 
County, FL 
French v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-53 2005 MLR 
Carroll v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. 196 (2016) 2005 MET & 
LPT 
 																																																								
33 Smokey Mountain National Land Trust.  
34 Montezuma Land Conservancy. 
35 Albemarle County Public Recreational Facilities Authority. 
36 Land Trust of Treasure Valley. 
37 Colorado Natural Land Trust. 
38 On appeal in 4th Circuit. 
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Mountanos v. Comm’r, 651 Fed. Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(unpublished) (Mountanos III), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-138 
(Mountanos I), reconsideration denied and opinion supplemented in 
T.C. Memo. 2014-38 (Mountanos II). 
 
2005 
 
GSLC39 
15 West 17th St. LLC v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 557 (2016) 2007 NAT 
 
McGrady v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2016-233 
 
2007 
Township, 
Bucks 
County, PA 
2017 
Ten Twenty Six Investors v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-115 2004 NAT 
RP Golf, LLC v. Comm’r, 860 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2017) (RP Golf 
III), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2016-80 (RP Golf II) and T.C. Memo. 2012-
282 (RP Golf I)  
 
2003 
 
PCLT40 
Partita Partners LLC v. U.S., 266 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(Partita Partners II) and 216 F.Supp.3d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(Partita Partners I) 
 
2008 
 
NAT 
Rutkoske v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. No. 6 (2017) 2009 ESLC41 
Bosque Canyon Ranch, 867 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2017) (Bosque 
Canyon Ranch II), vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-130 
(Bosque Canyon Ranch I) 
2005 
2007 
 
NALT 
310 Retail LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-164 2005 LPC of IL 
Big River Development, LP v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-166 2005 PHLF42 
Salt Point Timber, T.C. Memo. 2017-245 2009 LBCT43 
Graev v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. No. 23 (2017) (Graev III), 
supplementing vacated opinion in 147 T.C. 460 (2016) (Graev II), 
supplementing 140 T.C. 377 (2013) (Graev I)  
 
2004 
 
NAT 
2018 
PBBM-Rose Hill v. Comm’r, Bench Op. (Sept. 9, 2016) (PBBM-
Rose Hill I), aff’d 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018) (PBBM-Rose Hill 
II), petition for rehearing en banc denied, Doc. 00514755950 (5th 
Cir., Dec. 11, 2018) 
2007 NALT 
Harbor Lofts Associates v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. No. 3 (2018) 2009 ENHC44 
Champions Retreat Golf Founders, LLC v. Comm’r,  
T.C. Memo 2018-146 
2010 NALT 
Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-159 2009 GA LT45 
Wendell Falls Development v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2018-193 
(Wendell Falls II),  denying reconsideration of and supplementing 
T.C. Memo. 2018-45 (Wendell Falls I) 
 
2007 
 
SMNLT 
Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. No. 14 
(2018) (Pine Mountain II) and T.C. Memo. 2018-214 (Pine 
Mountain I) 
2005 
2006 
2007 
 
NALT 																																																								
39 Golden State Land Conservancy. 
40 Platte County Land Trust. 
41 Eastern Shore Land Conservancy. 
42 Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation. 
43 Lord Berkeley Conservation Trust. 
44 Essex National Heritage Commission. 
45 Georgia Land Trust. 
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2019 
Palmolive Building Investors, v. Comm’r, 152 T.C. No. 4 (2019) 
(Palmolive II) and 149 T.C. No. 380 (2017) (Palmolive I) 
2004 LPC of IL 
Roth v .Comm’r, _ F.3d. _, 2019 WL 1890976 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(Roth II), aff’ing T.C. Memo. 2017-248 (Roth I) 
2007 CNLT 
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Appendix D 
 
Internal Revenue Code § 170(f)(11) 
 
IRC § 170 Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts. 
  . . .  
   
  (f) Disallowance of deduction in certain cases and special rules. 
. . .  
  
(11) Qualified appraisal and other documentation for certain contributions. 
 
(A) In general. 
 
(i) Denial of deduction. In the case of an individual, partnership, or 
corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any 
contribution of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is 
claimed unless such person meets the requirements of subparagraphs 
(B), (C), and (D), as the case may be, with respect to such contribution. 
 
(ii) Exceptions. 
 
(I) Readily valued property. Subparagraphs (C) and (D) shall not 
apply to cash, property described in subsection (e)(1)(B)(iii) or 
section 1221(a)(1), publicly traded securities (as defined in section 
6050L(a)(2)(B)), and any qualified vehicle described in paragraph 
(12)(A)(ii) for which an acknowledgement under paragraph 
(12)(B)(iii) is provided. 
 
(II) Reasonable cause. Clause (i) shall not apply if it is shown that 
the failure to meet such requirements is due to reasonable cause 
and not to willful neglect. 
 
(B) Property description for contributions of more than $500. In the case of 
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500 is claimed, 
the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership or 
corporation includes with the return for the taxable year in which the 
contribution is made a description of such property and such other information 
as the Secretary may require. The requirements of this subparagraph shall not 
apply to a C corporation which is not a personal service corporation or a closely 
held C corporation. 
 
(C) Qualified appraisal for contributions of more than $5,000. In the case of 
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $5,000 is claimed, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
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the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, partnership, or 
corporation obtains a qualified appraisal of such property and attaches to the 
return for the taxable year in which such contribution is made such information 
regarding such property and such appraisal as the Secretary may require. 
 
(D) Substantiation for contributions of more than $500,000. In the case of 
contributions of property for which a deduction of more than $500,000 is 
claimed, the requirements of this subparagraph are met if the individual, 
partnership, or corporation attaches to the return for the taxable year a qualified 
appraisal of such property. 
 
(E) Qualified appraisal and appraiser. For purposes of this paragraph- 
 
(i) Qualified appraisal. The term ‘qualified appraisal‘ means, with respect 
to any property, an appraisal of such property which- 
(I) is treated for purposes of this paragraph as a qualified appraisal 
under regulations or other guidance prescribed by the Secretary, 
and 
(II) is conducted by a qualified appraiser in accordance with 
generally accepted appraisal standards and any regulations or 
other guidance prescribed under subclause (I). 
 
(ii) Qualified appraiser. Except as provided in clause (iii), the term 
‘qualified appraiser‘ means an individual who- 
(I) has earned an appraisal designation from a recognized 
professional appraiser organization or has otherwise met 
minimum education and experience requirements set forth in 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, 
(II) regularly performs appraisals for which the individual receives 
compensation, and 
(III) meets such other requirements as may be prescribed by the 
Secretary in regulations or other guidance. 
 
(iii) Specific appraisals. An individual shall not be treated as a qualified 
appraiser with respect to any specific appraisal unless- 
(I) the individual demonstrates verifiable education and 
experience in valuing the type of property subject to the 
appraisal, and  
(II) the individual has not been prohibited from practicing before 
the Internal Revenue Service by the Secretary under section 
330(c) of title 31, United States Code, at any time during the 3-
year period ending on the date of the appraisal. 
 
(F) Aggregation of similar items of property. For purposes of determining 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384360 
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thresholds under this paragraph, property and all similar items of property 
donated to 1 or more donees shall be treated as 1 property. 
 
(G) Special rule for pass-thru entities. In the case of a partnership or S 
corporation, this paragraph shall be applied at the entity level, except that the 
deduction shall be denied at the partner or shareholder level. 
 
(H) Regulations. The Secretary may prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including 
regulations that may provide that some or all of the requirements of this 
paragraph do not apply in appropriate cases.	
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system. The Department has written the 
regulation so as to minimize litigation 
and provide a clear legal standard for 
affected conduct, and the Department 
has reviewed the regulation carefully to 
eliminate drafting errors and 
ambiguities. 
Executive Order 13211 
This rule is not subject to E.O. 13211, 
because it will not have a significant 
adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy. 
Plain Language 
The Department drafted this IFR in 
plain language. 
List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 641 
Aged, Employment, Government 
contracts, Grant programs-labor, 
Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. 
■ Accordingly, the IFR amending 20 
CFR part 641 which was published at 82 
FR 56869 on December 1, 2017, is 
adopted as final without change. 
Rosemary Lahasky, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment 
and Training, Labor. 
[FR Doc. 2018–16216 Filed 7–27–18; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Internal Revenue Service 
26 CFR Parts 1 and 602 
[TD 9836] 
RIN 1545–BH62 
Substantiation and Reporting 
Requirements for Cash and Noncash 
Charitable Contribution Deductions 
AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
Treasury. 
ACTION: Final regulations. 
SUMMARY: These final regulations 
provide guidance concerning 
substantiation and reporting 
requirements for cash and noncash 
charitable contributions. The final 
regulations reflect the enactment of 
provisions of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 and the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006. These 
regulations provide guidance to 
individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations that make charitable 
contributions. 
DATES: Effective date: These regulations 
are effective on July 30, 2018. 
Applicability dates: For dates of 
applicability, see §§ 1.170A–1(k), 
1.170A–14(j), 1.170A–15(h), 1.170A– 
16(g), 1.170A–17(c), 1.170A–18(d), 
1.664–1(f), and 1.6050L–1(h). 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Charles Gorham at (202) 317–7003 (not 
a toll-free number). 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
Paperwork Reduction Act 
The collections of information 
contained in these final regulations have 
been reviewed and approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget in 
accordance with the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)) under control number 1545– 
1953. 
The collections of information in 
these final regulations are in §§ 1.170A– 
15(a) and (d)(1); 1.170A–16(a), (b), (c), 
(d), (e), and (f); and 1.170A–18(a)(2) and 
(b). These collections of information are 
required to obtain a benefit and will 
enable the IRS to determine if a taxpayer 
is entitled to a claimed deduction for a 
charitable contribution. 
An agency may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information 
unless it displays a valid control 
number. 
Books or records relating to a 
collection of information must be 
retained as long as their contents may 
become material in the administration 
of any internal revenue law. Generally, 
tax returns and return information are 
confidential, as required by section 
6103. 
Background 
This document contains amendments 
to the Income Tax Regulations, 26 CFR 
parts 1 and 602, relating to 
substantiating and reporting deductions 
for charitable contributions under 
section 170 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. These final regulations reflect 
amendments to section 170 made by 
section 883 of the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108– 
357 (118 Stat. 1418, 1631) (Jobs Act), 
and sections 1216, 1217, and 1219 of the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Public 
Law 109–280 (120 Stat. 780, 1079–83) 
(PPA), which added new rules for 
substantiating charitable contributions. 
The final regulations also update cross- 
references to the section 170 regulations 
in other regulations. 
Section 170(f)(8), which has been in 
the Code since 1993, provides that no 
deduction shall be allowed for any 
contribution of $250 or more, cash or 
noncash, unless the taxpayer 
substantiates the contribution with a 
contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment of the contribution by 
the donee organization. The 
contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment must include: (1) The 
amount of cash and a description (but 
not value) of any property other than 
cash contributed; (2) a statement of 
whether the donee organization 
provided any goods or services in 
consideration, in whole or in part, for 
any such cash or property; and (3) a 
description and good faith estimate of 
the value of any such goods or services 
or, if such goods or services consist 
solely of intangible religious benefits, a 
statement to that effect. 
Section 170(f)(11), as added by 
section 883 of the Jobs Act, restates, in 
part, section 155(a) of the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 and contains 
reporting and substantiation 
requirements relating to the allowance 
of deductions for noncash charitable 
contributions. Under section 
170(f)(11)(C), taxpayers are required to 
obtain a qualified appraisal for donated 
property for which a deduction of more 
than $5,000 is claimed. 
Under section 170(f)(11)(D), a 
qualified appraisal must be attached to 
any tax return claiming a deduction of 
more than $500,000. Section 
170(h)(4)(B), as added by section 1213 
of the PPA, adds the requirement that a 
qualified appraisal must be included 
with the taxpayer’s return for the 
taxable year of the contribution for any 
contribution of a qualified real property 
interest that is a restriction as to the 
exterior of a building described in 
section 170(h)(4)(C)(ii). 
Section 170(f)(11)(E), as amended by 
section 1219 of the PPA, provides 
statutory definitions of qualified 
appraisal and qualified appraiser for 
appraisals prepared with respect to 
returns filed after August 17, 2006. 
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(i) provides that 
the term qualified appraisal means an 
appraisal that is (1) treated as a qualified 
appraisal under regulations or other 
guidance prescribed by the Secretary, 
and (2) conducted by a qualified 
appraiser in accordance with generally 
accepted appraisal standards and any 
regulations or other guidance prescribed 
by the Secretary. 
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) provides that 
the term qualified appraiser means an 
individual who (1) has earned an 
appraisal designation from a recognized 
professional appraiser organization or 
has otherwise met minimum education 
and experience requirements set forth in 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, 
(2) regularly performs appraisals for 
which the individual receives 
compensation, and (3) meets such other 
requirements as may be prescribed by 
the Secretary in regulations or other 
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guidance. Section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii) 
provides that an individual will not be 
treated as a qualified appraiser with 
respect to any specific appraisal unless 
that individual (1) demonstrates 
verifiable education and experience in 
valuing the type of property subject to 
the appraisal, and (2) has not been 
prohibited from practicing before the 
IRS by the Secretary under section 
330(c) of Title 31 of the United States 
Code at any time during the 3-year 
period ending on the date of the 
appraisal. 
On October 19, 2006, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS released Notice 
2006–96, 2006–2 CB 902 (see 
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides 
transitional guidance on the definitions 
of qualified appraisal and qualified 
appraiser that apply on and after the 
effective date of the PPA definitions. 
Section 170(f)(16) as added by section 
1216 of the PPA generally provides that 
no deduction is allowed for a 
contribution of clothing or a household 
item unless the clothing or household 
item is in good used condition or better. 
Section 170(f)(17) as added by section 
1217 of the PPA imposes a 
recordkeeping requirement for all cash 
contributions, regardless of amount. 
Specifically, section 170(f)(17) requires 
a donor to maintain as a record of any 
cash, check, or other monetary gift (1) a 
bank record, or (2) a written 
communication from the donee. The 
record must show the name of the donee 
organization, the date of the 
contribution, and the amount of the 
contribution. 
On December 2, 2006, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS released Notice 
2006–110, 2006–2 CB 1127 (see 
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides 
rules under section 170(f)(17) for 
substantiating charitable contributions 
made by payroll deduction. 
On January 8, 2008, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS released Notice 
2008–16, 2008–1 CB 315 (see 
§ 601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b)), which provides 
rules under section 170(f)(17) for 
substantiating a one-time, lump-sum 
charitable contribution of a cash, check, 
or other monetary gift made through the 
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) or a 
similar program. Taxpayers may rely on 
Notice 2006–96, Notice 2006–110, and 
Notice 2008–16 prior to the effective 
date of these final regulations. 
On August 7, 2008, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS provided 
guidance on complying with section 170 
as amended by the Jobs Act and the PPA 
in a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(REG–140029–07) in the Federal 
Register (73 FR 45908). The Treasury 
Department and the IRS received 
comments responding to the notice of 
proposed rulemaking, and a public 
hearing was held on January 23, 2009. 
Copies of the comments received are 
available for public inspection at 
www.regulations.gov or upon request. 
After consideration of the comments 
received, the Treasury Department and 
the IRS adopt the proposed regulations 
as revised by this Treasury decision. 
The revisions are discussed in this 
preamble. 
Explanation of Provisions and 
Summary of Comments 
The final regulations implement 
changes made by the Jobs Act and PPA 
to the substantiation and reporting rules 
for charitable contributions under 
section 170. The final regulations set 
forth the substantiation requirements for 
contributions of more than $500 under 
section 170(f)(11)(B) through (D) (added 
by the Jobs Act); the new definitions of 
qualified appraisal and qualified 
appraiser applicable to noncash 
contributions under section 
170(f)(11)(E) (added by the PPA); 
substantiation requirements for 
contributions of clothing and household 
items under section 170(f)(16) (added by 
the PPA); and recordkeeping 
requirements for all cash contributions 
under section 170(f)(17) (added by the 
PPA). 
In addition, these final regulations 
amend the heading of § 1.170A–13 to 
alert readers to the updated regulations. 
The final regulations also update cross- 
references to the section 170 regulations 
in other regulations. 
I. Cash, Check, or Other Monetary Gift 
Substantiation Requirements 
Section 1.170A–15 implements the 
requirements of section 170(f)(17) for 
cash, check, or other monetary gift 
contributions, as added by the PPA, and 
clarifies that these rules supplement the 
substantiation rules in section 170(f)(8). 
A. Contributions Made to a Distributing 
Organization 
A donor may make a charitable 
contribution of cash, check, or other 
monetary gift to an organization that 
collects contributions and distributes 
them to ultimate recipient organizations 
(pursuant to the donor’s instructions or 
otherwise). The final regulations adopt 
the general rule of the proposed 
regulations that treats as a donee for 
purposes of sections 170(f)(8) and 
170(f)(17) an organization described in 
section 170(c) or a Principal Combined 
Fund Organization (PCFO) for purposes 
of the Combined Federal Campaign 
(CFC) and acting in that capacity. The 
CFC is a workplace giving campaign 
established by Executive Order 10728, 
as amended by Executive Orders 10927, 
12353, and 12404, and administered by 
the United States Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM). A PCFO 
administers the local campaign and acts 
as a fiscal agent for the CFC. 
1. Blank Pledge Card Is Not 
Substantiation 
Some commenters asked whether a 
blank pledge card provided by a donee 
organization but filled out by the donor 
constitutes adequate substantiation for a 
contribution of cash to a distributing 
organization. Section 170(f)(17) requires 
a taxpayer to maintain as a record of a 
contribution of a cash, check, or other 
monetary gift either a bank record or a 
written communication from the donee 
that shows the name of the donee 
organization, the date of the 
contribution, and the amount of the 
contribution. The proposed and final 
regulations at § 1.170A–15(b)(2) provide 
that a bank record includes a statement 
from a financial institution, an 
electronic fund transfer receipt, a 
canceled check, a scanned image of both 
sides of a canceled check obtained from 
a bank website, or a credit card 
statement. In addition, the proposed and 
final regulations provide that a written 
communication includes an email. 
Because a blank pledge card provided 
by the donee organization to a donor 
does not show the information required 
under section 170(f)(17), it is not 
sufficient substantiation for a cash, 
check, or other monetary gift. 
2. Name of Donee for Purposes of CFC 
One commenter noted that because 
the CFC generally does not include the 
name of the donee organization on its 
pledge cards, and a PCFO for purposes 
of the CFC often is a potential ultimate 
recipient of a contribution to the CFC, 
including the name of the PCFO on the 
pledge card could unduly influence 
donors to contribute to the PCFO rather 
than to other eligible donees. The 
commenter asked that the name of the 
local CFC campaign be treated as the 
name of the donee organization. The 
Treasury Department and the IRS agree 
with this comment. Accordingly, 
§ 1.170A–15(d)(2)(ii) provides that the 
name of the local CFC may be used 
instead of the name of the PCFO and 
may be treated as the donee 
organization for purposes of sections 
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17) and § 1.170A– 
15(d)(1)(ii). 
B. Compliance With 170(f)(8) and 
170(f)(17) in a Single Document 
Some commenters asked if a single 
written acknowledgment can be used to 
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satisfy the substantiation rules under 
sections 170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17). Section 
170(f)(8) does not require that a 
contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment by the donee 
organization include the date of the 
contribution. In addition, section 
170(f)(17) does not require that a written 
communication from the donee include 
a statement of whether any goods or 
services were provided in exchange for 
the contribution. Although there are 
different requirements under sections 
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17), § 1.170A– 
15(a)(3) of the final regulations provides 
that a single written acknowledgment 
that satisfies all substantiation 
requirements under both sections 
170(f)(8) and 170(f)(17) is adequate 
substantiation for contributions of a 
cash, check, or other monetary gift. 
II. Noncash Substantiation 
Requirements 
Section 1.170A–16 implements the 
requirements of section 170(f)(11) for 
noncash contributions, as added by the 
Jobs Act, and clarifies that these rules 
are in addition to the requirements in 
section 170(f)(8). 
Proposed and final § 1.170A–16 
provide that a donor who claims a 
deduction for a noncash contribution of 
less than $250 is required only to obtain 
a receipt from the donee or keep reliable 
records. A donor who claims a noncash 
contribution of at least $250 but not 
more than $500 is required only to 
obtain a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, as provided under 
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f). For 
claimed noncash contributions of more 
than $500 but not more than $5,000, the 
donor must obtain a contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment and must also 
file a completed Form 8283 (Section A), 
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’ 
with the return on which the deduction 
is claimed. For claimed noncash 
contributions of more than $5,000, in 
addition to a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, the donor generally 
must obtain a qualified appraisal and 
must also complete and file either 
Section A or Section B of Form 8283 
(depending on the type of property 
contributed) with the return on which 
the deduction is claimed. For claimed 
noncash contributions of more than 
$500,000, the donor must also attach a 
copy of the qualified appraisal to the 
return for the taxable year in which the 
contribution is made. 
Section 170(f)(11)(F) provides that for 
purposes of the $500, $5,000, and 
$500,000 thresholds in section 
170(f)(11), similar items contributed 
during the taxable year are treated as 
one property. In determining whether a 
contribution meets the $250 threshold, 
§ 1.170A–13(f)(1) provides that separate 
contributions made during the tax year, 
regardless of whether the sum of those 
contributions equal or exceed $250, are 
not combined. The proposed and final 
regulations also provide that the 
requirements for substantiation that 
must be submitted with a return also 
apply to the return for any carryover 
year under section 170(d). 
A. Reasonable Cause Exception 
In light of recent case law (see Crimi 
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013–51), 
the paragraph relating to the reasonable 
cause exception set forth in proposed 
regulation § 1.170A–16(f)(6) has been 
deleted from the final regulations 
because it is inconsistent with the Tax 
Court’s position. In Crimi, the IRS 
argued that there was no qualified 
appraisal. The Tax Court discussed the 
doctrine of substantial compliance with 
respect to the qualified appraisal 
regulation, but stated that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether it was 
applicable to the petitioners’ case 
because they established that the failure 
was due to reasonable cause. 
Specifically, the court stated that a 
reasonable cause inquiry is ‘‘inherently 
a fact-intensive one, and facts and 
circumstances must be judged on a case- 
by-case basis.’’ Id. at *99. The court 
found that petitioners reasonably and in 
good faith relied on their long-time 
certified public accountant’s advice that 
their appraisal met all the legal 
requirements to claim the deduction. 
Thus, the final regulations do not 
contain a standard for the reasonable 
cause exception. 
B. Appraiser Privacy Concerns 
A number of commenters expressed 
concern over appraisers’ privacy if the 
appraiser’s social security number is 
required on qualified appraisals and 
Forms 8283 (Section B). This concern 
was addressed by the proposed 
regulations. Both the proposed and final 
regulations require an appraiser to use 
a taxpayer identification number on an 
appraisal, but that number does not 
need to be the appraiser’s social security 
number. An appraiser may use an 
employer identification number, which 
may be obtained by: (1) Applying on the 
IRS website (www.regulationsgov); or (2) 
filing a completed Form SS–4, 
Application for Employer Identification 
Number, by mail or by fax. The IRS has 
modified the instructions to Form 8283 
to make clear that an appraiser may use 
either a social security number or an 
employer identification number. 
C. Form 8283 Is Not a Contemporaneous 
Written Acknowledgment 
One commenter asked whether a 
Form 8283 can satisfy the requirement 
for a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment under section 
170(f)(8). Although no format is 
prescribed for a contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment (for example, 
an email may qualify), a 
contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment of a contribution by 
the donee organization must contain all 
of the information required by section 
170(f)(8)(B). Moreover, section 
170(f)(8)(A) states that the 
acknowledgment is made ‘‘by the donee 
organization.’’ Only Section B, part IV of 
Form 8283, completed for property 
valued at over $5,000, is a donee 
acknowledgment, and this 
acknowledgment only contains some of 
the information required by section 
170(f)(8)(B). Accordingly, even a fully- 
completed Form 8283 does not satisfy 
the requirements of section 170(f)(8). 
D. Form 8283 (Section B) Provided to 
Donee 
Another commenter suggested that 
the Form 8283 (Section B) should be 
required to be fully completed, 
including the appraiser information and 
the appraised or claimed value of the 
property, before the donor obtains the 
donee’s signature. Section 1.170A– 
16(d)(5)(iii) of the proposed regulations 
provides that specific portions of the 
Form 8283 (Section B) must be 
completed before it is signed by the 
donee, but that the Form 8283 (Section 
B) does not need to contain certain other 
information, such as the appraiser 
information and the appraised or 
claimed value of the property, before the 
donee signs the form. Regardless of any 
benefits that may result from additional 
information sharing, the public should 
have the opportunity to comment on 
any proposed requirement to share 
additional information with the donee. 
Accordingly, the final regulations adopt 
the proposed regulation language 
without adoption of this suggestion. 
E. Attaching Appraisal to Carryover 
Year Returns 
One commenter suggested deleting 
the requirement in the regulations to 
attach an appraisal to the tax returns for 
carryover years. Because the need for 
the IRS to have the appraisal attached to 
each return reflecting a contribution in 
excess of $500,000 outweighs the 
burden on taxpayers to supply it, the 
final regulations retain this requirement. 
Accordingly, if the appraisal is required 
to be attached to the return for the 
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contribution year, it must also be 
attached to the returns for the carryover 
years. 
III. New Requirements for Qualified 
Appraisals and Qualified Appraisers 
As prescribed in section 170(f)(11)(E), 
as amended by the PPA, § 1.170A–17 of 
the proposed and final regulations 
provides definitions for qualified 
appraisal and qualified appraiser. 
A. Transitional Rule 
One commenter suggested that a 
transitional rule be included for 
§ 1.170A–17 because additional time 
may be needed to meet the education 
and experience requirements in 
§ 1.170A–17 for qualified appraisers. In 
order to provide appraisers with a 
reasonable amount of time to meet the 
new education and experience 
requirements, the final rules under 
§ 1.170A–17 apply only to contributions 
made on or after January 1, 2019. 
B. Definition of Generally Accepted 
Appraisal Standards 
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(i)(II) provides 
that the term qualified appraisal means 
an appraisal that is conducted by a 
qualified appraiser in accordance with 
generally accepted appraisal standards. 
Generally accepted appraisal standards 
are defined in the proposed regulations 
at § 1.170A–17(a)(2) as the ‘‘substance 
and principles of the Uniform Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice 
[USPAP], as developed by the Appraisal 
Standards Board of the Appraisal 
Foundation.’’ Several commenters 
recommended that the final regulations 
require appraisal documents to be 
prepared ‘‘in accordance with USPAP’’ 
and not merely in accordance with the 
‘‘substance and principles of USPAP.’’ 
Other commenters indicated that strict 
compliance with USPAP would 
eliminate use of all other appraisal 
standards, including some that are 
generally accepted in the appraisal 
industry. The Treasury Department and 
the IRS agree that it is beneficial to 
provide some flexibility by requiring 
conformity with appraisal standards 
that are consistent with the substance 
and principles of USPAP rather than 
requiring that all appraisals be prepared 
strictly in accordance with USPAP. 
Accordingly, the final regulations do not 
adopt the recommendation to require 
strict compliance with USPAP and 
retain the requirement of consistency 
with the substance and principles of 
USPAP. 
C. Education and Experience 
Requirement for Qualified Appraisers 
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(ii)(I) and (iii)(I) 
and § 1.170A–17(b) of the proposed 
regulations provide that a qualified 
appraiser is an individual with 
verifiable education and experience in 
valuing the type of property for which 
the appraisal is performed. Some 
commenters reiterated suggestions made 
in response to Notice 2006–96 that the 
final regulations interpret the 
requirement in section 170(f)(11)(E) that 
a qualified appraiser have verifiable 
‘‘education and experience’’ as 
requiring verifiable ‘‘education or 
experience.’’ The Treasury Department 
and the IRS did not adopt this 
suggestion in the proposed regulations, 
and do not do so in the final regulations, 
because it would be contrary to the clear 
language of the statute. 
Section 1.170A–17(b)(4) of the 
proposed regulations requires an 
appraiser to specify in the appraisal the 
appraiser’s education and experience in 
valuing the type of property and to 
make a declaration in the appraisal that, 
because of the appraiser’s education and 
experience, the appraiser is qualified to 
make appraisals of the type of property 
being valued. A commenter suggested 
that, to meet the ‘‘verifiable’’ 
requirement in § 1.170A–17(b), the 
appraiser should be required to specify 
in the appraisal only that the appraiser 
is a qualified appraiser under § 1.170A– 
17(b) and that the appraisal was 
prepared in accordance with the 
substance and principles of USPAP. The 
general statement of qualification 
suggested by the commenter does not 
demonstrate, as required under section 
170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I), that the appraiser 
has verifiable education and experience 
that qualifies the appraiser to prepare 
the appraisal for that type of property. 
Accordingly, the final regulations do not 
adopt this suggestion. 
D. Parity Between ‘‘Designation’’ and 
‘‘Education and Experience’’ 
Section 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i) of the 
proposed regulations provides that an 
individual is treated as having 
education and experience in valuing the 
type of property if, as of the date the 
individual signs the appraisal, the 
individual has satisfied the following 
requirements: (A) Successfully 
completed professional or college-level 
coursework in valuing the type of 
property and has two or more years of 
experience in valuing the type of 
property; or (B) earned a recognized 
appraiser designation for the type of 
property. One commenter suggested that 
it is much more difficult to earn a 
designation from a generally recognized 
professional appraiser organization 
under § 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i)(B) than to 
satisfy the education and experience 
requirements under § 1.170A– 
17(b)(2)(i)(A). The commenter suggested 
that the education and experience 
requirements be made more stringent. In 
enacting section 170(f)(11)(E), Congress 
intended to improve the accuracy of 
deductions claimed for noncash 
contributions by requiring qualified 
appraisers to meet more stringent 
qualification standards, including by 
requiring that both education and 
experience requirements be met. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 108–548, pt. 1, at 356 
(2004). The requirements for education 
and experience in the proposed 
regulations are sufficiently stringent as 
intended by Congress. Accordingly, the 
final regulations do not adopt this 
suggestion and retain without 
modification the requirements for 
education and experience in the 
proposed regulations. 
E. Satisfying Verifiable Education 
Requirement 
Section 170(f)(11)(E)(iii)(I) requires 
verifiable education and experience in 
valuing the type of property subject to 
the appraisal. Section 1.170A– 
17(b)(2)(i)(A) of the proposed 
regulations provides that an individual 
is treated as having education and 
experience in valuing the type of 
property if, as of the date the individual 
signs the appraisal, the individual has 
successfully completed (for example, 
received a passing grade on a final 
examination) professional or college- 
level coursework in valuing the type of 
property, and has two or more years of 
experience in valuing the type of 
property. One commenter asked 
whether attendance at a training event 
that does not include a final 
examination meets the requirement of 
successful completion of coursework. 
The reference to a passing grade on a 
final examination in § 1.170A– 
17(b)(2)(i)(A) is merely an example of 
what is considered successful 
completion of professional or college- 
level coursework, and other evidence of 
successful completion may be sufficient. 
However, mere attendance at a training 
event is not sufficient, and evidence of 
successful completion of coursework is 
necessary under the final regulations. 
F. Education Provided by Trade 
Organization 
Two commenters pointed out that, in 
addition to generally recognized 
professional appraiser organizations, a 
generally recognized professional trade 
organization may provide coursework 
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that satisfies the requirement for 
verifiable education in valuing the type 
of property under § 1.170A– 
17(b)(2)(i)(A) and (ii)(B). The Treasury 
Department and the IRS agree with this 
comment, and the final regulations 
provide that an appraiser also can 
satisfy § 1.170A–17(b)(2)(i)(A) and 
(ii)(B) by successfully completing 
coursework in valuing the type of 
property from a generally recognized 
professional trade organization. 
G. Examples of Generally Recognized 
Professional Appraiser Organizations 
Some commenters objected to the 
references in the proposed regulations 
to designations conferred by one 
particular organization as examples of 
recognized appraiser designations. The 
Treasury Department and the IRS do not 
require or prefer the designation of any 
particular appraiser organization, and, 
therefore, the final regulations do not 
contain examples of any designations. 
IV. Additional Comments 
A number of commenters requested 
that the Treasury Department and the 
IRS provide that the final regulations 
apply to charitable contributions for all 
federal tax purposes, including estate 
and gift tax. These regulations are 
promulgated under Jobs Act and PPA 
provisions that apply only to income tax 
deductions for charitable contributions 
under section 170. No substantive 
changes were made to the proposed 
regulations in response to these 
comments because these comments 
were beyond the scope of the proposed 
regulations. 
Some commenters suggested that 
appraisers be allowed to use certain IRS 
valuation tables, such as those for 
charitable remainder trusts, other 
remainder interests in property, and life 
insurance policies, instead of a qualified 
appraisal. These tables may be used to 
value property in certain other contexts, 
but they do not necessarily provide a 
fair market value of the property 
contributed. Therefore, these tables are 
not acceptable substitutes for a qualified 
appraisal to substantiate deductions for 
charitable contributions under section 
170. 
Another commenter suggested that 
taxpayers should not be required to 
substantiate their charitable 
contribution deduction with a qualified 
appraisal when they purchase medical 
equipment, such as a Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine, and 
donate the equipment to a qualified 
organization. The purchase price of the 
medical equipment may differ from its 
fair market value. A qualified appraisal 
prepared by a qualified appraiser is 
required to determine the fair market 
value at the time of contribution. 
Therefore, no changes were made to the 
proposed regulations in response to this 
comment. 
Effect on Other Documents 
Notice 2006–96 provides transitional 
guidance on the definitions of qualified 
appraisal and qualified appraiser under 
section 170(f)(11). Notice 2006–110 
provides transitional guidance under 
section 170(f)(17) for substantiating 
charitable contributions made by 
payroll deduction. Notice 2008–16 
provides transitional guidance under 
section 170(f)(17) for substantiating a 
one-time, lump-sum charitable 
contribution of a cash, check, or other 
monetary gift made through the CFC or 
a similar program. All three notices 
provide that taxpayers may rely on the 
notices until final regulations are 
effective. Accordingly, Notice 2006–110 
and Notice 2008–16 are obsolete as of 
July 30, 2018 and Notice 2006–96 is 
obsolete as of January 1, 2019. 
V. Applicability Dates 
In general, §§ 1.170A–15, 1.170A–16, 
and 1.170A–18 apply to contributions 
made after July 30, 2018. Section 
1.170A–17 applies to contributions 
made on or after January 1, 2019. 
Taxpayers are reminded that the 
effective dates of the Jobs Act and the 
PPA relating to substantiating and 
reporting charitable contributions 
precede the effective date of these final 
regulations, and the Jobs Act and the 
PPA apply in accordance with their 
applicability dates. See Notice 2006–96. 
Special Analyses 
This regulation is not subject to 
review under section 6(b) of Executive 
Order 12866 pursuant to the 
Memorandum of Agreement (April 11, 
2018) between the Department of the 
Treasury and the Office of Management 
and Budget regarding review of tax 
regulations. Further it is hereby certified 
that these regulations will not have a 
significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. 
Accordingly, a Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is 
not required. Although this rule could 
affect a substantial number of small 
entities, any economic impact is 
expected to be minimal. The final rule 
provides clarifications and 
simplifications to the existing 
substantiation and reporting 
requirements for charitable 
contributions and are designed to 
reduce the burden on taxpayers. 
Further, any substantiation and 
reporting rules contained in these final 
regulations that are in addition to the 
rules in current regulations reflect 
statutory substantiation and reporting 
requirements. Pursuant to section 
7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
the notice of proposed rulemaking 
preceding this regulation was submitted 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration for 
comment on its impact on small 
business, and no comments were 
received. 
Drafting Information 
The principal author of these 
regulations is Charles Gorham of the 
Office of Associate Chief Counsel 
(Income Tax and Accounting). Other 
personnel from the Treasury 
Department and the IRS participated in 
their development. 
List of Subjects 
26 CFR Part 1 
Income taxes, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements. 
26 CFR Part 602 
Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. 
Adoption of Amendments to the 
Regulations 
Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602 
are amended as follows: 
PART 1—INCOME TAXES 
■ Paragraph 1. The authority citation 
for part 1 amended by adding sectional 
authorities for §§ 1.170A–15 through 
1.170A–18 in numerical order to read in 
part as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * * 
* * * * * 
§ 1.170A–15 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 
170(a)(1). 
§ 1.170A–16 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 
170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11). 
§ 1.170A–17 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 
170(a)(1) and 170(f)(11). 
§ 1.170A–18 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 
170(a)(1). 
* * * * * 
§§ 1.170–0, 1.170–1, and 1.170–2 
[Removed] 
■ Par. 2. Sections 1.170–0, 1.170–1, and 
1.170–2 are removed. 
■ Par. 3. Section 1.170A–1 is amended 
by revising the third sentence of 
paragraph (a) and adding two sentences 
to the end of paragraph (k) to read as 
follows: 
§ 1.170A–1 Charitable, etc., contributions 
and gifts; allowance of deduction. 
(a) * * * For rules relating to record 
keeping and return requirements in 
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support of deductions for charitable 
contributions (whether by an itemizing 
or nonitemizing taxpayer), see 
§§ 1.170A–13, 1.170A–14, 1.170A–15, 
1.170A–16, 1.170A–17, and 
1.170A–18. * * * 
* * * * * 
(k) * * * The third sentence of 
paragraph (a) applies as provided in the 
sections referenced in that sentence. 
■ Par. 4. Section 1.170A–13 is amended 
by revising the heading to read as 
follows: 
§ 1.170A–13 Recordkeeping and return 
requirements for deductions for charitable 
contributions. 
* * * * * 
■ Par. 5. Section 1.170A–14 is amended 
by revising paragraphs (i) and (j) to read 
as follows: 
§ 1.170A–14. Qualified conservation 
contributions. 
* * * * * 
(i) Substantiation requirement. If a 
taxpayer makes a qualified conservation 
contribution and claims a deduction, 
the taxpayer must maintain written 
records of the fair market value of the 
underlying property before and after the 
donation and the conservation purpose 
furthered by the donation, and such 
information shall be stated in the 
taxpayer’s income tax return if required 
by the return or its instructions. See also 
§ 1.170A–13(c) (relating to 
substantiation requirements for 
deductions in excess of $5,000 for 
charitable contributions made on or 
before July 30, 2018); § 1.170A–16(d) 
(relating to substantiation of charitable 
contributions of more than $5,000 made 
after July 30, 2018); § 1.170A–17 
(relating to the definitions of qualified 
appraisal and qualified appraiser for 
substantiation of contributions made on 
or after January 1, 2019); and section 
6662 (relating to the imposition of an 
accuracy-related penalty on 
underpayments). Taxpayers may rely on 
the rules in § 1.170A–16(d) for 
contributions made after June 3, 2004, 
or appraisals prepared for returns or 
submissions filed after August 17, 2006. 
Taxpayers may rely on the rules in 
§ 1.170A–17 for appraisals prepared for 
returns or submissions filed after 
August 17, 2006. 
(j) Effective/applicability dates. 
Except as otherwise provided in 
§ 1.170A–14(g)(4)(ii) and § 1.170A–14(i), 
this section applies only to 
contributions made on or after 
December 18, 1980. 
■ Par. 6. Section 1.170A–15 is added to 
read as follows: 
§ 1.170A–15 Substantiation requirements 
for charitable contribution of a cash, check, 
or other monetary gift. 
(a) In general—(1) Bank record or 
written communication required. No 
deduction is allowed under sections 
170(a) and 170(f)(17) for a charitable 
contribution in the form of a cash, 
check, or other monetary gift, as 
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section, unless the donor substantiates 
the deduction with a bank record, as 
described in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section, or a written communication, as 
described in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section, from the donee showing the 
name of the donee, the date of the 
contribution, and the amount of the 
contribution. 
(2) Additional substantiation required 
for contributions of $250 or more. No 
deduction is allowed under section 
170(a) for any contribution of $250 or 
more unless the donor substantiates the 
contribution with a contemporaneous 
written acknowledgment, as described 
in section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f), 
from the donee. 
(3) Single document may be used. The 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and 
(2) of this section may be met by a single 
document that contains all the 
information required by paragraphs 
(a)(1) and (2) of this section, if the 
document is obtained by the donor no 
later than the date prescribed by 
paragraph (c) of this section. 
(b) Terms—(1) Monetary gift includes 
a transfer of a gift card redeemable for 
cash, and a payment made by credit 
card, electronic fund transfer (as 
described in section 5061(e)(2)), an 
online payment service, or payroll 
deduction. 
(2) Bank record includes a statement 
from a financial institution, an 
electronic fund transfer receipt, a 
canceled check, a scanned image of both 
sides of a canceled check obtained from 
a bank website, or a credit card 
statement. 
(3) Written communication includes 
email. 
(c) Deadline for receipt of 
substantiation. The substantiation 
described in paragraph (a) of this 
section must be received by the donor 
on or before the earlier of— 
(1) The date the donor files the 
original return for the taxable year in 
which the contribution was made; or 
(2) The due date, including any 
extension, for filing the donor’s original 
return for that year. 
(d) Special rules—(1) Contributions 
made by payroll deduction. In the case 
of a charitable contribution made by 
payroll deduction, a donor is treated as 
meeting the requirements of section 
170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this 
section if, no later than the date 
described in paragraph (c) of this 
section, the donor obtains— 
(i) A pay stub, Form W–2, ‘‘Wage and 
Tax Statement,’’ or other employer- 
furnished document that sets forth the 
amount withheld during the taxable 
year for payment to a donee; and 
(ii) A pledge card or other document 
prepared by or at the direction of the 
donee that shows the name of the 
donee. 
(2) Distributing organizations as 
donees. The following organizations are 
treated as donees for purposes of section 
170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this 
section, even if the organization 
(pursuant to the donor’s instructions or 
otherwise) distributes the amount 
received to one or more organizations 
described in section 170(c): 
(i) An organization described in 
section 170(c). 
(ii) An organization described in 5 
CFR 950.105 (a Principal Combined 
Fund Organization (PCFO) for purposes 
of the Combined Federal Campaign 
(CFC)) and acting in that capacity. For 
purposes of the requirement for a 
written communication under section 
170(f)(17), if the donee is a PCFO, the 
name of the local CFC campaign may be 
treated as the name of the donee 
organization. 
(e) Substantiation of out-of-pocket 
expenses. Paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section does not apply to a donor who 
incurs unreimbursed expenses of less 
than $250 incident to the rendition of 
services, within the meaning of 
§ 1.170A–1(g). For substantiation of 
unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses of 
$250 or more, see § 1.170A–13(f)(10). 
(f) Charitable contributions made by 
partnership or S corporation. If a 
partnership or an S corporation makes 
a charitable contribution, the 
partnership or S corporation is treated 
as the donor for purposes of section 
170(f)(17) and paragraph (a) of this 
section. 
(g) Transfers to certain trusts. The 
requirements of section 170(f)(17) and 
paragraphs (a)(1) and (3) of this section 
do not apply to a transfer of a cash, 
check, or other monetary gift to a trust 
described in section 170(f)(2)(B); a 
charitable remainder annuity trust, as 
described in section 664(d)(1) and the 
corresponding regulations; or a 
charitable remainder unitrust, as 
described in section 664(d)(2) or (d)(3) 
and the corresponding regulations. The 
requirements of section 170(f)(17) and 
paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section 
do apply, however, to a transfer to a 
pooled income fund, as defined in 
section 642(c)(5). 
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(h) Effective/applicability date. This 
section applies to contributions made 
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely 
on the rules of this section for 
contributions made in taxable years 
beginning after August 17, 2006. 
■ Par. 7. Section 1.170A–16 is added to 
read as follows: 
§ 1.170A–16 Substantiation and reporting 
requirements for noncash charitable 
contributions. 
(a) Substantiation of charitable 
contributions of less than $250—(1) 
Individuals, partnerships, and certain 
corporations required to obtain receipt. 
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section, no deduction is allowed 
under section 170(a) for a noncash 
charitable contribution of less than $250 
by an individual, partnership, S 
corporation, or C corporation that is a 
personal service corporation or closely 
held corporation unless the donor 
maintains for each contribution a 
receipt from the donee showing the 
following information: 
(i) The name and address of the 
donee; 
(ii) The date of the contribution; 
(iii) A description of the property in 
sufficient detail under the 
circumstances (taking into account the 
value of the property) for a person who 
is not generally familiar with the type of 
property to ascertain that the described 
property is the contributed property; 
and 
(iv) In the case of securities, the name 
of the issuer, the type of security, and 
whether the securities are publicly 
traded securities within the meaning of 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi). 
(2) Substitution of reliable written 
records—(i) In general. If it is 
impracticable to obtain a receipt (for 
example, where a donor deposits 
property at a donee’s unattended drop 
site), the donor may satisfy the 
recordkeeping rules of this paragraph (a) 
by maintaining reliable written records, 
as described in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and 
(iii) of this section, for the contributed 
property. 
(ii) Reliable written records. The 
reliability of written records is to be 
determined on the basis of all of the 
facts and circumstances of a particular 
case, including the proximity in time of 
the written record to the contribution. 
(iii) Contents of reliable written 
records. Reliable written records must 
include— 
(A) The information required by 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section; 
(B) The fair market value of the 
property on the date the contribution 
was made; 
(C) The method used in determining 
the fair market value; and 
(D) In the case of a contribution of 
clothing or a household item as defined 
in § 1.170A–18(c), the condition of the 
item. 
(3) Additional substantiation rules 
may apply. For additional 
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of 
this section. 
(b) Substantiation of charitable 
contributions of $250 or more but not 
more than $500. No deduction is 
allowed under section 170(a) for a 
noncash charitable contribution of $250 
or more but not more than $500 unless 
the donor substantiates the contribution 
with a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, as described in 
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f). 
(c) Substantiation of charitable 
contributions of more than $500 but not 
more than $5,000—(1) In general. No 
deduction is allowed under section 
170(a) for a noncash charitable 
contribution of more than $500 but not 
more than $5,000 unless the donor 
substantiates the contribution with a 
contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, as described in 
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f), and 
meets the applicable requirements of 
this section. 
(2) Individuals, partnerships, and 
certain corporations also required to file 
Form 8283 (Section A). No deduction is 
allowed under section 170(a) for a 
noncash charitable contribution of more 
than $500 but not more than $5,000 by 
an individual, partnership, S 
corporation, or C corporation that is a 
personal service corporation or closely 
held corporation unless the donor 
completes Form 8283 (Section A), 
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’ as 
provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this 
section, or a successor form, and files it 
with the return on which the deduction 
is claimed. 
(3) Completion of Form 8283 (Section 
A). A completed Form 8283 (Section A) 
includes— 
(i) The donor’s name and taxpayer 
identification number (for example, a 
social security number or employer 
identification number); 
(ii) The name and address of the 
donee; 
(iii) The date of the contribution; 
(iv) The following information about 
the contributed property: 
(A) A description of the property in 
sufficient detail under the 
circumstances, taking into account the 
value of the property, for a person who 
is not generally familiar with the type of 
property to ascertain that the described 
property is the contributed property; 
(B) In the case of real or tangible 
personal property, the condition of the 
property; 
(C) In the case of securities, the name 
of the issuer, the type of security, and 
whether the securities are publicly 
traded securities within the meaning of 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi); 
(D) The fair market value of the 
property on the date the contribution 
was made and the method used in 
determining the fair market value; 
(E) The manner of acquisition (for 
example, by purchase, gift, bequest, 
inheritance, or exchange), and the 
approximate date of acquisition of the 
property by the donor (except that in the 
case of a contribution of publicly traded 
securities as defined in § 1.170A– 
13(c)(7)(xi), a representation that the 
donor held the securities for more than 
one year is sufficient) or, if the property 
was created, produced, or manufactured 
by or for the donor, the approximate 
date the property was substantially 
completed; 
(F) The cost or other basis, adjusted as 
provided by section 1016, of the 
property (except that the cost or basis is 
not required for contributions of 
publicly traded securities (as defined in 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi)) that would have 
resulted in long-term capital gain if sold 
on the contribution date, unless the 
donor has elected to limit the deduction 
to basis under section 170(b)(1)(C)(iii)); 
(G) In the case of tangible personal 
property, whether the donee has 
certified it for a use related to the 
purpose or function constituting the 
donee’s basis for exemption under 
section 501, or in the case of a 
governmental unit, an exclusively 
public purpose; and 
(v) Any other information required by 
Form 8283 (Section A) or the 
instructions to Form 8283 (Section A). 
(4) Additional requirement for certain 
vehicle contributions. In the case of a 
contribution of a qualified vehicle 
described in section 170(f)(12)(E) for 
which an acknowledgment by the donee 
organization is required under section 
170(f)(12)(D), the donor must attach a 
copy of the acknowledgment to the 
Form 8283 (Section A) for the return on 
which the deduction is claimed. 
(5) Additional substantiation rules 
may apply. For additional 
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of 
this section. 
(d) Substantiation of charitable 
contributions of more than $5,000—(1) 
In general. Except as provided in 
paragraph (d)(2) of this section, no 
deduction is allowed under section 
170(a) for a noncash charitable 
contribution of more than $5,000 unless 
the donor— 
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(i) Substantiates the contribution with 
a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, as described in 
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f); 
(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal, as 
defined in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), prepared 
by a qualified appraiser, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–17(b)(1); and 
(iii) Completes Form 8283 (Section B), 
as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this 
section, or a successor form, and files it 
with the return on which the deduction 
is claimed. 
(2) Exception for certain noncash 
contributions. A qualified appraisal is 
not required, and a completed Form 
8283 (Section A) containing the 
information required in paragraph (c)(3) 
of this section meets the requirements of 
paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section for 
contributions of— 
(i) Publicly traded securities as 
defined in § 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi); 
(ii) Property described in section 
170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (certain intellectual 
property); 
(iii) A qualified vehicle described in 
section 170(f)(12)(A)(ii) for which an 
acknowledgment under section 
170(f)(12)(B)(iii) is provided; and 
(iv) Property described in section 
1221(a)(1) (inventory and property held 
by the donor primarily for sale to 
customers in the ordinary course of the 
donor’s trade or business). 
(3) Completed Form 8283 (Section B). 
A completed Form 8283 (Section B) 
includes— 
(i) The donor’s name and taxpayer 
identification number (for example, a 
social security number or employer 
identification number); 
(ii) The donee’s name, address, 
taxpayer identification number, 
signature, the date signed by the donee, 
and the date the donee received the 
property; 
(iii) The appraiser’s name, address, 
taxpayer identification number, 
appraiser declaration, as described in 
paragraph (d)(4) of this section, 
signature, and the date signed by the 
appraiser; 
(iv) The following information about 
the contributed property: 
(A) The fair market value on the 
valuation effective date, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–17(a)(5)(i). 
(B) A description in sufficient detail 
under the circumstances, taking into 
account the value of the property, for a 
person who is not generally familiar 
with the type of property to ascertain 
that the described property is the 
contributed property. 
(C) In the case of real property or 
tangible personal property, the 
condition of the property; 
(v) The manner of acquisition (for 
example, by purchase, gift, bequest, 
inheritance, or exchange), and the 
approximate date of acquisition of the 
property by the donor, or, if the 
property was created, produced, or 
manufactured by or for the donor, the 
approximate date the property was 
substantially completed; 
(vi) The cost or other basis of the 
property, adjusted as provided by 
section 1016; 
(vii) A statement explaining whether 
the charitable contribution was made by 
means of a bargain sale and, if so, the 
amount of any consideration received 
for the contribution; and 
(viii) Any other information required 
by Form 8283 (Section B) or the 
instructions to Form 8283 (Section B). 
(4) Appraiser declaration. The 
appraiser declaration referred to in 
paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of this section must 
include the following statement: ‘‘I 
understand that my appraisal will be 
used in connection with a return or 
claim for refund. I also understand that, 
if there is a substantial or gross 
valuation misstatement of the value of 
the property claimed on the return or 
claim for refund that is based on my 
appraisal, I may be subject to a penalty 
under section 6695A of the Internal 
Revenue Code, as well as other 
applicable penalties. I affirm that I have 
not been at any time in the three-year 
period ending on the date of the 
appraisal barred from presenting 
evidence or testimony before the 
Department of the Treasury or the 
Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. 330(c).’’ 
(5) Donee signature—(i) Person 
authorized to sign. The person who 
signs Form 8283 (Section B) for the 
donee must be either an official 
authorized to sign the tax or information 
returns of the donee, or a person 
specifically authorized to sign Forms 
8283 (Section B) by that official. In the 
case of a donee that is a governmental 
unit, the person who signs Form 8283 
(Section B) for the donee must be an 
official of the governmental unit. 
(ii) Effect of donee signature. The 
signature of the donee on Form 8283 
(Section B) does not represent 
concurrence in the appraised value of 
the contributed property. Rather, it 
represents acknowledgment of receipt of 
the property described in Form 8283 
(Section B) on the date specified in 
Form 8283 (Section B) and that the 
donee understands the information 
reporting requirements imposed by 
section 6050L and § 1.6050L–1. 
(iii) Certain information not required 
on Form 8283 (Section B) before donee 
signs. Before Form 8283 (Section B) is 
signed by the donee, Form 8283 
(Section B) must be completed (as 
described in paragraph (d)(3) of this 
section), except that it is not required to 
contain the following: 
(A) The appraiser declaration or 
information about the qualified 
appraiser. 
(B) The manner or date of acquisition. 
(C) The cost or other basis of the 
property. 
(D) The appraised fair market value of 
the contributed property. 
(E) The amount claimed as a 
charitable contribution. 
(6) Additional substantiation rules 
may apply. For additional 
substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of 
this section. 
(7) More than one appraiser. More 
than one appraiser may appraise the 
donated property. If more than one 
appraiser appraises the property, the 
donor does not have to use each 
appraiser’s appraisal for purposes of 
substantiating the charitable 
contribution deduction under this 
paragraph (d). If the donor uses the 
appraisal of more than one appraiser, or 
if two or more appraisers contribute to 
a single appraisal, each appraiser shall 
comply with the requirements of this 
paragraph (d) and the requirements in 
§ 1.170A–17, including signing the 
qualified appraisal and appraisal 
summary. 
(e) Substantiation of noncash 
charitable contributions of more than 
$500,000—(1) In general. Except as 
provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this 
section, no deduction is allowed under 
section 170(a) for a noncash charitable 
contribution of more than $500,000 
unless the donor— 
(i) Substantiates the contribution with 
a contemporaneous written 
acknowledgment, as described in 
section 170(f)(8) and § 1.170A–13(f); 
(ii) Obtains a qualified appraisal, as 
defined in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), prepared 
by a qualified appraiser, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–17(b)(1); 
(iii) Completes, as described in 
paragraph (d)(3) of this section, Form 
8283 (Section B) and files it with the 
return on which the deduction is 
claimed; and 
(iv) Attaches the qualified appraisal of 
the property to the return on which the 
deduction is claimed. 
(2) Exception for certain noncash 
contributions. For contributions of 
property described in paragraph (d)(2) 
of this section, a qualified appraisal is 
not required, and a completed Form 
8283 (Section A), containing the 
information required in paragraph (c)(3) 
of this section, meets the requirements 
of paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section. 
(3) Additional substantiation rules 
may apply. For additional 
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substantiation rules, see paragraph (f) of 
this section. 
(f) Additional substantiation rules— 
(1) Form 8283 (Section B) furnished by 
donor to donee. A donor who presents 
a Form 8283 (Section B) to a donee for 
signature must furnish to the donee a 
copy of the Form 8283 (Section B). 
(2) Number of Forms 8283 (Section A 
or Section B)—(i) In general. For each 
item of contributed property for which 
a Form 8283 (Section A or Section B) is 
required under paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) 
of this section, a donor must attach a 
separate Form 8283 (Section A or 
Section B) to the return on which the 
deduction for the item is claimed. 
(ii) Exception for similar items. The 
donor may attach a single Form 8283 
(Section A or Section B) for all similar 
items of property, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii), contributed to the 
same donee during the donor’s taxable 
year, if the donor includes on Form 
8283 (Section A or Section B) the 
information required by paragraph (c)(3) 
or (d)(3) of this section for each item of 
property. 
(3) Substantiation requirements for 
carryovers of noncash contribution 
deductions. The rules in paragraphs (c), 
(d), and (e) of this section (regarding 
substantiation that must be submitted 
with a return) also apply to the return 
for any carryover year under section 
170(d). 
(4) Partners and S corporation 
shareholders—(i) Form 8283 (Section A 
or Section B) must be provided to 
partners and S corporation 
shareholders. If the donor is a 
partnership or S corporation, the donor 
must provide a copy of the completed 
Form 8283 (Section A or Section B) to 
every partner or shareholder who 
receives an allocation of a charitable 
contribution deduction under section 
170 for the property described in Form 
8283 (Section A or Section B). Similarly, 
a recipient partner or shareholder that is 
a partnership or S corporation must 
provide a copy of the completed Form 
8283 (Section A or Section B) to each of 
its partners or shareholders who 
receives an allocation of a charitable 
contribution deduction under section 
170 for the property described in Form 
8283 (Section A or Section B). 
(ii) Partners and S corporation 
shareholders must attach Form 8283 
(Section A or Section B) to return. A 
partner of a partnership or shareholder 
of an S corporation who receives an 
allocation of a charitable contribution 
deduction under section 170 for 
property to which paragraph (c), (d), or 
(e) of this section applies must attach a 
copy of the partnership’s or S 
corporation’s completed Form 8283 
(Section A or Section B) to the return on 
which the deduction is claimed. 
(5) Determination of deduction 
amount for purposes of substantiation 
rules—(i) In general. In determining 
whether the amount of a donor’s 
deduction exceeds the amounts set forth 
in section 170(f)(11)(B) (noncash 
contributions exceeding $500), 
170(f)(11)(C) (noncash contributions 
exceeding $5,000), or 170(f)(11)(D) 
(noncash contributions exceeding 
$500,000), the rules of paragraphs 
(f)(5)(ii) and (iii) of this section apply. 
(ii) Similar items of property must be 
aggregated. Under section 170(f)(11)(F), 
the donor must aggregate the amount 
claimed as a deduction for all similar 
items of property, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii), contributed 
during the taxable year. For rules 
regarding the number of qualified 
appraisals and Forms 8283 (Section A or 
Section B) required if similar items of 
property are contributed, see § 1.170A– 
13(c)(3)(iv)(A) and (4)(iv)(B). 
(iii) For contributions of certain 
inventory and scientific property, excess 
of amount claimed over cost of goods 
sold taken into account—(A) In general. 
In determining the amount of a donor’s 
contribution of property to which 
section 170(e)(3) (relating to 
contributions of inventory and other 
property) or (e)(4) (relating to 
contributions of scientific property used 
for research) applies, the donor must 
take into account only the excess of the 
amount claimed as a deduction over the 
amount that would have been treated as 
the cost of goods sold if the donor had 
sold the contributed property to the 
donee. 
(B) Example. The following example 
illustrates the rule of this paragraph 
(f)(5)(iii): 
Example. X Corporation makes a 
contribution of inventory described in 
section 1221(a)(2). The contribution, 
described in section 170(e)(3), is for the care 
of the needy. The cost of the property to X 
Corporation is $5,000 and the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the 
contribution is $11,000. Pursuant to section 
170(e)(3)(B), X Corporation claims a 
charitable contribution deduction of $8,000 
($5,000 + 1⁄2 × ($11,000 ¥ 5,000) = $8,000). 
The amount taken into account for purposes 
of determining the $5,000 threshold of 
paragraph (d) of this section is $3,000 
($8,000¥$5,000). 
(g) Effective/applicability date. This 
section applies to contributions made 
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely 
on the rules of this section for 
contributions made after June 3, 2004, 
or appraisals prepared for returns or 
submissions filed after August 17, 2006. 
■ Par. 8. Section 1.170A–17 is added to 
read as follows: 
§ 1.170A–17 Qualified appraisal and 
qualified appraiser. 
(a) Qualified appraisal—(1) 
Definition. For purposes of section 
170(f)(11) and § 1.170A–16(d)(1)(ii) and 
(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraisal 
means an appraisal document that is 
prepared by a qualified appraiser (as 
defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section) in accordance with generally 
accepted appraisal standards (as defined 
in paragraph (a)(2) of this section) and 
otherwise complies with the 
requirements of this paragraph (a). 
(2) Generally accepted appraisal 
standards defined. For purposes of 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section, 
generally accepted appraisal standards 
means the substance and principles of 
the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice, as developed by the 
Appraisal Standards Board of the 
Appraisal Foundation. 
(3) Contents of qualified appraisal. A 
qualified appraisal must include— 
(i) The following information about 
the contributed property: 
(A) A description in sufficient detail 
under the circumstances, taking into 
account the value of the property, for a 
person who is not generally familiar 
with the type of property to ascertain 
that the appraised property is the 
contributed property. 
(B) In the case of real property or 
tangible personal property, the 
condition of the property. 
(C) The valuation effective date, as 
defined in paragraph (a)(5)(i) of this 
section. 
(D) The fair market value, within the 
meaning of § 1.170A–1(c)(2), of the 
contributed property on the valuation 
effective date; 
(ii) The terms of any agreement or 
understanding by or on behalf of the 
donor and donee that relates to the use, 
sale, or other disposition of the 
contributed property, including, for 
example, the terms of any agreement or 
understanding that— 
(A) Restricts temporarily or 
permanently a donee’s right to use or 
dispose of the contributed property; 
(B) Reserves to, or confers upon, 
anyone, other than a donee or an 
organization participating with a donee 
in cooperative fundraising, any right to 
the income from the contributed 
property or to the possession of the 
property, including the right to vote 
contributed securities, to acquire the 
property by purchase or otherwise, or to 
designate the person having income, 
possession, or right to acquire; or 
(C) Earmarks contributed property for 
a particular use; 
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(iii) The date, or expected date, of the 
contribution to the donee; 
(iv) The following information about 
the appraiser: 
(A) Name, address, and taxpayer 
identification number. 
(B) Qualifications to value the type of 
property being valued, including the 
appraiser’s education and experience. 
(C) If the appraiser is acting in his or 
her capacity as a partner in a 
partnership, an employee of any person, 
whether an individual, corporation, or 
partnership, or an independent 
contractor engaged by a person other 
than the donor, the name, address, and 
taxpayer identification number of the 
partnership or the person who employs 
or engages the qualified appraiser; 
(v) The signature of the appraiser and 
the date signed by the appraiser 
(appraisal report date); 
(vi) The following declaration by the 
appraiser: ‘‘I understand that my 
appraisal will be used in connection 
with a return or claim for refund. I also 
understand that, if there is a substantial 
or gross valuation misstatement of the 
value of the property claimed on the 
return or claim for refund that is based 
on my appraisal, I may be subject to a 
penalty under section 6695A of the 
Internal Revenue Code, as well as other 
applicable penalties. I affirm that I have 
not been at any time in the three-year 
period ending on the date of the 
appraisal barred from presenting 
evidence or testimony before the 
Department of the Treasury or the 
Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. 330(c)’’; 
(vii) A statement that the appraisal 
was prepared for income tax purposes; 
(viii) The method of valuation used to 
determine the fair market value, such as 
the income approach, the market-data 
approach, or the replacement-cost-less- 
depreciation approach; and 
(ix) The specific basis for the 
valuation, such as specific comparable 
sales transactions or statistical 
sampling, including a justification for 
using sampling and an explanation of 
the sampling procedure employed. 
(4) Timely appraisal report. A 
qualified appraisal must be signed and 
dated by the qualified appraiser no 
earlier than 60 days before the date of 
the contribution and no later than— 
(i) The due date, including 
extensions, of the return on which the 
deduction for the contribution is first 
claimed; 
(ii) In the case of a donor that is a 
partnership or S corporation, the due 
date, including extensions, of the return 
on which the deduction for the 
contribution is first reported; or 
(iii) In the case of a deduction first 
claimed on an amended return, the date 
on which the amended return is filed. 
(5) Valuation effective date—(i) 
Definition. The valuation effective date 
is the date to which the value opinion 
applies. 
(ii) Timely valuation effective date. 
For an appraisal report dated before the 
date of the contribution, as described in 
§ 1.170A–1(b), the valuation effective 
date must be no earlier than 60 days 
before the date of the contribution and 
no later than the date of the 
contribution. For an appraisal report 
dated on or after the date of the 
contribution, the valuation effective 
date must be the date of the 
contribution. 
(6) Exclusion for donor knowledge of 
falsity. An appraisal is not a qualified 
appraisal for a particular contribution, 
even if the requirements of this 
paragraph (a) are met, if the donor either 
failed to disclose or misrepresented 
facts, and a reasonable person would 
expect that this failure or 
misrepresentation would cause the 
appraiser to misstate the value of the 
contributed property. 
(7) Number of appraisals required. A 
donor must obtain a separate qualified 
appraisal for each item of property for 
which an appraisal is required under 
section 170(f)(11)(C) and (D) and 
paragraph (d) or (e) of § 1.170A–16 and 
that is not included in a group of similar 
items of property, as defined in 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(iii). For rules 
regarding the number of appraisals 
required if similar items of property are 
contributed, see section 170(f)(11)(F) 
and § 1.170A–13(c)(3)(iv)(A). 
(8) Time of receipt of qualified 
appraisal. The qualified appraisal must 
be received by the donor before the due 
date, including extensions, of the return 
on which a deduction is first claimed, 
or reported in the case of a donor that 
is a partnership or S corporation, under 
section 170 with respect to the donated 
property, or, in the case of a deduction 
first claimed, or reported, on an 
amended return, the date on which the 
return is filed. 
(9) Prohibited appraisal fees. The fee 
for a qualified appraisal cannot be based 
to any extent on the appraised value of 
the property. For example, a fee for an 
appraisal will be treated as based on the 
appraised value of the property if any 
part of the fee depends on the amount 
of the appraised value that is allowed by 
the Internal Revenue Service after an 
examination. 
(10) Retention of qualified appraisal. 
The donor must retain the qualified 
appraisal for so long as it may be 
relevant in the administration of any 
internal revenue law. 
(11) Effect of appraisal disregarded 
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 330(c). If an 
appraiser has been prohibited from 
practicing before the Internal Revenue 
Service by the Secretary under 31 U.S.C. 
330(c) at any time during the three-year 
period ending on the date the appraisal 
is signed by the appraiser, any appraisal 
prepared by the appraiser will be 
disregarded as to value, but could 
constitute a qualified appraisal if the 
requirements of this section are 
otherwise satisfied, and the donor had 
no knowledge that the signature, date, 
or declaration was false when the 
appraisal and Form 8283 (Section B) 
were signed by the appraiser. 
(12) Partial interest. If the contributed 
property is a partial interest, the 
appraisal must be of the partial interest. 
(b) Qualified appraiser—(1) 
Definition. For purposes of section 
170(f)(11) and § 1.170A–16(d)(1)(ii) and 
(e)(1)(ii), the term qualified appraiser 
means an individual with verifiable 
education and experience in valuing the 
type of property for which the appraisal 
is performed, as described in paragraphs 
(b)(2) through (4) of this section. 
(2) Education and experience in 
valuing the type of property—(i) In 
general. An individual is treated as 
having education and experience in 
valuing the type of property within the 
meaning of paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section if, as of the date the individual 
signs the appraisal, the individual has— 
(A) Successfully completed (for 
example, received a passing grade on a 
final examination) professional or 
college-level coursework, as described 
in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, in 
valuing the type of property, as 
described in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section, and has two or more years of 
experience in valuing the type of 
property, as described in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section; or 
(B) Earned a recognized appraiser 
designation, as described in paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii) of this section, for the type of 
property, as described in paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section. 
(ii) Coursework must be obtained from 
an educational organization, generally 
recognized professional trade or 
appraiser organization, or employer 
educational program. For purposes of 
paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section, the 
coursework must be obtained from— 
(A) A professional or college-level 
educational organization described in 
section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); 
(B) A generally recognized 
professional trade or appraiser 
organization that regularly offers 
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educational programs in valuing the 
type of property; or 
(C) An employer as part of an 
employee apprenticeship or educational 
program substantially similar to the 
educational programs described in 
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this 
section. 
(iii) Recognized appraiser designation 
defined. A recognized appraiser 
designation means a designation 
awarded by a generally recognized 
professional appraiser organization on 
the basis of demonstrated competency. 
(3) Type of property defined—(i) In 
general. The type of property means the 
category of property customary in the 
appraisal field for an appraiser to value. 
(ii) Examples. The following 
examples illustrate the rule of 
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this 
section: 
Example (1). Coursework in valuing type of 
property. There are very few professional- 
level courses offered in widget appraising, 
and it is customary in the appraisal field for 
personal property appraisers to appraise 
widgets. Appraiser A has successfully 
completed professional-level coursework in 
valuing personal property generally but has 
completed no coursework in valuing widgets. 
The coursework completed by Appraiser A is 
for the type of property under paragraphs 
(b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this section. 
Example (2). Experience in valuing type of 
property. It is customary for professional 
antique appraisers to appraise antique 
widgets. Appraiser B has 2 years of 
experience in valuing antiques generally and 
is asked to appraise an antique widget. 
Appraiser B has obtained experience in 
valuing the type of property under 
paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this 
section. 
Example (3). No experience in valuing type 
of property. It is not customary for 
professional antique appraisers to appraise 
new widgets. Appraiser C has experience in 
appraising antiques generally but no 
experience in appraising new widgets. 
Appraiser C is asked to appraise a new 
widget. Appraiser C does not have 
experience in valuing the type of property 
under paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (b)(3)(i) of this 
section. 
(4) Verifiable. For purposes of 
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 
education and experience in valuing the 
type of property are verifiable if the 
appraiser specifies in the appraisal the 
appraiser’s education and experience in 
valuing the type of property, as 
described in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of 
this section, and the appraiser makes a 
declaration in the appraisal that, 
because of the appraiser’s education and 
experience, the appraiser is qualified to 
make appraisals of the type of property 
being valued. 
(5) Individuals who are not qualified 
appraisers. The following individuals 
are not qualified appraisers for the 
appraised property: 
(i) An individual who receives a fee 
prohibited by paragraph (a)(9) of this 
section for the appraisal of the 
appraised property. 
(ii) The donor of the property. 
(iii) A party to the transaction in 
which the donor acquired the property 
(for example, the individual who sold, 
exchanged, or gave the property to the 
donor, or any individual who acted as 
an agent for the transferor or for the 
donor for the sale, exchange, or gift), 
unless the property is contributed 
within 2 months of the date of 
acquisition and its appraised value does 
not exceed its acquisition price. 
(iv) The donee of the property. 
(v) Any individual who is either— 
(A) Related, within the meaning of 
section 267(b), to, or an employee of, an 
individual described in paragraph 
(b)(5)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section; 
(B) Married to an individual described 
in paragraph (b)(5)(v)(A) of this section; 
or 
(C) An independent contractor who is 
regularly used as an appraiser by any of 
the individuals described in paragraph 
(b)(5)(ii), (iii), or (iv) of this section, and 
who does not perform a majority of his 
or her appraisals for others during the 
taxable year. 
(vi) An individual who is prohibited 
from practicing before the Internal 
Revenue Service by the Secretary under 
31 U.S.C. 330(c) at any time during the 
three-year period ending on the date the 
appraisal is signed by the individual. 
(c) Effective/applicability date. This 
section applies to contributions made 
on or after January 1, 2019. Taxpayers 
may rely on the rules of this section for 
appraisals prepared for returns or 
submissions filed after August 17, 2006. 
■ Par. 9. Section 1.170A–18 is added to 
read as follows: 
§ 1.170A–18 Contributions of clothing and 
household items. 
(a) In general. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this section, no 
deduction is allowed under section 
170(a) for a contribution of clothing or 
a household item (as described in 
paragraph (c) of this section) unless— 
(1) The item is in good used condition 
or better at the time of the contribution; 
and 
(2) The donor meets the 
substantiation requirements of 
§ 1.170A–16. 
(b) Certain contributions of clothing or 
household items with claimed value of 
more than $500. The rule described in 
paragraph (a)(1) of this section does not 
apply to a contribution of a single item 
of clothing or a household item for 
which a deduction of more than $500 is 
claimed, if the donor submits with the 
return on which the deduction is 
claimed a qualified appraisal, as defined 
in § 1.170A–17(a)(1), of the property 
prepared by a qualified appraiser, as 
defined in § 1.170A–17(b)(1), and a 
completed Form 8283 (Section B), 
‘‘Noncash Charitable Contributions,’’ as 
described in § 1.170A–16(d)(3). 
(c) Definition of household items. For 
purposes of section 170(f)(16) and this 
section, the term household items 
includes furniture, furnishings, 
electronics, appliances, linens, and 
other similar items. Food, paintings, 
antiques, and other objects of art, 
jewelry, gems, and collections are not 
household items. 
(d) Effective/applicability date. This 
section applies to contributions made 
after July 30, 2018. Taxpayers may rely 
on the rules of this section for 
contributions made after August 17, 
2006. 
■ Par. 10. § 1.664–1 is amended by 
revising paragraph (a)(7)(i)(b) and 
adding a sentence to the end of 
paragraph (f)(1) to read as follows: 
§ 1.664–1. Charitable remainder trusts. 
(a) * * * 
(7) * * * 
(i) * * * 
(b) Determined by a current qualified 
appraisal from a qualified appraiser, as 
those terms are defined in— 
(1) Section 1.170A–13(c)(3) and 
1.170A–13(c)(5), respectively, for 
appraisals prepared for returns or 
submissions filed on or before August 
17, 2006; 
(2) Section 3 of Notice 2006–96, 
2006–2 CB 902, for appraisals prepared 
for returns or submissions filed after 
August 17, 2006, if the donations are 
made before January 1, 2019; or 
(3) Section 1.170A–17(a) and 1.170A– 
17(b), respectively, for appraisals 
prepared for returns or submissions for 
donations made on or after January 1, 
2019. 
* * * * * 
(f) * * * 
(1) * * * The provisions of paragraph 
§ 1.664–1(a)(7)(i)(b) apply as provided 
in that paragraph. 
* * * * * 
■ Par. 10. § 1.6050L–1 is amended by: 
■ 1. Revising the first two sentences of 
paragraph (a)(2)(i). 
■ 2. Revising paragraphs (c)(4)(i) 
introductory text and (d)(2). 
■ 3. Revising the first sentences of 
paragraphs (e) and (f)(2)(ii). 
■ 4. Adding paragraph (h). 
The revisions and addition read as 
follows: 
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§ 1.6050L–1. Information return by donees 
relating to certain dispositions of donated 
property. 
(a) * * * 
(2) * * * 
(i) In general. Paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section shall not apply with respect to 
an item of charitable deduction property 
disposed of by sale if the Form 8283 
appraisal summary (as described in 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(4) for contributions 
made on or before July 30, 2018 and 
§ 1.170A–16(d)(3) for contributions 
made after July 30, 2018), or a successor 
form, signed by the donee with respect 
to the item contains, at the time of the 
donee’s signature, a statement signed by 
the donor that the appraised value of the 
item does not exceed $500. In the case 
of a Form 8283 appraisal summary that 
describes more than one item, this 
exception shall apply only with respect 
to an item clearly identified as having 
an appraised value of $500 or 
less. * * * 
* * * * * 
(c) * * * 
(4) * * * 
(i) Shall provide its name, address, 
and employer identification number and 
a copy of the Form 8283 appraisal 
summary (as described in § 1.170A– 
13(c)(4) for contributions made on or 
before July 30, 2018 and § 1.170A– 
16(d)(3) for contributions made after 
July 30, 2018) relating to the transferred 
property to the successor donee on or 
before the 15th day after the latest of— 
* * * * * 
(d) * * * 
(2) Retention of Form 8283 appraisal 
summary. Every donee shall retain the 
Form 8283 appraisal summary (as 
described in § 1.170A–13(c)(4) for 
contributions made on or before July 30, 
2018 and § 1.170A–16(d)(3) for 
contributions made after July 30, 2018) 
in the donee’s records for so long as it 
may be relevant in the administration of 
any internal revenue law. 
* * * * * 
(e) Charitable deduction property. For 
purposes of this section, the term 
charitable deduction property means 
any property (other than money and 
publicly traded securities to which 
§ 1.170A–13(c)(7)(xi)(B) does not apply) 
contributed after December 31, 1984, 
with respect to which the donee signs 
(or is presented with for signature in 
cases described in § 1.170A– 
13(c)(4)(iv)(C)(2)) a Form 8283 appraisal 
summary (as described in § 1.170A– 
13(c)(4) for contributions made on or 
before July 30, 2018 and § 1.170A– 
16(d)(3) for contributions made after 
July 30, 2018). * * * 
* * * * * 
(f) * * * 
(2) * * * 
(ii) Exception. Notwithstanding 
paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this section, in the 
case of a donee who, on the date of 
receipt of the transferred property, had 
no reason to believe that the 
substantiation requirements of 
§ 1.170A–13(c) or § 1.170A–16(d) apply 
with respect to the property, the donee 
information return is not required to be 
filed until the 60th day after the date on 
which such donee has reason to believe 
that the substantiation requirements of 
§ 1.170A–13(c) or § 1.170A–16(d) apply 
with respect to the property. * * * 
* * * * * 
(h) Effective/applicability dates. The 
first two sentences of paragraph (a)(2)(i), 
paragraphs (c)(4)(i) and (d)(2), and the 
first sentences of paragraphs (e) and 
(f)(2)(ii) apply to contributions made 
after July 30, 2018. 
PART 602—OMB CONTROL NUMBERS 
UNDER THE PAPERWORK 
REDUCTION ACT 
■ Par. 11. The authority citation for part 
602 continues to read as follows: 
Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805. 
■ Par. 12. In § 602.101, paragraph (b) is 
amended by adding in numerical order 
entries for 1.170A–15 through 1.170A– 
18 to read as follows: 
§ 602.101 OMB Control numbers. 
* * * * * 
(b) * * * 
CFR part or section where 
identified and described 
Current OMB 
control No. 
1.170A–15 ............................ 1545–1953 
1.170A–16 ............................ 1545–1953 
1.170A–17 ............................ 1545–1953 
1.170A–18 ............................ 1545–1953 
Kirsten Wielobob, 
Deputy Commissioner for Services and 
Enforcement. 
Approved: April 23, 2018. 
David J. Kautter, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax 
Policy). 
[FR Doc. 2018–15734 Filed 7–27–18; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 4830–01–P 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
Coast Guard 
33 CFR Part 117 
[Docket No. USCG–2018–0730] 
Drawbridge Operation Regulation; Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway, South 
Pasadena, FL 
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 
ACTION: Notice of deviation from 
drawbridge regulation. 
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard has issued a 
temporary deviation from the operating 
schedule that governs the Corey 
Causeway (SR693) Bridge across the 
Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GICW), 
mile 117.7, South Pasadena, FL. The 
deviation is necessary to accommodate 
repairs to the Bridge. This deviation 
allows the bridge open at requested 
times a single leaf and with a 6 hour 
notice for double leaf openings. 
DATES: This deviation is effective from 
7 a.m. on August 1, 2018 to 7 a.m. on 
February 28, 2019. 
ADDRESSES: The docket for this 
deviation, USCG–2018–0730 is available 
at http://www.regulations.gov. Type the 
docket number in the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box 
and click ‘‘SEARCH’’. Click on Open 
Docket Folder on the line associated 
with this deviation. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 
you have questions on this temporary 
deviation, call or email MST1 Deborah 
A. Schneller, U.S. Coast Guard Sector 
Saint Petersburg, Waterways 
Management Division, telephone (813) 
228–2194 x 8133, email 
Deborah.A.Schneller@uscg.mil. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Florida 
Department of Transportation (FDOT) 
via Quinn Construction Inc, has 
requested a temporary deviation from 
the operation that govern the Corey 
Causeway Bridge across the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway, mile 117.7. This 
deviation is necessary to facilitate 
mechanical and electrical repairs, 
painting, roadway and sidewalk grating 
replacement which includes concrete 
removal, spall repair and tender house 
replacement. The bridge is a double-leaf 
bascule bridge and has a vertical 
clearance in the closed to navigation 
position of 23 feet at mean high water. 
The current operating schedule is set 
out in 33 CFR 117.287(f). Under this 
temporary deviation, the bridge will 
operate per the listed schedule but 
single leaf only and with a 6 hour notice 
for double leaf openings. This section of 
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway is 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
 
 
IRS FORM 8283 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT 
DONATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENT1 
 
On December 8, 2017, Cartwright Holdings, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 
company, the owner of record (the “LLC,” or the “donor”), with a mailing address 
______________________________, donated a conservation easement (the “Easement”) 
under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and the 
regulations thereunder (the “Code”), on approximately 38 acres (the “Property”) out of a 
larger parcel of 45+/- contiguous acres owned by the LLC in East Standwich, Open Space 
County, [State].   A resolution dated December 1, 2017, and signed by all of the members 
of the LLC, authorized the LLC to convey a conservation easement to the Town of East 
Standwich, as a gift and for no consideration, on 38 acres of the property owned by the 
LLC in East Standwich. 
 
Pursuant to Chief Counsel Advice No. 201334039 (release date August 23, 2013), 
and Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-14(h), the appraiser has valued all of the donor’s 
contiguous property before the Easement and all of the donor’s contiguous property after 
the Easement.2  Accordingly, for purposes of the qualified appraisal report filed herewith, 
the entire 45+/- acre contiguous parcel owned by the donor is valued both before and after 
the conveyance of the Easement. 
 
The donation of the Easement was made to the Town of East Standwich, a [State] 
municipal corporation (“Grantee”), a government agency having an address at 445 
Blooming Ave., East Standwich, [State] [zip] (“Grantee”).  Grantee has the commitment 
and the resources to enforce the terms of the Easement and is a “qualified organization” 
under Section 170(h) of the Code.    
 
The Easement was recorded on December 8, 2017, at Book _______, Page _____, 
in the Recorder’s Office in Open Space County, [State].  Accordingly, as the appraiser’s 
                                                        
1 This document is not and does not offer legal advice.  Use at your own risk. There is no guarantee 
whatsoever that if you use this language, or something close to it, you will not be audited on this issue, 
and there is no guarantee that if you are audited on this issue your deduction will not be denied. In 
that regard, the Internal Revenue Service has not recommended, ruled on, endorsed, or otherwise, 
formally or informally, liked this language.  Copyright 2019 by Stephen J. Small, Esq., all rights reserved. 
2 Determining exactly what to appraise requires (i) an understanding of the specific conservation easement 
valuation rules (including but not limited to the definition of “contiguous” in your state), and (ii) knowledge 
of what if any property that might be relevant to the appraisal is owned by the donor, members of the donor’s 
family, and “related persons,” as defined by the Treasury Regulations. 
Name(s) shown on tax return                   Identifying number 
        Cartwright Holdings, LLC                            
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certification in the qualified appraisal was signed on April 16, 2018,3 the effective date for 
purposes of determining the value of the Easement under Section 170(h) of the Code is 
December 8, 2017. 
  
The Easement allows public access to and across a designated portion of the 
Property, referred to as the “Trail” in the Easement, for passive pedestrian outdoor 
recreation.  No motorized vehicles are permitted on the Trail.  In addition, the Trail will  
provide for enhanced public access to and the use of the greater trail network that extends 
through East Standwich’s Historic District and ridgelines.  On November 29, 2017, the 
Town of East Standwich, the Grantee, in a public session, unanimously approved the 
acquisition of this Easement, citing the importance of maintaining the Property in a scenic, 
natural, and permitting access along the Trail. 
 
As discussed above and below, by retaining the Property in perpetuity in its current 
open and undeveloped state, the Easement donation allows for public outdoor recreation, 
yields a significant public benefit, protects important scenic open space, important habitat 
and other natural and scientific resources, and is pursuant to clearly delineated government 
policy. 
 
THE PROPERTY AND ITS CONSERVATION VALUES 
 
The Property has the following conservation values, which are covered in greater 
detail in the Easement and in the Baseline Documentation Report (as hereinafter defined): 
(i) protection of land areas for public outdoor recreation and education; (ii) protection of 
significant habitat; (iii) preservation of open space for the scenic enjoyment of the general 
public, which yields a significant public benefit; and (iv) preservation of open space 
pursuant to clearly delineated governmental policy, including historic preservation value, 
which yields a significant public benefit. 
 This Easement protects land areas for public outdoor recreation and education and 
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(A)(i) of the Code: 
As previously noted, the Easement allows public access along a Trail into 
and across the Property.  In addition, the Trail will provide for enhanced 
public access to and the use of the greater trail network that extends through 
East Standwich’s Historic District and ridgelines. 
 
 Protection of the Property will preserve significant relatively natural habitat and 
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) of the Code: 
  
The Property has native vegetation, including forestland comprised of 
Quaking Aspen Groves, Bigtooth Maple and Gambel Oak.  The Property is 
habitat for a wildlife including large game, ground mammals including 
marmot, squirrel, ermine and birds (ruffed grouse).  Mule Deer, Elk, and 
                                                        
3 If more than one appraiser signed the appraisal and appraisal certificate, and accordingly the Form 8283, 
this should be adjusted. 
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Moose frequent the Property year-round.  The Property is adjacent to protected 
open space and open public lands that extend to larger mountainous areas that 
provide quality habitat for wildlife, and protection of the Property will create 
a larger contiguous bloc of habitat.  Preservation of the Property will 
contribute to the ecological viability of native plants and  
wildlife.   
 
Protection of the Property is for the scenic enjoyment of the general public and will 
yield a significant public benefit, and therefore this Easement meets the requirements of 
Section 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(I) of the Code: 
 
The hillside on the Property continues a natural scenic barrier between 
the East Standwich Historic District and the Hummer Hill 
development, contributing to the quiet semi-rural town feel.  The 
Property’s protected hillside can be viewed from the Hummer Hill 
neighborhood, including Cartwright Ave, and Antelope Valley Drive;  
the Property can be viewed from public trails located on the adjacent 
____________ easement and a parcel owned by the Bureau of Land 
Management;  
the Property is within the viewshed of the East Standwich Historic District, 
a nationally recognized Historic District.  The Property is within a 
neighborhood with multiple properties and structures listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places.  Preserving the Property contributes to the feel 
and character of the historic neighborhood, and prevents development that is 
incongruous to the historic aspect;  
 
the Property is visible from public access trails on adjacent land owned by 
the Town of East Standwich and permanently protected by a conservation 
easement, and said public access trails may extend to the Property in the 
future.  The Property is part of a natural and scenic open space buffer between 
the East Standwich Historic District and the Antelope Valley  development. 
 
Protection of the Property is pursuant to clearly delineated federal, state, and local 
governmental conservation policies, and will yield a significant public benefit, and 
therefore this Easement meets the requirements of Section 170(h)(4)(a)(iii)(II) of the Code: 
 
as previously noted, on November 29, 2017,  the Town Board of East 
Standwich  unanimously approved the acquisition of this Easement, and 
cited the  importance of maintaining the Property in a scenic, natural, and 
pedestrian accessible condition, and commending Grantor for making this 
commitment; 
 
as noted above, the Property is within the viewshed of the East Standwich,  
Historic District.  The Property is adjacent to a zoned Historic District, and 
is within a neighborhood with multiple properties and structures listed on 
the National Register of Historic Places.  Preserving the Property 
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contributes to the feel and character of the historic neighborhood, and 
prevents development that is incongruous to the historic aspect; and 
 
the public benefits from preserving open space in the bordering areas of 
historic main street by creating a more substantial buffer zone between new 
residential development and the classic character of the Historic District. In 
addition, the Property is located on a narrow road with large vehicles and 
increased traffic that has resulted in recent years from the construction of 
new homes on Hummer Hill. Preventing residential development will 
mitigate future traffic impacts in an already heavily-travelled area. 
 
THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
 
 The Easement is very restrictive.  It prohibits the division of the Property and 
prohibits residential construction, commercial activities, and industrial activities on the 
Property, thereby extinguishing almost all of the Property’s development rights potentially 
allowable under applicable zoning regulations.  The Easement prohibits any activity on the 
Property that would interfere with the perpetual protection of the Property’s conservation 
values, as those are defined in the Easement and set forth above.  The Easement allows 
public access to and across a designated portion of the Property, referred to as the “Trail” 
in the Easement, for passive pedestrian outdoor recreation, and prohibits the use of 
motorized vehicles on the Trail.  In addition, the Trail will connect to and therefore provide 
for enhanced public access to and  use of the greater trail network that extends through East 
Standwich’s Historic District and surrounding property.   
 
VALUATION AND RELATED MATTERS 
 
 Applying the sales comparison approach, the appraiser concluded that the fair 
market value of the Easement is determined as follows: 
 
a. Fair market value of the entire contiguous property owned by the donor 
before donation of the Easement:  $3,800,000 
 
b. Fair market value of the entire contiguous property owned by the donor after 
donation of the Easement:  $1,700,000 
 
c. Fair market value of the Easement:  $2,100,000 
 
The donor’s basis in the entire contiguous property is $3,374,779.  A copy of the 
qualified appraisal report dated April 16, 2018, that substantiates these values is filed with 
this Form 8283.  A copy of the recorded Easement is included in the qualified appraisal 
report.  As noted above, the Easement was recorded on December 8, 2017 (the effective 
date of the Easement), at Book ______, Page: ______, in the Recorder’s Office in Open 
Space County, [State].  
As described in greater detail in the attached qualified appraisal, neither the donor 
nor related family members or related persons (as defined by the Treasury Regulations) 
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own any other property the value of which is increased by the Easement, so no further 
adjustment is required to the conclusion of value.  The donation of the Easement was not 
made to obtain a permit or other approval from a local or other governing authority, nor 
was the donation required by any contractual obligation. 
 The condition of the Property at the time of the donation was documented and 
established through extensive documentation in a contemporaneous Baseline Documentation 
Report, dated November 25, 2017, and acknowledged by the parties to the donation in 
accordance with Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-14(g)(5).  A copy of the Baseline Documentation 
Report is filed herewith.  A copy of the contemporaneous written acknowledgement of the 
gift of the Easement required by Section 170(f)(8) of the Code is also filed herewith. 
 
 
Attachments 
 
Copies of the following are filed with this Form 8283: 
 
 
Qualified appraisal report dated April 16, 2018, with effective date December 8, 2017 
(date of recording of the Easement) (appraisal report includes copy of 
recorded Easement) 
  
Code Section 170(f)(8) donation acknowledgement letter from Grantee East Standwich 
Municipal Corporation. 
  
Contemporaneous Baseline Documentation Report dated November 25, 2017 
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Appendix G 
 
Limited Amendment Provision 
 
*******This is not legal advice. There is no guarantee whatsoever that if you use this language, 
or something close to it, you will not be audited on this issue, and there is no guarantee that if 
you are audited on this issue your deduction will not be denied. In that regard, the Internal 
Revenue Service has not recommended, ruled on, endorsed, or otherwise, formally or 
informally, liked this language. Given the still unsettled law on the issue of amending 
conservation easements, some practitioners will prefer to use different language or to draft 
conservation easements with no amendment provision whatsoever. Use or modify at your own 
risk. And I really mean it. 
 
   Law Office of Stephen J. Small, Esq., P.C. 
     4/19/19 draft 
 
 
 
 
5.03 Limitations on Amendment 
 
 (a)  Background; Acting in Good Faith  Grantor and Grantee have been informed 
that the Internal Revenue Service has been concerned about the possibility of the parties thereto 
amending conservation easements in the future  in a manner that fails to protect the conservation 
values of the subject property in perpetuity.  Accordingly, Grantor and Grantee have agreed to 
include a suitably restrictive amendment clause in this Easement, to address IRS concerns. 
(b)  In General   Grantor and Grantee recognize that natural conditions, landscapes, 
and technologies change over time (including best practices of open space stewardship 
techniques), and, in an abundance of caution, have determined, in good faith, to articulate herein 
the limited parameters of any permissible amendment hereto.  The intent of Grantor and Grantee 
is that (except in a case involving solely the correction of a drafting mistake, or mapping error, or 
in a situation involving solely adding additional property to the existing encumbered property or 
otherwise eliminating or further restricting previously reserved rights) any such amendment would 
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be executed only in rare instances and unusual circumstances not envisioned by either party at the 
time of this grant, consistent with and true to the perpetual protection of the Conservation Values, 
and consistent with the goals and provisions of [citation to state statute] and the goals and 
provisions of Section 170(h) of the Code.  Further, it may be necessary at some point to amend 
this Easement in response to changes over time specifically to ensure the perpetual protection of 
the Conservation Values.  This Section 5.03 is accordingly carefully limited so as to ensure that 
no amendment shall in any way impair the perpetual protection of the Conservation Values.  
Nothing in this Section 5.03 shall require Grantor or Grantee to agree to any amendment or to 
consult or negotiate regarding any amendment. 
(c) Limitations on Amendment  This Easement shall be amended only upon the 
written agreement of Grantee and Grantor, at Grantee’s sole and absolute discretion, but only if 
such amendment: (i) does not constitute private inurement or give rise to an impermissible private 
benefit under Section 501(c)(3) and other applicable provisions of the Code or the  law of [state], 
based on an appraisal of the economic impact of the proposed amendment by an appraiser selected 
by Grantee; (ii) has a neutral or positive effect on the Conservation Values*, based on an evaluation 
of the effect of the proposed amendment on the Conservation Values by an independent qualified 
person selected by Grantee; (iii) is consistent with the purpose of this  Easement and the perpetual 
protection of the Conservation Values; (iv) does not affect the perpetual nature of this Easement; 
and (v) complies with [state statute] and Section 170(h) of the Code.  Further, no amendment shall 
be permitted that (vi) causes the provisions of this Section 5.03 to be less restrictive, (vii) does not 
comply with the provisions of this Section 5.03, (viii) would involve the removal of any of the 
Property from the Easement, or (ix) would alter or remove the restrictions on assignment of this 
Easement under the provisions of Section ____, or the provisions on extinguishment, percentage 
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interests, or condemnation under Section ____.  In the case of any amendment, all of the 
requirements and restrictions in this Section 5.03 must be satisfied.   
(d) Updated Baseline Documentation Report   In the event Grantor and Grantee 
agree to an amendment pursuant to the provisions of this Section 5.03, an addendum to the Baseline 
Documentation Report shall be prepared and shall be acknowledged by Grantor and Grantee as 
memorializing the condition of the Property as of the date the amendment is delivered for recording 
to the [name of recording office].  Notwithstanding the foregoing, an addendum to the Baseline 
Documentation Report shall not be required for any amendment that involves solely the correction 
of a drafting mistake or mapping error.    
(e) Costs   If Grantor is the party requesting an amendment of this Easement, Grantor 
shall be responsible for all reasonable and customary costs related to Grantee’s evaluation of said 
request and the amendment’s execution, including but not limited to (i) any costs incurred in 
connection with the requirements of paragraphs 5.03(c)(i) and, if applicable, (ii) any agency or 
judicial proceeding referred to in Section 5.03(f), including reasonable attorney’s fees and staff, 
contractor, legal, and consultant costs incurred in connection therewith by Grantee, and (iii) any 
costs associated with the preparation of the updated Baseline Documentation Report prepared 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5.03(d).    
(f) Court Approval Required  A proposed amendment that is agreed to by Grantor 
and Grantee but nevertheless exceeds the scope of the limited discretion granted under this Section 
5.03 is not permitted except by a final non-appealable judgment of a court having jurisdiction in a 
proceeding to which the Attorney General of the [state] was given written notice and an 
opportunity to participate to represent the public interest in ensuring the continued perpetual 
protection of the Conservation Values and the purpose of this Easement.  [italicized language is 
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optional, but if the state AG is knowledgeable about conservation easement, parties may want to 
leave it in.] 
 
 *As noted, the law on amending conservation easements is unsettled.  One of the more 
difficult issues is the so-called “four corners” question:  if you are amending a conservation 
easement, and, for example, there would be prohibited private economic benefit to the landowner 
as a result of the proposed amendment, is it permissible to go “outside” the four corners of the 
easement document (and, in fact, outside the four corners of the property encumbered by the 
easement), and encumber other property (and take no income tax deduction for same) so there is 
a net loss of economic value to the landowner.  Some would argue that this is tantamount to buying 
one’s way out of a perpetual conservation easement.  Others would argue that if there is an 
important net conservation gain, an easement holder should at least be free to consider such a 
transaction. 
 At least as problematic as the “netting” of economic benefit is this:  what if the proposed 
conservation easement amendment has a negative impact on the Conservation Values of the 
Property under easement (capitalized terms used and defined in the easement document)?  
Arguably, under Section 170(h) and the regulations, this is prohibited.  On these facts, the 
Conservation Values are not protected in perpetuity.  Can a loss of Conservation Values on the 
eased property be supportable if there is a significant net conservation gain by virtue of easing or 
gifting other property with important conservation values (that is, outside the four corners)?  The 
answer to that may be “no.”  So it is quite possible that a proposed amendment that would have an 
adverse impact on the Conservation Values of the eased property is stopped dead in its tracks, and 
the landowner cannot “net out” that conservation loss by encumbering or gifting other property 
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(and taking no income tax deduction).  The provision in paragraph 5.03(c)(ii) text accompanying 
the asterisk takes that position, that is, if one starts with a proposed amendment that has an adverse 
impact on the Conservation Values of the eased property, the Easement may not be amended under 
the provisions included above.  However, recognizing that in some rare and unusual cases, a case 
can be made for netting out a loss of Conservation Values by filling the cup with substantially 
more protected conservation values (for which no income tax deduction is taken), the reader is 
referred to paragraph 5.03(f), above. 
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